Complete Phase 12 dual-stack networking

Add IPv6-aware Wi-Fi state, HTTPS/SSH listeners, mDNS service
reconciliation, and browser Wi-Fi administration.

Include a guarded build-local fix for mDNS 1.12.0 membership handling,
focused regression suites, and Phase 12 acceptance documentation.

docs/agent/architecture.md

@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ TinyUSB callbacks enqueue/copy data and state; the transport task owns broker li
 
 ### HTTPS, WebSocket, and web serial
 
-`web_server` owns HTTPS on port 443 with a persisted self-signed P-256 identity. `web_serial_transport` mediates two fixed WebSocket slots through the broker; HTTPD owns socket sends/close, the transport task owns broker IO. Four outstanding serial tickets, four cookie sessions, one optional admin WebSocket and six total HTTPD sockets are distinct limits; LRU is disabled. Current handler capacity is 40. Base HTTPS can serve authenticated non-WebSocket routes if optional serial/admin transport initialization fails.
+`web_server` owns HTTPS on port 443 with a persisted self-signed P-256 identity and IDF's dual-stack listener. Shared Host/Origin parsing accepts canonical bracketed IPv6 literals (no interface zones) while preserving same-origin/session binding; DNS discovery does not confer certificate trust. `web_serial_transport` mediates two fixed WebSocket slots through the broker; HTTPD owns socket sends/close, the transport task owns broker IO. Four outstanding serial tickets, four cookie sessions, one optional admin WebSocket and six total HTTPD sockets are distinct limits; LRU is disabled. Current handler capacity is 40. Base HTTPS can serve authenticated non-WebSocket routes if optional serial/admin transport initialization fails.
 
 Cookie login/logout replaces Basic/cache. Digest-only records carry copied principals, CSRF state, absolute expiry and nonreused originating-session IDs. Strict same-origin/CSRF mutations and session/principal checks gate admission; logout invalidates its session before transport cleanup, account mutations invalidate only the affected account, and ongoing currentness is authoritative. Authentication initialization failure gates HTTPS; failed start/accepted stop wipes records. RNG/SHA/database calls run outside short spinlocks with post-call epoch/identity revalidation. [Authentication contract](../web_administration.md#authentication-and-admission).
 
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ The server transition and identity reservations exclude competing lifecycle work
 
 Typed SSH settings use the existing ID dispatcher and original-login result slot, never HTTPD wolfSSH calls or owner waits. Conditional lifecycle/session controls compare a saturated service generation and exact nonreused session ID under canonical locks. `ssh_transport_replace_identity` reserves service then identity before stop, retaining the command mutex across stop → commit → conditional restart. Failed stop skips mutation/start; failed persistence may follow disconnection; committed identity is never rolled back after restart failure. Only the SSH owner frees context after all slots retire, and start rejects orphan handles. Direct security/CLI/deferred SSH callers share task-bound identity reservations; crypto/NVS run outside security locks. HTTPS remains available, so no self-cutting HTTP ACK gate is needed. [SSH contracts](../web_administration.md#ssh).
 
-`ssh_transport` uses wolfSSH on port 22 with two fixed session/handshake slots. Initialization calls `wolfSSH_Init()` in the caller before task creation; after that, one owner task pinned to core 1 exclusively owns runtime contexts/sessions and wolfSSH calls. It enforces bounded handshakes, authentication attempts, receive work, and session buffers.
+`ssh_transport` uses wolfSSH on port 22 with one explicitly dual-stack IPv6 wildcard listener and two fixed session/handshake slots. Peer formatting preserves IPv6 interface scope; IPv4 shares the listener, not a second socket. Initialization calls `wolfSSH_Init()` in the caller before task creation; after that, one owner task pinned to core 1 exclusively owns runtime contexts/sessions and wolfSSH calls. It enforces bounded handshakes, authentication attempts, receive work, and session buffers.
 
 Authentication uses user-database passwords or stored Ed25519/ECDSA-P256 public keys. Public-key lookup authorizes a username/key pair, while wolfSSH verifies signed proof of possession. SSH host identity is a separate persisted P-256 key managed by `ssh_security`.
 
