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Harden SSH parsing and add notice tooling

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- Enforce exact service and channel names with bounded failure parsing
- Add hash-pinned offline notice assembly and regression coverage
- Record advisory dispositions, provenance, integration evidence, and
  remaining gates
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Commander1024
2026-09-16 15:06:38 +02:00
parent bea33e1c95
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@@ -21,13 +21,18 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
- Files: root `CMakeLists.txt` (after `project()`), `cmake/security_overrides.cmake`, `tools/security_overrides.py`; tests: `tests/sdk_security_overrides/run.py --build-dir .pio/build/esp32-s3-devkitc-1-n16r8`.
- Build input is the exact-hash original **plus checked-in edits**, not installed source alone. Generated copies replace eight target C sources plus one PUBLIC forced header without modifying SDK/managed components: HTTPS cleanup/private-key release, HTTPD scratch lifetime/null first read, ESP-TLS server-only protocol list, wolfSSH password bounds/payload wiping plus bounded IGNORE/service/string parsing, channel-window overflow rejection and ECC/Ed25519 label/exact-signature framing, DHCP option bounds (CVE-2026-45160), TLS 1.2 EMS error propagation (CVE-2026-50581), and X.509 OID allocation failure (CVE-2026-34874). The mbedTLS entries explicitly select validated nested `mbedtls`/`mbedx509` targets, not the component wrapper. Original notices and compile properties retained; all outputs carry the 2026-09-15 baseline modification notice and wolfSSH outputs add the 2026-09-16 ordering/provenance notice; source/hash/target ambiguity fails configuration. Never hand-edit generated copies or silently repin.
- Xtensa crypto policy: root `CMakeLists.txt` sets `CURVE25519_SMALL`/`ED25519_SMALL` before component parsing; `cmake/wolf_crypto_policy.cmake` PUBLIC-propagates `cmake/wolf_crypto_policy.h` to wolfSSL consumers. PUBLIC `WOLFSSL_VALIDATE_ECC_IMPORT` and `WOLFSSL_ECDHX_SHARED_NOT_ZERO` enable existing P-256 import and X25519 all-zero-result checks. The resolved-settings guard requires these checks and both small implementations, rejects reviewed ECC validator-disabling/hardware-stub configurations, X25519 blinding and unreviewed Curve448/Ed448 enablement. Tests: `tests/wolf_crypto_policy/run.py` (strict actual production flags, real vendor crypto/ASN vectors and independently specified exact source deltas; candidate injection is not production evidence). [Key-validation review](../ssh_key_validation_review.md) records effective flags, caller/API limits and unmeasured validation cost. [Wolf review](../wolf_security_review.md) distinguishes implemented restricted ordering/crypto/parser mitigations from pending target gates and deferred parsers; [IDF review](../idf_security_review.md) records the three backports and remaining findings.
- Parser tests: `tests/wolfssh_parser_contract/run.py`, [scope and exclusions](../../tests/wolfssh_parser_contract/README.md): 3,124 extracted-function cases per each of two stack modes, guard pages/UBSan traps and six rejected guard-removal mutations. Crypto doubles test gating, not arithmetic. PR892/881/880 subsets plus local signature framing only; no PR899 changes; ordering has its separate suite below. Password/dispatch/deferred-source fences preserve prior contracts.
- Latest supplied parent `pio run` PASS: **94,340 B linked RAM / 1,768,701 B flash (−248 B versus 1,768,949 B)**. Final parent **all six suites PASS**: ordering `--interop` (8,028 checks / seven rejected mutations / 12 exact-256-KiB sessions, clean channel close and transport EOF), SDK overrides `--build-dir .pio/build/esp32-s3-devkitc-1-n16r8`, auth (135), protocol, strict crypto and parser (3,124 × two modes). Interop used unsandboxed approval only for local AF_UNIX sockets; no remote network/device operation. Review's misplaced EOF guard is corrected in `SendChannelEof` before lookup/serialization/state mutation; follow-up verification found no scoped blocker. Not target/runtime-reserve evidence.
- Xtensa crypto policy: root `CMakeLists.txt` sets `CURVE25519_SMALL`/`ED25519_SMALL` before component parsing; `cmake/wolf_crypto_policy.cmake` PUBLIC-propagates `cmake/wolf_crypto_policy.h` to wolfSSL consumers. PUBLIC `WOLFSSL_VALIDATE_ECC_IMPORT` and `WOLFSSL_ECDHX_SHARED_NOT_ZERO` enable existing P-256 import and X25519 all-zero-result checks. The resolved-settings guard requires these checks and both small implementations, rejects reviewed ECC validator-disabling/hardware-stub configurations, X25519 blinding and unreviewed Curve448/Ed448 enablement. Tests: `tests/wolf_crypto_policy/run.py` (strict actual production flags, real vendor crypto/ASN vectors and independently specified exact source deltas; candidate injection is not production evidence). [Key-validation review](../ssh_key_validation_review.md) records effective flags, caller/API limits and unmeasured validation cost. [Wolf review](../wolf_security_review.md) distinguishes implemented restricted ordering/crypto/parser mitigations from pending target gates and explicit dormant-profile exclusions; [IDF review](../idf_security_review.md) records three backports, finite six-finding applicability completion and first-page feature exclusions, not exhaustive advisory safety.
