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Consolidate Phase 8 documentation

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Mark web administration complete, centralize current contracts and
acceptance evidence, and remove superseded slice records. Update
roadmap,
architecture notes, and test references without changing firmware
sources.
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Commander1024
2026-09-13 22:27:10 +02:00
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@@ -34,12 +34,10 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
## Session broker
- **8D.16 management:** `session_broker_get_management_snapshot()` copies compact eight-client rows plus writer/lease generation atomically with zero wait; `session_broker_assign_writer_current()` compares generation and target under the force-writer lock. 29-bit client generations retire slots instead of wrapping; saturating lease generation fences ABA, survives counter clear, and leaves ordinary recovery available. Actual canonical regressions extend `tests/session_broker_diagnostics/run.py`. Full contracts/wrap analysis: `docs/phase8d16_implementation.md`.
**Responsibility:** mediate all transport access to the serial service; provide one writer lease and multiple isolated observers.
- Files: `src/session_broker.{h,c}`, `src/session_console.{h,c}`
- Interfaces: connect/disconnect, request/release/force writer, nonblocking read/write/event APIs, snapshots and counters
- Interfaces: connect/disconnect, request/release/force writer, nonblocking read/write/event APIs, snapshots and counters; `session_broker_get_management_snapshot()` and `session_broker_assign_writer_current()` atomically project/compare target and lease generation. Exhausted 29-bit client generations retire; saturated lease generation preserves ordinary recovery. Tests: `tests/session_broker_diagnostics/run.py`.
- Called by: USB, web serial, role-`user` SSH, console tests, local UI snapshots/actions
- Dependencies: `serial_service`
- Data path: `transport -> broker -> serial service -> UART1`; reverse data is fanned out per client.
@@ -57,36 +55,20 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
- Dependencies: TinyUSB, broker, serial service
- Flow: `USB host <-> USB task <-> broker`
- Lifecycle: permanent owner task; broker client exists only while attached with host DTR asserted.
- Constraint: callbacks retain the latest host line coding only for diagnostics; it never reconfigures UART1. UART1 framing and speed remain controlled by the serial configuration and its explicit persistence commands.
- Constraint: callbacks retain the latest host line coding only for diagnostics; it never reconfigures UART1. UART1 framing and speed remain controlled by the serial configuration and its explicit persistence commands.
## Web and WebSocket serial
- **8D.21 HTTPS-only slice (2026-09-13):** `web_security.{c,h}` owns zero-wait fingerprint/generation projection and nonreused identity reservation shared by canonical rotate/reset; replacement generates/commits outside locks, publishes only after commit. `web_server_replace_identity()` reserves service before identity checks and retains both through commit/stop/start, shared by `web_console` and browser-shell owner; no mutation before stale service rejection, no rollback after commit. `web_lifecycle_settings.c`/`web_ui.c` extend the existing 8D.20 slot/routes/controller with confirmed `rotate` plus required identity generation and seven-field public metadata snapshot (320-byte bound); ACK/original-login and pending/no-replay rules unchanged. No new route/task/timer/queue/assets/config/SSH identity work. PASS security17, lifecycle44+two real-crypto/NVS integration groups, cookie lifecycle8+shared/all variants, UI156+HTML/CSP and broad regressions. Final pio100,532 RAM/1,825,073 flash (+24/+3,568 vs audited baseline), CPU160 verified. Chosen HTTPS slice implemented; parent review/target pending, full21 incomplete pending separately requested SSH identity work. Exact ownership/API/failure/wrap/test/resource contracts: `docs/phase8d21_implementation.md`.
