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Extend browser admin lifecycle actions

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Support browser reboot and HTTPS stop through deferred control, plus
exact
`web certificate rotate --force` handoff to the dispatcher. Add typed
request
validation and focused boundary and lifecycle coverage.
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Commander1024
2026-09-07 09:36:38 +02:00
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# Phase 8D.7 — Web-shell lifecycle parity and M2 acceptance
## Current status — second bounded certificate slice
**Second slice implemented / host-tested / build-verified; independent reviewer reports no actionable findings. No hardware validation or 8D.7/M2 acceptance.** The user explicitly authorized continuing to stack the next bounded slice; this is a continuation decision, not target sign-off. Next comes credential/account handling, then other owner-specific slices. Prior 8D.6 sign-off stands; numeric reserves remain open.
The second slice enables only exact parsed browser **`web certificate rotate --force`**. It changes the shared console boundary, WEB owner and canonical web handler (`src/admin_ssh_console.{c,h}`, `src/web_admin_transport.c`, `src/web_console.c`) plus focused tests. No new task, queue depth, route, socket/session/ticket capacity, asset, UI/settings feature or stack size. SSH and UART0 certificate/lifecycle behavior is unchanged. This documentation handoff does not change source/tests or run a build/device operation.
### Second-slice execution contract
- Policy uses the same argument parser as the canonical console: exactly four parsed arguments are required; quoted equivalents are accepted, missing `--force` or extra arguments are not. The browser handler schedules a typed action before certificate side effects, not a command string for later replay.
- The existing request queue uses a command-line/deferred-action union, preserving capacity. The immutable owner's `dispatcher_actions` mask selects certificate rotation for the existing **12 KiB dispatcher**, not the **4 KiB control task**. Other existing actions retain control-task execution; a zero mask preserves SSH behavior.
- Control waits up to ten seconds for application-buffer drain, cancels if it does not drain, then delays **200 ms** and attempts a nonblocking dispatcher handoff. A full queue fails before mutation. Pending input gating persists through queue residence and execution, not just handoff. This bounds the acknowledgement/drain stage, **not browser receipt, dispatcher queue latency, or certificate/NVS/stop/start execution time**; another command or prompt can delay the dispatcher.
- Dispatcher revalidates token/principal/originating session, verifies owner and pending state, reserves the slot as executing and rechecks currentness before the owner callback. WEB revalidates again before mutation. Self-detach cannot reuse the executing slot; it is wiped/released after return. Stale/revoked work fails before side effects; these checks cannot roll back an already executing action.
- WEB calls transactional `web_security_rotate_certificate()` → `web_server_stop()` → `web_server_start()`, outside console locks and without socket IO or handler replay. Generation/key generation/persistence failure leaves the previous committed/live material and skips stop/start. Successful commit installs the new identity before stop; later lifecycle failure does not undo it. A stop error returns immediately without start, retaining HTTPD ownership under existing server rules; auth may already be invalidated and transports detached. Start failure requires UART0/admin-SSH recovery.
- Successful restart closes both browser routes, invalidates old sessions/tickets and removes any web writer lease. Reconnect requires verifying/trusting the new certificate and logging in again. No account password or legacy recovery credential is rotated; USB UART1, UART0 and SSH are not stopped. Completion/error output after self-detach is not guaranteed to reach the browser.
### Second-slice reported verification and resources
The implementer reports PASS for `python3 tests/admin_console_boundary/run.py` (including `certificate.c`), `python3 tests/admin_console_boundary/lifecycle.py`, `python3 tests/admin_ssh_policy/run.py`, `python3 tests/web_admin_transport/run.py --tickets` (**25 transport / 12 ticket groups**), `python3 tests/web_admin_transport/server_lifecycle.py` (**11 groups**), `python3 tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --admin`, `python3 tests/web_session_store/run.py --serial`, and `git diff --check`. Independent review found no actionable findings. Sanitizer validation is unavailable because `libasan`/`libubsan` are missing; no sanitizer pass is claimed. Host harnesses do not prove concurrent RTOS/HTTPD/TLS behavior or target stack margins.
Parent reports final **`pio run` PASS in 26.32 s: 95,580 B linked RAM / 1,648,061 B flash**. Deltas: **0 / +1,036 B** versus first slice, **0 / +1,572 B** versus 8D.6, **+1,048 / +48,088 B** versus 8D.0. Baselines were not rebuilt. The owner mask and local deferred-request/principal scratch are real accounting considerations despite unchanged linked RAM and queue capacity; host `sizeof` is not target layout or stack-margin proof. Control/dispatcher path high-water marks remain unknown. No new tasks, queue depths, routes, assets or stacks; existing HTTPD/SSH stacks and transport capacities remain unchanged.
## First-slice history (2026-09-06)
The following behavior, verification and resource figures record the first slice, not the second-slice final build.
