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Implement role-aware HTTPS and SSH authentication

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Commander1024
2026-08-30 01:31:05 +02:00
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README.md
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@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ ESP32-S3 firmware for a secure, multi-transport RS-232 adapter. It operates one
## Development status
Hardware characterization, the serial core, USB CDC-ACM, Wi-Fi, HTTPS/WebSocket, SSH serial transport, and the local display/control interface are implemented. Phase 8A adds the bounded role-based user database and physical UART0 user administration; target-hardware validation and the later HTTPS/SSH authentication cutover are still pending. See the [Roadmap](docs/roadmap.md) for phase status and validation details.
Hardware characterization, the serial core, USB CDC-ACM, Wi-Fi, HTTPS/WebSocket, SSH serial transport, and the local display/control interface are implemented. Phase 8A's bounded role-based user database and UART0 administration are complete. Phase 8B integrates role-aware HTTPS passwords, SSH passwords/public keys, and per-account session revocation; target-hardware validation is pending. See the [Roadmap](docs/roadmap.md) for phase status and validation details.
## Documentation
@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ The firmware provides an interactive UART0 console at `serial-tool>`. Run `help`
The console supports session history, line editing, cursor movement, and hierarchical Tab completion. After an unattended boot, attach an ANSI-capable terminal and press Enter once to enable enhanced editing; this avoids blocking while no terminal is attached.
Serial configuration and Wi-Fi edits remain in RAM until explicitly saved with `serial save` or `wifi save`. During Phase 8A, retrieve the legacy HTTPS/SSH network credential only from physical UART0 with `web credentials show`; manage the new role-based accounts with the `user` command group.
Serial configuration and Wi-Fi edits remain in RAM until explicitly saved with `serial save` or `wifi save`. Manage role-based HTTPS/SSH passwords and SSH public keys with the physical UART0 `user` command group. `web credentials show` now exposes only the legacy migration/recovery credential, not an active Phase 8B network login.
## Security notes
The HTTPS interface uses a device-specific self-signed certificate and HTTP Basic authentication over TLS; there is no plaintext HTTP or TCP serial listener. During Phase 8A, HTTPS and SSH continue to use the legacy shared `admin` credential while role-aware password/public-key authentication remains scheduled for Phase 8B. New user passwords are stored as salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 verifiers, but the legacy network password, HTTPS private key, SSH private key, and Wi-Fi credentials remain recoverable from unencrypted application-owned NVS blobs. Offline password guessing and stale append-oriented flash copies also remain possible. The reserved `nvs_key` partition does not enable encryption. Do not treat this firmware as resistant to physical flash or RAM extraction until the planned hardening work is complete.
The HTTPS interface uses a device-specific self-signed certificate and role-aware HTTP Basic authentication over TLS; there is no plaintext HTTP or TCP serial listener. SSH accepts role-based passwords and authorized Ed25519/ECDSA P-256 public keys. User passwords are stored as salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 verifiers, but the legacy recovery password, HTTPS private key, SSH private key, and Wi-Fi credentials remain recoverable from unencrypted application-owned NVS blobs. Offline password guessing and stale append-oriented flash copies also remain possible. The reserved `nvs_key` partition does not enable encryption. Do not treat this firmware as resistant to physical flash or RAM extraction until the planned hardening work is complete.
## License