- **8D.20 end-to-end (supersedes prerequisite-only entry below):** `web_lifecycle_settings.{c,h}` owns three optional current-admin lifecycle snapshot/operation routes,256-byte typed stop/restart/reboot, one original-login slot and bounded send-return→HTTPD ID callback→existing dispatcher handoff. One lost ACK reservation survives until callback/successful HTTPD destruction; nonreused IDs and owner generation prevent late/same-pointer ABA. `web_server` conditional reboot uses canonical `esp_restart()` outside locks, stop/restart retains owner reservation. `web_ui.c` adds confirmed HTTPS/Reboot,15-second requests/manual results, pending uncertainty/no replay/relogin, link to existing Network with accurate UART0/SSH/USB recovery.39 handlers/six sockets; no tasks/timers/queue growth/assets/config/identity work. PASS lifecycle41, cookie lifecycle8+shared, UI153+HTML/CSP, dispatcher and broad regressions. Final pio100,508 RAM/1,821,505 flash (+104/+13,064 vs pre-phase100,404/1,808,441); CPU160 preserved. Host/build complete, independent parent review and target/runtime checks pending. Exact bounds/failure/reboot audit/resources/checklist: `docs/phase8d20_implementation.md`.
- **Historical 8D.20 internal HTTPS owner prerequisite (superseded by integration above):** `web_server.{c,h}` owns zero-wait `web_server_get_management_snapshot()` plus off-HTTPD `web_server_stop_current()`/`web_server_restart_current()`. Canonical mutex compares saturated lifecycle generation; restart retains transition reservation across stop/start, failures preserve canonical cleanup/recovery. Repeated init preserves lifecycle failure. No HTTP/UI/ACK/reboot integration or new production caller yet. Existing lifecycle harness now34 groups including ABA, saturation, gap interleavings and failure recovery. Baseline100,404/1,808,441 →100,404/1,808,589 B (+0/+148); unused public entry points linker-discarded. Parent/target review pending. Contract/split/remaining authorized20 and target checklist: `docs/phase8d20_implementation.md`. Do not implement unrelated19 or duplicate existing Network controls.
- **8D.18 client/writer contexts (2026-09-13):** `web_ui.c` extends8D.17's sole quick host with admin-only Broker clients/Active writer entrances to the existing Broker controller/native confirmation. One5-second-after-success live timer and5-second whole-read deadline; explicit identity/lease token retained across refresh, sticky stale/absence latches prevent rebasing/resurrection. Full-page drafts untouched by new triggers; focused controls retain focus with guarded aria-disabled state. No backend/policy/assets/CPU/transport changes. `tests/web_ui_session/{broker.cjs,layout.py}`:135 UI groups+renderer/HTML/CSP; broad broker/auth/lifecycle/transport regressions PASS. Baseline100,300/1,788,661 → final100,300/1,793,301 RAM/flash (+0/+4,640 B), CPU160 verified. Independent parent review and target sign-off pending. Exact contracts/tests/limits/checklist: `docs/phase8d18_implementation.md`.
- **8D.17 quick settings (2026-09-13):** `web_ui.c` owns Serial/Wi-Fi status-trigger nonmodal popovers using the single existing settings DOM/controller, no parallel drafts/endpoints. Secret-free Network quick mode excludes password controls; full-page promotion preserves controller/nonsecret draft, dismissal fences reads/polling without replay. Hover/focus/click/tap, Escape/outside dismiss; full-page drafts protected from hover. Tests `tests/web_ui_session/{browser,network}.cjs`, `layout.py`:126 UI groups + renderer/HTML/CSP PASS; optional Chromium geometry blocked by sandbox, target/independent parent review pending. Baseline100,300/1,782,613 → final100,300/1,788,629 RAM/flash (+0/+6,016 B). CPU160/combined WS send/Broker/Display unchanged. Contract, exact tests and checklist: `docs/phase8d17_implementation.md`.
- **8D.16 Broker (2026-09-13):** `web_broker_settings.{c,h}` owns optional admin-only GET `/api/settings/broker`, GET/POST `/api/settings/broker-operation`; existing dispatcher queues only IDs. `web_ui.c` adds Serial/Display-style full-page rows and explicit confirmed assignment, no mutation on view/selection. 256-byte/four-receive request,2048-byte snapshot,96-byte result, one login-bound slot/no timer;33 handlers/six sockets, unchanged tasks/stacks/queue/assets/CPU160/combined WS send. Tests: cookie `--broker`6+shared, broker management/wrap, dispatcher, lifecycle25, UI119+HTML/CSP and broad regressions. Baseline100,196/1,765,233 B → final100,300/1,782,613 RAM/flash. Independent parent review and target sign-off pending. Contracts/resources/checklist: `docs/phase8d16_implementation.md`.