**First increment implemented / host-tested / build-verified; target validation pending. 8D.7 and M2 are not complete.** Prior 8D.6 user sign-off stands. The user requested starting 8D.7; scope review splits the several distinct lifecycle/identity/network/account paths as the plan permits.
This increment enables **browser-admin `reboot` and `web stop`** using the existing deferred-control task. Allowed production files are `src/admin_ssh_console.{c,h}`, `src/web_admin_transport.c`, `src/web_console.c` and `src/system_console.c`; related host tests and documentation are updated. Starting worktree was clean. No new task, queue, socket, route, payload capacity, generated asset, UI/settings feature, upload, erase or commit.
## Implemented behavior
- The canonical `web stop` handler recognizes browser-origin dispatch through `admin_ssh_console_dispatch_is_web()` and queues `ADMIN_CONSOLE_DEFER_WEB_STOP` before any service side effect. UART0 and admin SSH keep their existing synchronous HTTPS-stop path.
- Browser `reboot` now passes parsed command policy and uses the existing canonical remote-reboot deferral. The acknowledgement says console output rather than SSH output. UART0 remains synchronous; SSH reboot remains deferred.
- In the first slice, WEB owner supports SELF_CLOSE, REBOOT and WEB_STOP only. Its control-task callback revalidates originating cookie-session/principal binding and full console identity after the drain delay, outside console locks. It calls lifecycle APIs, not socket IO; HTTPD remains the socket owner. Stop API errors propagate through the existing deferred-result path. Revoked/stale work does not invoke stop/reboot.
- Existing two-entry control queue, ten-second drain wait, 200 ms final delay and five-second output backpressure remain. Drain is a best-effort application-buffer heuristic, **not browser receipt confirmation**, and the drain bound does not establish a hard upper bound on underlying lifecycle API execution. A failed stop may already have invalidated authentication and require UART0/SSH recovery.
- Console snapshots expose the existing deferred-pending flag. While deferral is observed, HTTPD wipes buffered/new input rather than replaying it after cancellation. The incoming frame's discard decision is latched before bounded payload reception, so cancellation during reception cannot reclassify that frame as a new command. A second frame arriving before the periodic poll does not turn deferred trailing input into a session-closing overflow. Normal invalid/oversized/fragmented frames and nondeferred buffer exhaustion still fail closed. Discard events contribute to existing input-backpressure counts.
**Intentional effects:** `web stop` closes both browser-admin and serial WebSockets and invalidates HTTPS sessions. A web writer therefore loses its broker lease; USB, UART0 and SSH are not stopped. Restart HTTPS through UART0/admin SSH using `web start`, then log in again. `reboot` restarts the entire device and loses RAM-only configuration. Normal terminal selection and admin-only `exit` retain their existing serial-isolation behavior.
## Restrictions still in force
These remain deliberately blocked for WEB, before canonical handler side effects:
- All `web` forms except exact parsed `web status`, `web stop` and `web certificate rotate --force`. This still blocks certificate info, start, help/counters, legacy credential display/rotation and full material reset.
- Wi-Fi/mDNS commands except exact status queries.
- User mutations; allowed inspection remains bare `user`, `user status`, `user list`, `user show <name>`.
- SSH stop/disconnect/reset and host-key mutation (host-key info remains allowed).
- Bootstrap/recovery remain UART0-only for all remotes. No one-time self-generated credential workflow was enabled.
The next increment remains **within 8D.7**: credential/account handling, then other owner-specific restrictions in bounded slices. The user explicitly authorized stacking the next bounded slice without target sign-off. Preserve explicit rejection until each path is implemented. Do not proceed to settings or close M2 based on either slice.
## First-slice executed verification
| Command | Result |
|---|---|
| `python3 tests/admin_console_boundary/run.py` | Shared console/SSH, dispatcher-origin, pending snapshot, action bounds, queue/drain/cancellation and existing prompt/currentness regressions pass |
| `python3 tests/admin_console_boundary/lifecycle.py` | New extracted canonical-handler checks pass: browser stop deferred, SSH/UART stop unchanged, remote reboot and scheduling-failure isolation |
| `python3 tests/admin_ssh_policy/run.py` | Actual IDF parser permits only the intended new WEB forms, including quotes; remaining restrictions/SSH policy pass |
| `python3 tests/web_admin_transport/run.py --tickets` | **23 transport / 12 ticket groups pass**, including stale/revoked action rejection, control-task API routing/error propagation, pending input, second frame before poll and cancellation during receive |
| `python3 tests/web_admin_transport/server_lifecycle.py` | **11 groups pass**, including detach timeout, failed stop/retry and optional failure isolation |
| `python3 tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --admin` | Real cookie/store/ticket/adapter/admin endpoint integration passes; lifecycle calls doubled and not invoked by endpoint tests |
| `python3 tests/web_session_store/run.py --serial` | Store/serial binding/isolation/race regressions pass |
| `python3 tests/web_ui_session/run.py` | Renderer/CSP and **17 UI groups pass**; no UI changes |
| `git diff --check` | Pass |
| `pio run` | Final source build **12.44 s**, finite 180-second timeout; **95,580 B linked RAM / 1,647,025 B flash** |
Independent review identified the second-frame-before-poll cancellation bug, then cancellation-during-receive reclassification. Both were fixed with regressions; reviewer confirmed the final correction with no remaining findings in it. An initial console test still expected `web stop` denial; updated it to a still-restricted command. These are not target failures. An earlier pre-review-final build was 1,646,965 B flash; the table above supersedes it.
