Extend browser admin lifecycle actions

Support browser reboot and HTTPS stop through deferred control, plus
exact
`web certificate rotate --force` handoff to the dispatcher. Add typed
request
validation and focused boundary and lifecycle coverage.

docs/agent/current-state.md

@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ This file is working memory. Update it during active work and before handoff; do
 
 ## Development state
 
+- **8D.7 second certificate slice implemented / host-tested / build-verified, target pending:** Exact parsed browser `web certificate rotate --force` is enabled. Typed deferred-request union preserves queue capacity; immutable owner `dispatcher_actions` transfers certificate work after bounded drain/200 ms delay to the existing 12 KiB dispatcher, not the 4 KiB control stack. Pending-input gate survives handoff; token/principal/session revalidation and executing-slot reservation fence stale work/self-detach reuse. WEB uses transactional certificate commit → stop → start, returning on early errors and retaining ownership on failed stop. SSH/UART0 unchanged; other account/network/credential/SSH mutations remain blocked. No new tasks/depth/routes/assets/stacks. Parent final `pio run` PASS **26.32 s, 95,580 B RAM / 1,648,061 B flash**: **0 / +1,036 B** vs first slice, **0 / +1,572 B** vs 8D.6, **+1,048 / +48,088 B** vs 8D.0. Parent final rerun passes boundary (`run.py` including `certificate.c`), lifecycle, policy, transport **25**/tickets **12**, server **11**, cookie/admin, store/serial, UI **17** plus renderer/CSP and diff checks; independent reviewer has no actionable findings. Sanitizers unavailable (missing libasan/libubsan); no hardware validation. Owner mask/local scratch and target stack margins remain unmeasured; host sizeof is not target proof. Drain/acknowledgement is bounded, not execution latency or peer receipt. **User explicitly authorized continuing to stack the next bounded slice, not target sign-off. Next: credential/account, then other owner slices; 8D.7/M2 acceptance and numeric reserves pending.** See `docs/phase8d7_implementation.md` for separate slice histories and certificate force/trust/relogin/USB/SSH/failure checklist. Supersedes the first-slice next-step/continuation-pending instruction below. Production/tests/docs updated and parent build/regressions executed; no device operation, asset regeneration or commit.
+
+- **8D.7 first increment implemented / host-tested / build-verified (2026-09-06), target pending:** User requests starting 8D.7. Scope split enables only browser `reboot` and `web stop` through existing bounded deferred control; WEB revalidates session/principal/token before lifecycle APIs. Adds browser-origin query and pending snapshot flag; HTTPD discards deferred input, latching disposition before receive. Review fixed second-frame-before-poll and cancellation-during-receive races; final reviewer confirms correction. Canonical handler/console/policy, transport **23**/tickets **12**, lifecycle **11**, cookie/admin, store/serial and UI **17** suites pass. Final `pio run` **12.44 s, 95,580 B RAM / 1,647,025 B flash**, **0 / +536 B** vs 8D.6. No tasks/routes/capacity/assets/UI/credential changes or device operations. `docs/phase8d7_implementation.md` holds behavior, restrictions, validation limits/resources and disruptive target checklist. **8D.7/M2 incomplete; next slice remains safe HTTPS identity/certificate handling**, then remaining owner/account restrictions. Obtain target regression or explicit user decision before stacking runtime changes. `web stop` intentionally closes both browser routes; restart via UART0/admin SSH. Prior 8D.6 sign-off stands; internal/DMA minima **6,516 / 1,580 B** and numeric reserves remain follow-ups.
+
 - **8D.6 validated by explicit user sign-off (2026-09-06):** After 60-second boot/full-mix/partial-cleanup telemetry, user confirms all discussed remaining checks and requests wrap-up. Closes 8D.6 including Open admin and toolbar-order fixes, superseding older target-pending notes below. Evidence in `docs/phase8d6_implementation.md`: full mix at **230400 baud**, browser admin + admin SSH, two web serial/SSH/USB broker clients; web24 sole writer. Loaded internal/DMA/PSRAM free **33,900 / 26,144 / 8,087,468 B**, minima **6,516 / 1,580 / 8,063,428 B**, largest **24,576 / 24,576 / 7,995,392 B**; SSH stack minimum-free **16,280 B**. Partial cleanup retains serial, internal/DMA largest returns to **31,744 B**. One SSH handshake failure and rejected input byte remain unattributed. Exact revision/browser/counts/soak duration not separately supplied; no invented detailed execution or reserve approval. Numeric reserves and low lifetime minima remain follow-ups, not blockers reopening signed-off 8D.6. Last toolbar build/tests: **7.60 s, 95,580 B RAM / 1,646,489 B flash**, 17 UI groups/CSP/diff pass. This handoff changes documentation only. **Wait for separately requested 8D.7 — bounded web-shell lifecycle parity and M2 acceptance.** Preserve current restrictions until their safe owner paths are implemented; no settings/M2 completion or new implementation is implied.
 
 - **8D.6 Open admin bug fix (2026-09-06), target retest pending:** Confirmed frontend/backend ticket mismatch: `openAdmin()` required 32 URL-safe characters (serial format), while admin issuance returns 64 lowercase hex characters. Valid POST responses therefore threw before WebSocket construction with the user's exact generic message. Fixed only the admin validator; split the previously shared serial/admin test fixture, assert exact admin query URL and reject malformed/serial-format tickets without closing serial. Correct-format fixture reproduced pre-fix failure; final production-renderer/CSP + 17 UI groups, cookie/admin endpoint integration, transport 19/tickets 12 and lifecycle 11 pass. These are separate frontend and backend harnesses, not real-browser/on-wire integration. CSP loader hash matches the reported `o6St...` policy; rejected UUID/index.js scripts' origin is unverified, not grounds to relax CSP. Final bounded `pio run` passed in **7.96 s**, **95,580 B RAM / 1,646,489 B flash**, unchanged sizes. Diff check passes. No assets, upload, commit, backend/admission changes or target pass. Short bug record in `docs/phase8d6_implementation.md`; parent independent review and user target retest pending.
@@ -77,7 +81,7 @@ Based on checked-in source plus `README.md` and `docs/roadmap.md`:
 
 - Phase 8C hardware validation passed, including route separation, shared command serialization, history/completion, prompts, output backpressure, revocation during queued work, deferred SSH lifecycle/reboot actions, and full concurrent transport operation. At 460800 baud with SSH and WebSocket clients in parallel, substantial packet drops and slow display controls were observed under load, without memory exhaustion; no baud-rate reduction is planned.
 - Current HTTPS UI retains status/serial for both roles and exposes an admin-only selector in 8D.6. The 8D.5 backend's temporary policy still denies all user mutations and unsupported self-affecting lifecycle commands.
-- Browser authentication uses cookie login/logout without Basic fallback. M1 and 8D.5 are signed off; 8D.6 selector target checks remain pending. Lifecycle parity remains separately requested 8D.7 work, not completed M2.
+- Browser authentication uses cookie login/logout without Basic fallback. M1 and 8D.4–8D.6 are signed off. 8D.7 stop/reboot and certificate slices are implemented with target checks pending; the user authorized the next bounded credential/account slice, not M2 acceptance.
 - NVS encryption, secure boot/flash encryption review, production certificate/provisioning policy, and OTA are not implemented. HTTPS login has a bounded global five-verifications/60-second throttle, not comprehensive cross-transport DoS protection.
 
 ## Known inconsistencies