- **8D.14 Display (2026-09-09):** `web_display_settings.{c,h}` owns optional admin-only GET `/api/settings/display`, GET/POST `/api/settings/display-operation`; `web_ui.c` supplies Serial-style dim/off settings and bounded completion checks. `local_status_ui` owns generation-safe config/storage reservation shared with CLI; buttons do not edit timeouts. No I2C changes. 256-byte/four-receive request,128-byte snapshot,96-byte result, one slot/no timer;30 handlers/six sockets, unchanged tasks/stacks/queue/schema. Tests: cookie `--display` (7+shared), UI111, lifecycle23, dispatcher and broad regressions. Actual baseline100,100/1,748,513 B → final100,196 RAM/1,765,233 flash at160MHz. Target pending; exact API, reset ordering, deadlines, resource/validation limits: `docs/phase8d14_implementation.md`.
- **Current 8D.12/8D.13 — user functional sign-off 2026-09-08, including Settings presentation:** `web_network_settings.{c,h}` owns optional admin-only GET `/api/settings/network` and GET/POST `/api/settings/network-operation`; `web_ui.c` supplies Network, UTF-8/hex SSID editing and explicit transient-secret/connection controls. `wifi_manager` owns generation-checked secret-free snapshots/patch/save/stored-only load and radio transitions; `mdns_service` owns independent conditional hostname persistence, with manager reannouncement. Existing dispatcher receives IDs only. 768-byte request/2,048-byte snapshot/128-byte result, one slot/one-second timer with 30-second queued expiry plus scheduling latency; no hard cancellation. 27 handlers/six sockets, no task/stack/queue/schema growth. Parent integrated tests/build PASS; latest styling UI100 + renderer/CSP/Chromium checks, 99,548 B RAM / 1,744,325 B flash. User full-mix evidence accepted; loaded internal/DMA minima2,276/156 B remain resource follow-ups, not reserve approval. Full contract/exclusions/checklist: `docs/phase8d12_13_implementation.md`. Both phases user-authorized together; no 8D.14/M3 claim. Older next-phase statements below are historical.
- **8D.11:** `web_account_settings.{c,h}` extends Accounts with fingerprint-only POST `/api/settings/accounts/keys` and key-add/key-delete/key-clear on the existing operation endpoint/dispatcher. `user_database.{c,h}` owns zero-wait target-checked snapshots and canonical conditional key mutations. `web_ui.c` handles confirmations, sparse stable indices and self-revocation uncertainty. 24 handlers, six sockets; no new task/stack/queue depth. Host-tested/build-verified, target pending. Contracts/tests/checklist: `docs/phase8d11_implementation.md`.
**Responsibility:** serve authenticated HTTPS UI/API, issue WebSocket tickets, and adapt browser serial sessions to broker clients.
- Files: `src/web_server.{h,c}`, `src/web_serial_transport.{h,c}`, `src/web_ui.{h,c}`, `src/web_console.{h,c}`
- Ordinary HTTPS idle cleanup: `src/web_httpd_idle.{c,h}`, owner sweep in `web_httpd_adapter.{c,h}`, lifecycle/TLS composition in `web_server.c`; `tests/web_httpd_idle/run.py`. Independent of diagnostics/optional transports: 15-second observed idle, one-second timer/one queued probe, six rows, actual WS/async/pending exemptions, safe current-owner shutdown and stop/restart fencing. No LRU/socket/timeout/stack increase. SDK queue/owner-delay limits and target checklist: `docs/https_idle_cleanup.md`.
- Ordinary HTTPS idle cleanup: `src/web_httpd_idle.{c,h}`, owner sweep in `web_httpd_adapter.{c,h}`, lifecycle/TLS composition in `web_server.c`; `tests/web_httpd_idle/run.py`. Independent of diagnostics/optional transports: 15-second observed idle, one-second timer/one queued probe, six rows, actual WS/async/pending exemptions, safe current-owner shutdown and stop/restart fencing. No LRU/socket/timeout/stack increase. SDK queue/owner-delay and regression contract: `docs/https_idle_cleanup.md`.
