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Migrate to IDF 5.5.3 candidate

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Pin PlatformIO packages and toolchains, rebase protected SDK
overrides, and add WebSocket receive regression coverage. Document
isolated candidate validation, archive provenance, and remaining gates.
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Commander1024
2026-09-18 14:23:13 +02:00
parent cdc4d4a8df
commit 797d2681ac
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README.md
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@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ ESP32-S3 firmware for a secure, multi-transport RS-232 adapter. It operates one
## Development status
Hardware characterization, serial/USB/Wi-Fi/HTTPS/SSH and local display/control are implemented and hardware-validated. **Phase 8 role-based users and administration is complete:** 8A–8C were target-hardware validated and the user explicitly signed off tested firmware at **8D.22 (2026-09-13)**. See the [roadmap](docs/roadmap.md#phase-8--role-based-users-and-administrative-access--complete) and [acceptance evidence](docs/web_administration_acceptance.md). Very low internal/DMA lifetime minima remain a nonblocking headroom follow-up, not an approved reserve. **Phase 9 security hardening is in progress**: 9A crash/debug policy, 9B SSH admission/credential handling and 9C library cleanup/protocol policy have passed host/build checks. **9D maintenance and lifecycle is in progress:** an operator runbook, finite SSH parser/caller and IDF applicability reviews, and offline notice assembly tooling are available. Scoped corrections have parent host/build evidence; the [finite dependency search](docs/dependency_advisory_coverage.md) is complete (all 22 IDF advisory entries across three pages plus named managed/browser channels), but fresh findings, explicit coverage gaps, release delivery/source/legal questions and whole-phase target gates remain open. **The PMF-capable SoftAP security blocker is not fixed**: the [update plan](docs/wifi_security_update_plan.md) requires a coherent vendor framework/source/header/binary ABI bundle and compatible tooling, not PMF/WPA3 weakening; **Phase 9 is not complete or production-ready**. The user will validate Phase 9 as a whole; no 9D device validation or license clearance is claimed. See [security hardening](docs/security_hardening.md) for scope, operational profiles, and validation gates.
Hardware characterization, serial/USB/Wi-Fi/HTTPS/SSH and local display/control are implemented and hardware-validated. **Phase 8 role-based users and administration is complete:** 8A–8C were target-hardware validated and the user explicitly signed off tested firmware at **8D.22 (2026-09-13)**. See the [roadmap](docs/roadmap.md#phase-8--role-based-users-and-administrative-access--complete) and [acceptance evidence](docs/web_administration_acceptance.md). Very low internal/DMA lifetime minima remain a nonblocking headroom follow-up, not an approved reserve. **Phase 9 security hardening is in progress**: 9A crash/debug policy, 9B SSH admission/credential handling and 9C library cleanup/protocol policy have passed host/build checks. **9D maintenance and lifecycle is in progress:** an operator runbook, finite SSH parser/caller and IDF applicability reviews, and offline notice assembly tooling are available. Scoped corrections have parent host/build evidence; the [finite dependency search](docs/dependency_advisory_coverage.md) is complete (all 22 IDF advisory entries across three pages plus named managed/browser channels), but fresh findings, explicit coverage gaps, release delivery/source/legal questions and whole-phase target gates remain open. **The fix-bearing vendor Wi-Fi bundle is integrated in the validated IDF 5.5.3 candidate, not radio-hardware closure**: the [update plan](docs/wifi_security_update_plan.md) retains target gates and unchanged PMF/WPA3; **Phase 9 is not complete or production-ready**. The user will validate Phase 9 as a whole; no 9D device validation or license clearance is claimed. See [security hardening](docs/security_hardening.md) for scope, operational profiles, and validation gates.
Latest supplied parent integration: `pio run` **PASS**, **94,340 B linked RAM / 1,768,901 B flash** (+200 B flash); **seven focused suites PASS**. See [exact counts and evidence limits](docs/security_hardening.md#ordering-hostbuild-evidence--2026-09-16). Linked size and host passes are not target headroom or release acceptance.
Latest supplied parent integration: **fresh isolated IDF 5.5.3 application build PASS**, **95,552 B linked RAM / 1,749,493 B flash** (**+1,212 B RAM / −19,408 B flash** versus historical 94,340 / 1,768,901 B). Explicit-candidate Phase 9 validation with interop and web performance **PASS 24/24**. Default root `pio run` timed out at **200 seconds during installation, before compilation**—not a normal root build PASS. See [candidate integration](docs/idf_candidate_integration.md) and [exact command/snapshot evidence](docs/phase9_validation.md#current-candidate-execution--2026-09-18). Linked size and host passes are not target headroom or release acceptance.
### Browser administration
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ pio device monitor -b 115200
pio run
```
The build requires the reviewed ESP-IDF 5.5.0 and pinned component sources. It generates audited security corrections under `.pio/build/` without changing the installed SDK/managed components; changed source hashes fail configuration rather than silently dropping a fix. See the [library review and upgrade contract](docs/security_library_review.md). Do not edit generated corrections or update hashes without reviewing the new source.
The root configuration pins PlatformIO espressif32 **6.13.0**, ESP-IDF **5.5.3** (`framework-espidf@3.50503.0`), and Xtensa/RISC-V toolchains **14.2.0+20251107**, with pinned component sources. Exact version pins do not establish a complete immutable build closure. Nine C overrides plus one forced header retain the reviewed corrections, including five signed WS receive-size checks; see the [semantic rebase review](docs/idf_553_rebase_review.md). It generates audited security corrections under `.pio/build/` without changing the installed SDK/managed components; changed source hashes fail configuration rather than silently dropping a fix. See the [library review and upgrade contract](docs/security_library_review.md). Do not edit generated corrections or update hashes without reviewing the new source.
## Upload and monitor