- Parser tests: `tests/wolfssh_parser_contract/run.py`, [scope and exclusions](../../tests/wolfssh_parser_contract/README.md): 3,258 base cases per each of two stack modes plus five channel profiles in both modes (2,737/profile/mode for TERM, TERM+SHELL, TERM+SHELL+AGENT; 2,735 for neither/SHELL-only); 11 base + 18 name/length + 2 application-gate mutations rejected. Guard pages/UBSan and crypto doubles test parsing/gating, not arithmetic. [Finite review](../ssh_parser_remaining_review.md) closes exact CHANNEL_FAILURE recipient, ssh-userauth service and nine channel-name dispatch checks; PR899 client skips remain unchanged behind role/ordering gates, forwarding disabled, generic caller trace dispositioned but APIs unpatched. Unknown/trailing behavior is retained; not exhaustive safety. Ordering has its separate suite below.
- Latest supplied parent `pio run` PASS: **94,340 B linked RAM / 1,768,901 B flash (+200 B versus 1,768,701 B)**. Final parent **all seven suites PASS**: ordering `--interop` (8,028 checks / seven rejected mutations / 12 exact-256-KiB sessions, clean channel close and transport EOF), SDK overrides `--build-dir .pio/build/esp32-s3-devkitc-1-n16r8`, auth (135), protocol, strict crypto, notices (30), and parser (3,258 × two modes plus channel profiles; 11 + 18 + 2 rejected mutations). Interop used unsandboxed approval only for local AF_UNIX sockets; no remote network/device operation. Review's misplaced EOF guard is corrected in `SendChannelEof` before lookup/serialization/state mutation; follow-up verification found no scoped blocker. Not target/runtime-reserve evidence.
- Restricted **CVE-2025-14942** ordering correction implemented: `tools/wolfssh_order/delta.json` supplies exact executable edits to `internal.c`, `ssh.c` and `internal.h`; [README](../../tools/wolfssh_order/README.md) records PR793/819/840/855/921 prerequisite disposition, and `provenance.json` pins archived patch hashes/commit IDs. Existing X25519/P-256 KEX only; independent SELF/PEER bits, expected-message/auth gates and exactly-once queued NEWKEYS under WANT_WRITE. **EXT_INFO intentionally disabled, no `server-sig-algs`; `extInfoSent` stays zero.** No full upstream backport or dependency upgrade. CMake propagates the generated ABI header BEFORE PUBLIC plus PUBLIC forced include with stale-header rejection; joined `-include/path` flags preserve ordering/crypto guards through PlatformIO sorting/deduplication.
- Ordering tests: [tests/wolfssh_order_contract](../../tests/wolfssh_order_contract/README.md), full generated C/real wolfCrypt, **8,028 checks / seven rejected mutations**; `pio_adapter.py` validates installed PlatformIO/SCons flags with a real Xtensa consumer. Initial interop failed a harness close race despite early PASS output; fixed harness awaits peer close and transport EOF and independently reaps the server via fd-passing proxy. Final agent `--interop --interop-repeat 3`: **36/36 sessions**, exact **256 KiB** each, **two or ten** key exchanges and clean client/server exits. [Remaining gates](../wolf_security_review.md#restricted-ordering-correction-and-remaining-gates): target cleanup during rekey, no-EXT_INFO client compatibility, resource/timing and whole-phase validation; no device operation or phase sign-off.
- Policy/evidence/limits: [library review](../security_library_review.md), [Phase 9C](../security_hardening.md#9c-library-cleanup-and-protocol-policy). Source-contract tests must locate and verify actual generated compilation inputs, not assume original vendor paths.
## Offline release notice assembly
- [Procedure and release gates](../release_packaging.md), [tool](../../tools/release_notices.py), catalog `third_party/release-notices/inputs.json`, scope/TLSF provenance under `third_party/release-notices/`; tests: `tests/release_notices/run.py` (parent 30 PASS). 62 explicit hash/size-pinned inputs; no recursive collection, fetch, build, asset regeneration or device access; output must be fresh and outside input roots.
- Supplied independent review: no actionable scoped parser/bundle defects; two actual 62-input bundles deterministic. Historical actual bundle: 64 files / 541,147 bytes, not remeasured here. The catalog does not pin these overview/review documents. Assembly is implemented; recipient delivery, corresponding source, legal/radio-blob basis, icon provenance and whole-phase target gates remain open. Do not equate a notice manifest with a source archive, complete SBOM or release clearance.
## Secure randomness
**Responsibility:** provide the sole project-owned, mutex-serialized application DRBG, seeded before Wi-Fi/radio use.