- Independent throughput diagnostics: `web_serial_transport.{c,h}` owns two fixed per-slot binary-TX aggregates and epoch fences; `web_console.c` exposes default-disabled `web performance enable|disable|show|clear`. Queue-entry/callback-entry, synchronous-send and completion/drain-return estimates, not peer receipt or scheduler-only latency. `tests/web_serial_performance/run.py`; resource/evidence limits and UART0 paired capture: `docs/web_throughput_diagnostics.md`.
- Opt-in admission diagnostics: `src/web_diagnostics.{c,h}`, `tests/web_diagnostics/run.py`. Public synchronous HTTPS create/close callbacks publish six post-TLS connection records; four ticket/upgrade wrappers feed a 32-entry numeric ring. UART0/admin SSH `web diagnostics enable|disable|show|clear`; no queue/task/cleanup override or capacity change. Full bounds, SDK semantics and preaccept/TLS blind spots: `docs/phase8d11_implementation.md`.
- Legacy removal **user-signed-off 2026-09-08** (unchanged certificate fingerprint, preexisting users usable, full-mix evidence): `user_database` persists missing storage empty and preserves valid v1 user bytes; private derived `v1_admin_marker`, no public bootstrap/migration/sync APIs. `web_security` privately migrates v1 1392-byte material to TLS-only v2 1340-byte material, exact identity/generation retained, commit before publish, fail closed without fallback overwrite. Credential commands removed; user generated passwords and TLS rotation remain. Contracts, downgrade and evidence limits: `docs/legacy_credential_removal.md`.
- Storage compatibility: `user_database` persists missing storage empty and preserves valid v1 user bytes; private derived `v1_admin_marker`, no public bootstrap/migration/sync APIs. `web_security` privately migrates v1 1392-byte material to TLS-only v2 1340-byte material, exact identity/generation retained, commit before publish, fail closed without fallback overwrite. Credential commands removed; user generated passwords and TLS rotation remain. Contracts, downgrade and evidence limits: `docs/legacy_credential_removal.md`.
- Security files: `src/web_security.{h,c}`, `src/web_cookie_auth.{h,c}`, `src/web_session_store.{h,c}`, `src/web_auth_parse.{h,c}`. Private IDF boundary: `src/web_httpd_adapter.{h,c}`.
- HTTP policy/UI: `web_cookie_auth` + `web_auth_parse` enforce bounded cookie/Origin/CSRF/admin admission; `web_login_ui.{c,h}` serves login, `web_ui.c` owns session-fenced Serial/Admin/Settings and shared quick controllers. Tests: `tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py` (domain variants), `tests/web_auth_parse/run.py`, `tests/web_login_ui/run.py`, `tests/web_ui_session/run.py`.
- Admission diagnostics: `web_diagnostics.{c,h}`, `tests/web_diagnostics/run.py`; six post-TLS records/32-event opt-in ring, no HTTPD off-owner inspection. [Contract](../web_admission_diagnostics.md).
- Identity/lifecycle: `web_server_replace_identity()` + `web_security` reserve service before identity; commit before reserved stop/start, no rollback after commit. `web_lifecycle_settings.{c,h}` owns original-login ID/ACK handoff. Tests: `tests/web_security/run.py`, `tests/web_admin_transport/server_lifecycle.py`.
- Asset files: authored/generated boundary in `src/web_assets_data.{h,c}`, `web_assets/SOURCES.md`, `web_assets/generate_embedded_assets.py`
- Interfaces: web init/start/stop/snapshots; HTTP handlers; ticket mint/consume; attach/detach; targeted session revocation
- Called by: startup, ESP-IDF HTTPS server, user administration revocation, console/local UI
@@ -95,43 +77,37 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
- Ownership: HTTPD owns socket send/close work; transport task owns broker mediation; two fixed WebSocket slots and four outstanding tickets.