@@ -185,13 +185,15 @@ For SSH, standard output/error is redirected to the invoking session's bounded o
 
 Admin SSH `exit`, remote reboot, SSH stop/disconnect, and host-key rotate/reset use deferred control. The control task waits up to ten seconds for command state plus administration and transport application buffers to clear, then adds a short delay; this is a bounded best-effort heuristic, not peer-delivery confirmation. UART0 invokes these actions synchronously. User mutations and their revocations are not part of this mechanism. UART0 linenoise and the SSH editor consume the same manually maintained completion matcher and candidate formatter, so the two administration routes cannot drift in offered or displayed ambiguous completions; the hints can still drift from command registration and are not an authorization list.
 
-Browser stop/reboot uses this same owner-adapter control path. Exact forced certificate rotation instead uses the typed queue union and immutable `dispatcher_actions` mask to hand off after drain/200 ms to the existing 12 KiB dispatcher, not the 4 KiB control stack. Pending input is discarded through execution and an executing slot remains reserved across self-detach. Canonical shared service/identity replacement preserves commit/stop/start failure semantics. Parsed other-account interactive add/password and forced role/delete are allowed, but browser self/generated/key/recovery and restricted network/SSH shell actions are not; typed Settings has separate permissions. Post-prompt currentness is operation admission, not an atomic session-liveness/NVS guarantee. [Browser policy and recovery](../web_administration.md#browser-shell-policy).
+Browser stop/reboot uses this same owner-adapter control path. Exact forced certificate rotation instead uses the typed queue union and immutable `dispatcher_actions` mask to hand off after drain/200 ms to the existing 12 KiB dispatcher, not the 4 KiB control stack. Pending input is discarded through execution and an executing slot remains reserved across self-detach. Canonical shared service/identity replacement preserves commit/stop/start failure semantics. Parsed other-account interactive add/password and forced role/delete are allowed. Canonical Wi-Fi commands are also allowed, including hidden secret prompts and disruptive changes; these use the ordinary owner queue and may cut off the browser before output arrives, without a deferred acknowledgement guarantee. Browser self/generated/key/recovery, mDNS mutations and restricted SSH shell actions remain denied; typed Settings has separate permissions. Post-prompt currentness is operation admission, not an atomic session-liveness/NVS guarantee. [Browser policy and recovery](../web_administration.md#browser-shell-policy).
 
 ## Wi-Fi and persistence
 
 `wifi_config` owns a fixed-width versioned NVS schema with four prioritized station profiles and AP policy `off`, `fallback`, or `always`. Missing configuration generates per-device defaults including a random AP password. Invalid stored data is generally left untouched while RAM defaults are used.
 
