Add SSH host identity rotation controls

2026-09-13 19:58:05 +02:00
parent aa4bbc2c8c
commit 8df1d2218b
19 changed files with 626 additions and 107 deletions
@@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ The 8D.6 document binds retained terminal state to its first validated username/

 ### SSH

+**8D.21 identity extension:** Existing SSH settings routes/controller/ID dispatcher slot expose atomic public stored fingerprint/generation and fixed supported ECDSA P-256 algorithm, plus rotation confirming service and identity generations. `ssh_transport_replace_identity()` takes existing command mutex with zero wait, compares service state then obtains task-bound nonreused security reservation before any stop/crypto/NVS. Canonical UART0/deferred SSH wrapper and direct security rotate/reset share admission; command mutex and identity reservation span stop→commit/publish→conditional restart. Crypto/NVS run outside security locks/spinlocks. Failed stop skips mutation/start; persistence failure can follow disconnection and attempts old-identity service recovery; committed replacement is never rolled back after restart failure. Stopped rotate stays stopped; canonical reset can recover unavailable material and start stopped SSH, without a browser Reset/recovery endpoint. Runtime owner retains context until all slots retire, frees it before clearing cleanup admission, and rejects orphan overwrites at start. wolfSSH copies caller DER; stack/candidate/live superseded key wiping retained. Public service/security snapshots are separate observations; admission compares both. Existing bounds256/768/96 bytes, login-isolated/manual15-second/no-replay result flow and shell policy unchanged; no HTTPS self-cutting ACK gate needed because HTTPS stays accessible. Changed-known_hosts verification requires trusted UART0 `ssh host-key info`. Full contract/evidence/parent-target limits: `docs/phase8d21_implementation.md`.
+
 **Typed ordinary SSH controls (8D.19 first service slice):** `web_ssh_settings` owns one session-bound operation/result slot, with256-byte/four-receive JSON,768-byte safe two-row projection and96-byte result. Three optional current-admin routes use canonical cookie/Origin/CSRF protection and the existing four-entry dispatcher (IDs only), never lifecycle work on HTTPD. The dispatcher checks login/principal currentness and30-second dequeue deadline. `ssh_transport` copies only published state under its short lock, and conditional actions take the existing command mutex with zero wait before checking a saturated lifecycle generation; lifecycle comparison/admission shares that mutex with CLI. Disconnect publishes an exact SSH-ID close request under the existing SSH lock; only the owner closes sockets/wolfSSH. SSH session generations now retire exhausted slots, while a separate lifecycle generation fences stop/start ABA and survives counter clear. Failed/pending cleanup gates typed controls, retaining canonical UART0 recovery. UI confirms SSH/all-SSH/one-SSH scope, preserves stale selection without rebasing, and uses15-second bounded requests with manual result/refresh recovery, no automatic replay.36 handlers/six sockets and unchanged tasks/stacks/timers/queue depth. No invoking HTTPS-session-cutting action, web-session/USB/Wi-Fi controls or identity mutation. Full contracts, admitted-work/timeout limits and pending target checks: `docs/phase8d19_implementation.md`.

 `ssh_transport` uses wolfSSH on port 22 with two fixed session/handshake slots. Initialization calls `wolfSSH_Init()` in the caller before task creation; after that, one owner task pinned to core 1 exclusively owns runtime contexts/sessions and wolfSSH calls. It enforces bounded handshakes, authentication attempts, receive work, and session buffers.