- Security constraints: Basic/cache removed; four absolute one-hour cookie sessions revalidate principal currentness. Four pre-login challenges (120 s), five credential attempts/60 s globally, no live session/challenge/ticket eviction. Origin/CSRF required for mutations; Origin/cookie/ticket before upgrade. Disconnect pauses reconnect but retains login; Sign out invalidates its session. Authored loader changes must update their hard-coded CSP hashes atomically.
- Session-store boundary: admitted HTTPS start initializes records; auth-init failure gates HTTPS. Failed start/accepted stop disables and wipes state. Tickets/slots require nonzero non-reused session IDs; session/account/global revocation invalidates store records before socket cleanup. RNG/SHA/database calls run outside short portMUX sections; ID/expiry/epoch checks reject stale work. Run `python3 tests/web_session_store/run.py` and its `--serial` integration mode.
- 8D.3 HTTP policy: `web_cookie_auth` owns public login/challenge/login POST/session/logout routes and protected-route checks; `web_auth_parse` handles bounded values/JSON. `web_httpd_adapter` alone reads private IDF 5.5.0 header scratch, rejects duplicate fields, defers 101 until transport admission and wipes consumed scratch while preserving right-aligned pending bytes. No SDK patch. `src/CMakeLists.txt` supplies private includes and compiles HTTPD warning/debug logs out. Test with `python3 tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py` and `python3 tests/web_auth_parse/run.py`.
- 8D.3 UI: `src/web_login_ui.{c,h}` serves standalone `/login`; `web_ui.c` validates session before serial connect/restore and handles logout/401 safely. Both scripts hash-bound, auth documents/app no-store. Tests: `python3 tests/web_login_ui/run.py` and `python3 tests/web_ui_session/run.py`. Live cutover host-tested/build-verified, M1 validated by user sign-off (numeric reserves open): `docs/phase8d3_implementation.md`.
- Asset constraint: `web_assets_data.c` is checked-in generated input to the build; do not hand-edit or regenerate casually.
- 8D.6 UI: `web_ui.c` adds admin-only Serial/Admin selection and explicit admin open/close through existing endpoints. Serial socket/client/lease survives mode switches; hidden output drains into independent 5,000-line/64 KiB-pending terminals with visible browser-drop counts. Selected keyboard only; logout/expiry/pagehide closes both with handler cleanup. Session identity changes require a clean document before adopting the view; same-session restore retains hidden-until-validated buffers. Fit readiness retries are bounded to three and cache only success. Focused `tests/web_ui_session/run.py` has 17 groups plus toolbar-order/CSP checks. 8D.6 is user-validated; telemetry, evidence limits and 8D.7 handoff are in `docs/phase8d6_implementation.md`. Numeric reserves remain open; no 8D.7 restriction change.
- **8D.8–8D.10 target sign-off (2026-09-08):** User reports thorough implemented Serial/account settings tests, supplies settled boot/full-mix telemetry and signs implemented work off. Covers both 8D.10 slices and 8D.9 UX. Supersedes target-pending/exclusion status in historical summaries below; exact scope/evidence/counters/limits: `docs/phase8d10_implementation.md`. No unreported checklist passes, reserve approval or M3 completion. Next 8D.11 only on separate request; no source change from sign-off.
- 8D.8: `web_ui.c` adds admin-only Settings/Serial without socket/lease changes. `web_server.c` exposes optional admin-only bodyless `GET /api/settings/serial`, eight working serial values, 256-byte response, no writes/NVS. `serial_service_get_snapshot()` is a zero-wait consistent config/running copy. `web_httpd_register_optional_get()` stages both new-route allocations before table publication (installed IDF public registration leaves a dangling descriptor on name-allocation failure); only Settings uses this startup/exact-GET adapter. 17 URI slots, six sockets/no LRU, no new task. Tests: cookie auth `--settings` (5 groups), UI (21 groups), lifecycle (12 groups). Implemented/build-verified, target/signoff pending; exact accounting and inherited registration-audit followup: `docs/phase8d8_implementation.md`. M2 remains signed off; no 8D.9.