Tests use deterministic dependencies, not real concurrent RTOS/HTTPD/TLS/device execution. Actual command handlers, console state machine, transport, and server orchestration are exercised in focused harnesses, not one fully linked concurrent end-to-end firmware harness. No sanitizer pass or on-device stop/reboot is claimed.
## First-slice resources
Versus signed-off 8D.6 (95,580 / 1,646,489 B): **0 B RAM / +536 B flash**. Versus recorded 8D.0 (94,532 / 1,599,973 B): **+1,048 / +47,052 B**. Baselines were not rebuilt.
No new static payload/state, module heap/PSRAM allocation, task, stack-size, queue-depth, HTTP handler, TLS/socket, ticket or session capacity. The snapshot adds a boolean describing already-existing console state; callers use local snapshot scratch. WEB lifecycle validation copies one secret-free principal on the existing control stack. Existing control stack is 4 KiB, dispatcher 12 KiB; runtime stack high-water marks for these new call paths remain unmeasured. HTTPD remains 10 KiB, SSH owner 20 KiB, web payload 1,552 B PSRAM-only, six HTTPD sockets and two shared console slots.
Carry forward 8D.6 loaded lifetime minima **6,516 B internal / 1,580 B DMA**, noting overlapping capabilities and conservative regional sums. Numeric reserves remain open; no safe margin or new reserve violation is inferred. Do not reopen the prior sign-off solely for incomplete numeric instrumentation.
## Pending target checklist — both slices
1. User-controlled flash/reload; capture exact revision, 60-second settled `memory`, web/SSH status and available stack telemetry. Check browser login/serial/admin, USB UART1, user/admin SSH and UART0 at the established 230400-baud workload.
2. With browser serial + admin and USB/user/admin SSH active, issue **`web stop` from browser admin**. Expect its best-effort scheduling acknowledgement, then both browser routes close; UART0/USB/SSH remain usable. Confirm no browser writer remains. Restart with UART0/admin SSH `web start`, reauthenticate and reconnect. Repeat five times and compare full-mix/cleanup heap and largest blocks; do not expect boot equivalence when UART/clients remain active.
3. With any RAM-only settings loss understood, issue browser **`reboot`**. Expect best-effort acknowledgement and device restart, then usable UART0 recovery and browser login. Verify no replay of the command on reconnect.
4. Exercise queued/slow output, trailing input and rapid additional input during deferral. No cross-session output, no deferred input replay after cancellation, no unrelated admin-only-close effect on serial. Logout/revoke/disconnect before execution should prevent stale actions. Timing/failure injection not practical on target remains explicitly unexecuted rather than assumed passed.
5. Check remaining forbidden commands still reject without side effects, and SSH/UART0 stop/reboot/certificate behavior remains unchanged. For browser rotation, reject missing force, extra arguments and other certificate forms without identity changes; accept only exact parsed `web certificate rotate --force` (including equivalent quoting).
6. With browser serial/admin plus USB and user/admin SSH active, rotate the certificate. Expect only a best-effort scheduling acknowledgement, both browser routes closing, old session/ticket rejection and loss of a web writer lease. Verify the changed public fingerprint through trusted UART0/admin SSH `web certificate info`, update browser trust deliberately, log in again with unchanged account credentials and reconnect. Confirm USB UART1/SSH traffic and UART0 recovery remain available; do not log private keys, passwords or session/ticket material.
7. Repeat rotation/relogin under the established full mix and compare loaded/cleanup memory and largest blocks. Exercise revocation/disconnect/slot reuse before dispatcher execution, queued prompts/slow output, trailing input and no replay. Collect control/dispatcher/HTTPD stack high-water evidence where instrumentation permits; record unknown margins rather than substituting host sizes.
8. Where safely injectable, verify generation/persistence failure skips stop/start and retains old material; stop/detach failure after commit retains ownership, skips start and may leave auth disabled; successful stop followed by start failure retains the new persisted identity. Recover through UART0/admin SSH by inspecting state and completing stop/start as appropriate, with no duplicate HTTPD start or blind rotation retry. Unavailable target failure injection remains unexecuted.
Do not run these disruptive commands automatically. The user has explicitly authorized stacking the next bounded runtime slice; no hardware checklist item is thereby passed. Final M2 acceptance remains pending and requires lifecycle parity, the full mixed-client/soak/resource checkpoint and explicit target/browser acceptance before settings.