-`wifi_manager` is a permanent task with one bounded command/event queue. ESP-IDF callbacks only copy compact events into the queue. The task owns association, DHCP deadlines, profile failover, AP policy, retries/backoff, next-profile requests, and the mDNS announcement lifecycle. `mdns_service` initializes the responder at most once after a validated STA `GOT_IP`; the managed component's own event handlers withdraw and restore the STA announcement across transient connectivity changes, while the project tracks whether announcement is currently expected. Initialization failure is latched rather than retried because partial upstream low-memory initialization is not safely recoverable; mDNS failure is nonfatal. It also reconciles against authoritative driver/netif state so dropped events do not permanently wedge policy. ESP-IDF Wi-Fi storage is RAM-only; the application blob is authoritative, and edits require explicit save. Edits to disabled station profiles are staged in RAM without restarting the radio; enabling/disabling a profile or changing enabled station/AP policy restarts it asynchronously. Start/stop—including local controls—intentionally update the RAM `enabled_at_boot` field. Working-configuration copies contain PSKs and must be securely wiped; routine status and the local UI use secret-free snapshots.
+`wifi_manager` is a permanent task with one bounded command/event queue. ESP-IDF callbacks only copy compact events into the queue. The task owns association, DHCP/address deadlines, profile failover, AP policy, retries/backoff, next-profile requests, and the mDNS announcement lifecycle. One-second reconciliation reads authoritative driver/netif state in TCP/IP context, enables STA SLAAC and creates link-local addresses without restarting DAD. IPv4 or preferred IPv6 (including link-local-only) establishes ONLINE and may retire the fallback AP; ONLINE does not imply a default route or Internet access. DHCPv4 option 12 carries the full `sak-<suffix>` from permanent bounded hostname storage installed before connection; rename updates subsequent exchanges without restarting DHCP. The bounded snapshot retains up to three preferred numeric IPv6 addresses from the same observation as its availability flags; compile-time capacity checks reject larger lwIP address-slot settings. `wifi status` formats these addresses and their scope. Web Network settings encode up to three fixed-width strings from the same snapshot and display link-local/ULA/GUA groups within a 2304-byte JSON bound; the overview/OLED retains availability-only reporting.
+
+`mdns_service` initializes the responder at most once after either-family STA readiness. Initialization failure is latched rather than retried because partial upstream low-memory initialization is not safely recoverable; mDNS failure is nonfatal. HTTPS/SSH owners publish availability under a short portMUX, and only the Wi-Fi owner reconciles the two STA-only DNS-SD records and address families, including while offline. Component calls run outside project service mutexes. Missing-family disable is reasserted every pass and present-family enable/reprobe every 30 seconds because upstream actions can silently drop and expose no readiness acknowledgement. This is eventual convergence, not instantaneous withdrawal: a transient stale/zero-A window can occur after DHCP loss, and AAAA follows upstream valid-address semantics including deprecated addresses. A version/hash-guarded build-local mDNS 1.12.0 source overlay balances per-family multicast membership and join cleanup; managed source stays immutable. Tests and upgrade/removal contract: `tests/mdns_membership/README.md`. ESP-IDF Wi-Fi storage is RAM-only; the application blob is authoritative, and edits require explicit save. Edits to disabled station profiles are staged in RAM without restarting the radio; enabling/disabling a profile or changing enabled station/AP policy restarts it asynchronously. Start/stop—including local controls—intentionally update the RAM `enabled_at_boot` field. Working-configuration copies contain PSKs and must be securely wiped; routine status and the local UI use secret-free snapshots.
 
 Persistent namespaces/blobs include:
 

docs/agent/code-map.md

@@ -158,7 +158,9 @@ Shared UI regression: `tests/web_ui_session/run.py` and its domain `.cjs` fixtur
 - Files: `src/wifi_config.{h,c}`, `src/wifi_manager.{h,c}`, `src/wifi_console.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_config.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_service.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_console.{h,c}`, `src/network_console.{h,c}`
 - Interfaces: config defaults/validate/load/save; manager init/start/stop/apply/reconnect/next-profile/snapshot
 - Dependencies: secure random for default AP password, NVS, ESP-NETIF/Wi-Fi/events, Espressif mDNS, lwIP diagnostics
-- Lifecycle: permanent manager task and bounded queue; callbacks enqueue compact events only.
+- Lifecycle: permanent manager task and bounded queue; callbacks enqueue compact events only. One-second owner reconciliation handles DHCP hostname updates, preferred IPv4/IPv6 readiness, missed events and mDNS records/families. `ONLINE` includes preferred link-local-only IPv6 and may retire fallback AP without IPv4; snapshots retain IPv6 availability flags plus up to three preferred numeric addresses from the same observation. `wifi status` and web Network settings render those addresses; overview/OLED remain availability-only. The typed runtime adds `ipv6_addresses` (up to three fixed-width strings); backend and UI share a 2304-byte response bound. Regression coverage includes byte order, address clearing and the compile-time slot-capacity bound.
+- Phase 12: `mdns_service_set_https_available()` / `mdns_service_set_ssh_available()` publish under a short portMUX; only the Wi-Fi owner calls component APIs. STA DNS-SD has two records; family repair re-probes available families every 30 seconds because upstream action admission has no reliable acknowledgement. AAAA uses valid (including deprecated) upstream addresses. DHCPv4 uses full `sak-<suffix>` before connection and in later exchanges after rename; permanent raw-netif hostname storage is updated only in TCP/IP context.
+- Focused tests: `tests/wifi_phase12`, `tests/mdns_phase12`, `tests/ssh_phase12`, `tests/mdns_membership`; HTTPS IPv6 authority cases live in `tests/web_auth_parse` and cookie suites. Build-local `cmake/mdns_membership.*` replaces only reviewed mDNS 1.12.0 networking source to balance multicast membership; version/hash drift fails configuration. No managed source is edited.
 - Constraint: application NVS is authoritative (`WIFI_STORAGE_RAM`); working edits are not persisted until save. Start/stop, including local controls, intentionally update the RAM `enabled_at_boot` field. Working-config copies contain PSKs and must be tightly scoped and wiped; routine status/local UI must use secret-free snapshots.
 
