# Existing serial app cookie-session cutover tests

Run from the repository root:

```sh
python3 tests/web_ui_session/run.py
```

Requires a host C compiler, Python 3, and Node with Fetch/Response/ReadableStream
support (Node 18+). All compiler outputs and rendered scripts are temporary; no
firmware build, generated assets, or device writes are performed.

The runner compiles production `src/web_ui.c` with HTTPD and vendored-asset data
doubles. It reuses the HTTPD stub text from `tests/web_login_ui/run.py`, without
importing/executing that runner. Node executes the actual C-rendered application
and inline asset-failure script, not a separately maintained implementation.

Coverage:

- Resource selection, NULL/invalid input, setter/send failure propagation,
  eight-header ceiling, no-store document/application, unchanged vendor caching,
  nosniff/no-referrer/frame denial, exact inline-loader CSP hash and login fallback.
- Session validation before initial/retried/restored connections; memory-only
  CSRF header and empty ticket/logout bodies; safe-text username/absolute expiry.
- 401 shutdown and navigation once; manual recovery on 403; bounded Retry-After
  display/backoff for capacity; network errors never assert successful logout.
- Confirmed 204 logout, lost response confirmed by session 401, uncertain logout,
  cancellation, explicit recovery, and stale session/ticket/status/logout/WS work.
- Pagehide/bfcache restoration, late response bodies, and superseded session checks.
- Existing writer controls, 1,024-byte binary input chunks, raw binary output,
  observer input gating, and explicit Disconnect pausing reconnect.
- Authentication/ticket response cap 512 bytes, existing status cap 3,072 bytes,
  15-second request deadline, single status request in flight, bounded retry delay,
  and unchanged 5,000-line terminal scrollback.

## Integration and known gaps

This is only the existing application browser portion of Phase 8D.3. It requires
the simultaneous server cookie/Origin/CSRF cutover for every route. The renderer
still relies on its caller to authenticate resources; protected asset failures
must be 401, never a redirect to HTML served as JavaScript. No Basic fallback is
implemented here. No server, auth-store, transport, admin UI, or generated asset
changes are included.

These tests model DOM, timers, fetch cancellation and WebSocket events. They do
not prove real-browser CSP enforcement, script-loading errors, TLS/HTTPD behavior,
actual bfcache policy, cookie expiry, server revocation, or hardware serial byte
integrity. Full firmware build and mandatory M1 browser/target checks remain the
integrator's responsibility. The full build was deliberately not run in this
restricted-write subtask. No target resource reserve is claimed. Browser secret
references are dropped and never persisted/logged, but JavaScript cannot securely
wipe engine-managed strings.