 ## Local display and controls

docs/agent/current-state.md

@@ -2,6 +2,37 @@
 
 Working memory, not an implementation timeline. Source is authoritative; begin with [code map](code-map.md), [architecture](architecture.md) and [decisions](design-decisions.md).
 
+## Phase 12 COMPLETE — explicit user validation
+
+- User states: “I just validated Phase 12 successfully.” Record acceptance, not a pending phase. Canonical device evidence and reusable regression guidance: [Phase 12](../roadmap.md#phase-12--advanced-network-integration). No unreported DHCP capture, DNS-zone update, exhaustive address/service transition, fault/soak or byte-integrity pass is implied.
+- User validated IPv6 ping/HTTPS and Avahi AAAA; Fedora authselect dual-family mDNS resolved the normal hostname lookup issue. Fresh-boot and full-mix captures show healthy reported service lifecycle. At 230400 baud 8N1 RTS/CTS: two SSH sessions with IPv6 ULA peers (user observer/admin console), two serial WebSockets (writer/observer), active browser admin, USB observer; four broker clients, one writer, zero pending/event counts at capture.
+- Memory table preserved in roadmap. Fresh internal8/DMA/PSRAM free: 65,880 / 58,124 / 8,196,732 B. Full-mix free: 35,408 / 27,652 / 8,111,952 B; lifetime minima: 8,528 / 772 / 8,072,612 B; largest blocks: 22,528 / 22,528 / 7,995,392 B. Capability pools overlap; minima are conservative per-region lifetime sums, not simultaneous reserves. DMA772 remains a watch item, not proof of OOM or an acceptance blocker. SSH stack20,480B minimum-free18,476→16,284B.
+- SSH two successful handshakes, no auth/handshake/timeouts/I/O failures; RX68 accepted65 rejected3, TX161,209B, broker revocations2. Web serial RX27B accepted, TX318,230B across782 frames; send/queue/protocol failures0. Browser admin RX106/TX3,721B with no reported send/queue failures. Do not reinterpret nonzero rejected bytes/writer denials as proven transport loss or claim zero UART/observer drops without their counters.
+- Boot TLS -0x004C receive errors and auth-failure counts have no demonstrated cause. Snapshots are non-atomic and counts are not an aligned interval. This handoff changes documentation only; no new build/test/upload/erase/device operation/commit; hardware directory untouched. Prior latest build94,444B RAM/1,854,485B flash and UI174+CSP remain historical validation.
+
+## Follow-up — IPv6 addresses in web Network settings
+
+- User confirms direct IPv6 ping/HTTPS and Avahi AAAA lookup for `sak-1024.local` succeed. Client NSS uses `mdns4_minimal [NOTFOUND=return]`; systemd-resolved explicit mDNS reports no eligible networks. This supports a client resolver integration issue, not failed firmware AAAA publication on the tested Avahi path. The user subsequently enabled dual-family mDNS through Fedora authselect and confirmed success; see acceptance above.
+- Added bounded runtime `ipv6_addresses` (<=3 fixed-width lowercase eight-hextet strings) to existing admin Network snapshot, grouped as link-local/ULA/GUA in Settings. Overview/OLED remain flags-only. No new netif call, allocation, task or snapshot storage. Backend/client JSON bound 2048→2304 (+256B response stack); maximum-escaped fixture with all three addresses is 2067B. Strict UI validation/text-only output and existing session fences preserved; generated assets untouched.
+- `pio run` PASS **94,444 B linked RAM / 1,854,485 B flash**, +0/+800 versus prior CLI-address build. Network cookie/owner regressions and UI174+CSP PASS. Initial cookie fixture had an obsolete 2048B output buffer; fixed to use the production bound and rerun PASS. Empty/full address lists, byte order, bad counts, malformed/injected UI entries and clearing covered. No upload or hardware operations; hardware directory untouched.
+
+## Follow-up — browser Wi-Fi controls and IPv6 diagnosis
+
+- User requests browser Admin shell Wi-Fi parity with SSH/typed settings. Removed only the Wi-Fi status-only policy gate; canonical settings/lifecycle/persistence/diagnostics and hidden secret prompts now work. mDNS remains status-only and unrelated restrictions stay intact. Disruptive commands may cut off the response; owner admission is not peer acknowledgement or cancellation on disconnect.
+- User now confirms the CLI displays an IPv6 address, direct IPv6 ping works, and the web interface opens using IPv6. This validates those reported unicast operations, not all Phase 12 checks. `ping sak-1024.local -6` fails on the client with “Die Adressfamilie für Hostnamen wird nicht unterstützt.” That earlier client failure was subsequently resolved through Fedora authselect dual-family mDNS; Avahi AAAA lookup and normal IPv6 hostname access succeeded. Do not reopen this as an established firmware discovery defect.
+- Added three bounded preferred numeric addresses to manager snapshot, copied/cleared with the same TCP/IP observation, and labelled output in `wifi status`. Web/OLED schema unchanged. +48 bytes per snapshot/settings copy and shared static storage; compile rejects >3 lwIP slots. No new allocation/task/socket. Latest `pio run` PASS **94,444 B RAM / 1,853,685 B flash** (+48/+660 vs initial Phase12). No upload/device operations.
+- PASS: browser policy, new actual Wi-Fi secret-handler/browser-prompt fixture (cancellation/revocation/wiping/history/role guards), account/lifecycle boundary, preferred-address lifecycle/byte-order/rendering/capacity, Network settings, cookie Network and UI171+CSP, diff check. Broader `admin_console_boundary/run.py` passes console/certificate then fails existing SSH-adapter compilation due missing `web_firmware_update_reserve_reboot` fake; left unrelated fixture unchanged. ASan/UBSan unavailable at host link. Hardware directory untouched.
+
+## Phase 12 implementation history — superseded by acceptance above
+
+- User authorized the agreed DHCPv4 hostname / dual-stack SLAAC / STA DNS-SD baseline. Another agent owns `hardware/`; this work did not read or edit it. Do not commit or revert that agent's work. No upload, erase or device operation performed.
+- Wi-Fi owner applies full `sak-<suffix>` before DHCP and on rename for future exchanges, using permanent TCP/IP-owned storage to preserve the existing 59-byte hostname maximum beyond IDF's setter limit. Preferred IPv6 link-local/ULA/GUA can establish ONLINE without IPv4; link-local-only can retire fallback AP. One-second reconciliation handles stale/missed events. Web/OLED expose availability; the follow-up above adds actual preferred addresses to CLI output.
+- HTTPS default listener verified dual-stack; shared authority parser now strictly canonicalizes bracketed IPv6 without zone IDs. SSH uses one explicitly dual-stack listener with scope-safe peers, preserving two slots. Service owners publish availability through short portMUX sections; Wi-Fi owner reconciles two DNS-SD records and address families. No new task/socket/broker slot/serial payload buffer, dependency version, partition or generated asset change.
+- mDNS action API can silently drop queued work; missing families disable each pass, available families repair/re-probe every 30 seconds. Transient stale/zero A window remains until processed; AAAA follows valid-address semantics including deprecated addresses. Upstream calls can block, so polling is not a hard deadline. The later user acceptance establishes the reported device/AAAA behavior, not exhaustive multicast fault/transition testing.
+- New **narrow** `cmake/mdns_membership.*` overlay fixes verified mDNS 1.12.0 per-family multicast reference imbalance and failed-PCB join cleanup. Only a build-local source copy is changed; version/source hash guarded, managed source immutable. This is not the abandoned Phase 9 patch set. Membership/CMake tests include negative controls and repeated transitions.
+- Final `pio run` PASS: **94,396 B RAM / 1,853,025 B flash** (+176 / +5,380 versus recorded Phase 10); not runtime headroom. Local saved sdkconfig mDNS capacity changed to 2; durable defaults pin IPv4/IPv6 and two services. Initial bool-atomic target failure fixed with portMUX; final target build includes overlay. Existing SDK Kconfig notes remain.
+- Host suites PASS: Wi-Fi, mDNS, membership, SSH dual-stack and existing management/runtime/security, auth parser689 (host + actual lwIP), cookie variants, Network settings (after updated netif fakes), UI171+CSP, HTTPS lifecycle45+status8+identity, firmware88+SDKcontract, broker diagnostics and session-store/serial. No network packet, hardware, fault-injection or new high-speed serial pass is implied. Canonical contracts, limits and device checklist: [Phase 12](../roadmap.md#phase-12--advanced-network-integration).
+
 ## Phase 10 COMPLETE — explicit user acceptance, 2026-09-18
 
 - User confirmed after firmware upload implementation and the concise-UI fix: “That works perfectly. And the usual operation is also verified.” Acceptance establishes that upload works and normal operation is verified. Do not infer specific fault-injection, NVS before/after comparisons, power-loss or recovery passes. The roadmap's compact regression guidance is reusable, not an acceptance blocker.
@@ -11,7 +42,7 @@ Working memory, not an implementation timeline. Source is authoritative; begin w
 - 4KiB internal buffer + transient2048B-stack reboot owner allocated before erase; 10s stall/120s receive-loop budget, not totalflashdeadline. HTTPD synchronously blocks other web work during upload; networkserial maystall/drop, reboot disruptsall. No task/request/socket lifetime capture after handler. Service/identity reservation and atomic ordinary-reboot gate cover UI/UART0/SSH/browser/localbutton paths. Failed response after bootselect schedules noautomaticreset; selected latch rejects further uploads409, manual reboot available. Successful response schedules500ms reboot retaining reservations.
 - Review fixed two actualSDK5.5.0 edge cases: failed esp_ota_begin maypublishlivehandle beforeeraseerror (abortthat handle); rawContentLength64 canwrapHTTPDsize_t32 (overflow-safe actualslotbound/strictdecimal/equality check beforebody/erase). End consumes handle evenerror. SDKvalidation followed by exactparsedimage length includingSHA; basic header requiresS3appdescriptor/hash. Unrelated old/privateSDK code unpatched.
 - Parent final pio PASS **94,220 B RAM / 1,847,645 B flash**, +24RAM/+19,080flash vsPhase9, not runtimeheadroom. Parent newbackend88cases+actualSDKbeginfailurecontract, UI169groups+CSP, serverlifecycle44, admin25, consolelifecycle, SSHruntime, cookielifecyclePASS. Additionalbase/admin/display/lifecyclecookie, idle18, SSHmanagement/runtime/security agentPASS after adding missing rebootfake to adminfixture (no productionchange). Independent review final noactionablefindings; realbuilt firmware parsed with SDKmetadata bothOTAoffsets (notdeviceflashproof).
-- **Scope decision (2026-09-18):** User removed the BLE transport/provisioning proposal entirely because it no longer fits the project concept. BLE is not planned; retain the existing USB, HTTPS/WebSocket and SSH transport scope. Remaining roadmap candidates are under evaluation, not authorized implementation work. Do not resurrect Phase 9 patches. This update changed documentation only; no build, test, upload, erase, device operation or commit was performed.
+- **Scope decision (2026-09-18):** User removed the BLE transport/provisioning proposal entirely because it no longer fits the project concept. BLE is not planned; retain the existing USB, HTTPS/WebSocket and SSH transport scope. This earlier scope decision did not authorize implementation; Phase 12 was subsequently authorized and implemented as recorded above. Do not resurrect Phase 9 patches. This update changed documentation only; no build, test, upload, erase, device operation or commit was performed.
 
 ## Session logging scope decision
 
@@ -27,7 +58,7 @@ Working memory, not an implementation timeline. Source is authoritative; begin w
 
 ## Evidence limits and follow-ups
 
-- Previously accepted combined binary WS send: CPU160MHz / 230400 baud full mix including browser admin. Latest recorded telemetry has very low internal/DMA lifetime minima (2,052/460 B); these are nonblocking headroom follow-ups, not approved reserves or proof of simultaneous allocation failure. Full table, capture workload and counter limits are preserved in the roadmap.
+- Previously accepted combined binary WS send: CPU160MHz / 230400 baud full mix including browser admin. The earlier Phase 8 telemetry had very low internal/DMA lifetime minima (2,052/460 B); these are nonblocking headroom follow-ups, not approved reserves or proof of simultaneous allocation failure. Full table, capture workload and counter limits are preserved in the roadmap. The latest Phase 12 full-mix minima are 8,528/772 B, with the same evidence limits.
 - TLS `-0x004C` means generic NET_RECV_FAILED, not OOM. Historical authentication/admission symptoms do not establish a cause. Do not invent fault, soak, timing or power-loss passes.
 - Credentials remain unencrypted; old flash contents are not erased. Intermittent trusted-network operation reduces exposure, not physical-extraction risk. Upstream upgrades are separate deliberate tasks, not an endless local backport programme.
 - Phase 10 is complete by the explicit acceptance above; detailed unreported regression scenarios remain unevidenced, not completion blockers. Device operations, branch/reset, commits and dependency upgrades remain outside this documentation task.

docs/agent/design-decisions.md

@@ -144,13 +144,13 @@ Only constraints supported by implementation or current project documentation be
 
 ## Wi-Fi callbacks enqueue; the manager owns policy
 
-**Decision:** ESP event callbacks copy bounded event data into the Wi-Fi manager queue. A permanent manager task performs driver operations, profile/AP policy, deadlines, reconciliation, and station mDNS announcement transitions. mDNS initializes at most once, remains allocated across transient disconnects while its component handlers withdraw/re-enable the STA interface, and treats failure as nonfatal.
+**Decision:** ESP event callbacks copy bounded event data into the Wi-Fi manager queue. A permanent manager task performs driver operations, profile/AP policy, deadlines, reconciliation, and station mDNS announcement transitions. mDNS initializes at most once, remains allocated across transient disconnects, and treats failure as nonfatal. IPv4 or preferred IPv6 including link-local-only establishes ONLINE; route/Internet reachability is not implied. Full DHCP hostname storage and IPv6 state access belong to TCP/IP context. HTTPS/SSH owners only publish availability with short critical sections; Wi-Fi owns DNS-SD record and family reconciliation. Public mDNS actions are not acknowledged, so absent-family disables repeat every pass and healthy enables re-probe on a slower 30-second repair cadence. Record/address withdrawal is eventual, and upstream AAAA includes deprecated-but-valid addresses.
 
 **Rationale/evidence:** Callback paths avoid blocking, NVS, and policy work. Manager deadlines consult authoritative driver/netif state so dropped events are recoverable.
 
 **Consequence for future changes:** Keep callbacks short and nonblocking. Add state transitions to the manager rather than directly invoking Wi-Fi policy from consoles, UI, or callbacks. Preserve queue-drop observability.
 
-**Relevant files:** `src/wifi_manager.{h,c}`, `src/wifi_config.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_service.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_config.{h,c}`
+**Relevant files:** `src/wifi_manager.{h,c}`, `src/wifi_config.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_service.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_config.{h,c}`. `cmake/mdns_membership.*` is a narrowly reviewed exception for mDNS 1.12.0 multicast join/leave imbalance: patch only a build-local networking source with strict version/hash guards, never the managed source. Dependency upgrades must review/remove the overlay; do not bypass its guards or restore the abandoned Phase 9 patches.
 
 ## Optional local UI cannot become a core dependency