- 8D.9: `web_serial_settings.{c,h}` owns strict 256-byte typed mutation admission and one session-bound pending/result slot. Existing `admin_ssh_console` dispatcher consumes only an ID, revalidates currentness/dequeue deadline and calls canonical serial APIs. `web_server.c` adds optional GET/POST `/api/settings/serial-operation` (19 handlers total); `web_cookie_auth_require_json()` retains Origin/CSRF/admin policy, private optional registration supports exact GET/POST. UI adds explicit framing/lifecycle/persistence with automatic completion checks (1 s, at most 10 GETs/15 s overall), refresh on known terminal results and manual uncertainty recovery without socket/lease changes. Settings stay visible/stale while pending; only Reset confirms NVS overwrite; selecting the current view is a no-op. `/api/status` uses a consistent zero-wait serial snapshot (`running:null` when unavailable). Tests: cookie `--serial-settings` (10 groups), `--settings` (6), UI (35 after UX refinement), console boundary and lifecycle (13). Build verified, target/signoff pending; bounds and failure contracts: `docs/phase8d9_implementation.md`. Supersedes 8D.8's no-8D.9 status above.
- 8D.10 first slice: `web_account_settings.{c,h}` owns compact admin account list and one session-bound other-account role/delete operation slot. `user_database_get_accounts()` is a zero-wait key/secret-free projection; `*_current()` role/delete wrappers compare target ID/auth generation under the canonical mutation lock. Existing dispatcher routes IDs; successful calls target-revoke web/SSH. Optional GET `/api/settings/accounts`, GET/POST `/api/settings/account-operation` raise handlers to 22, sockets/tasks/stacks/queue depth unchanged. UI Accounts subview preserves terminal/lease semantics, confirms mutations and auto-checks/refreshes with manual uncertainty recovery. Tests: cookie `--accounts` (5), canonical accounts, dispatcher, lifecycle (14), UI (41 + CSP). Target pending; create/password/generated-secret/self changes remain next slice, 8D.10 incomplete. Record: `docs/phase8d10_implementation.md`.
- **Current 8D.10 slice 2 (supersedes first-slice exclusions above):** `web_account_settings.{c,h}` adds create/password/self and separate bodyless POST `/api/settings/accounts/generate-password`; `user_database_set_password_current()` shares mutation-lock target checks and canonical commit logic, `user_database_generate_password_value()` generates without mutation. 768-byte/four-receive admission, 96-byte secret-free results; one-second periodic timer cancels/wipes queued non-executing credentials after 30 seconds plus scheduling latency, while dispatcher wipes executing locals on return. Generation has no retained retrieval; UI uses 60-second context-bound acknowledgement before separate submission. Self revocation can deny result retrieval; 401/disconnect is uncertain. Browser-shell restrictions unchanged. Missing generated-route registration found in review is fixed: independent optional endpoint, 23 handlers, failure isolation/restart coverage. Implementation complete, host-tested/build-verified; target/signoff pending. Parent PASS canonical accounts/boundary, parser 294, cookie accounts 9/shared and serial-settings 10, transport 25/tickets 12, store/serial and diff check; UI agent PASS 57/CSP, route agent lifecycle 15. Parent build 25.61 s, 95,908 B RAM / 1,694,237 B flash (+80/+9,880 vs slice 1; +200/+25,400 vs final 8D.9 UX). Timer runtime costs/stack margins remain unmeasured; no 8D.11. Exact evidence attribution: `docs/phase8d10_implementation.md`.
### Browser admin backend (8D.5)
- **8D.7 current status (2026-09-07): implemented scope validated; M2 explicitly signed off by the user ("Jupp, sign M2 off").** Supersedes M2-open/target-pending/continuation statements in the historical slices below; accepted M2 does not require revalidation. User verified certificate rotation and web start/stop via UART0/SSH admin/web admin, restarting after browser stop via another route; full mix without broker drops up to 230400 baud after external adapter correction is user-reported. Intermittent supported two serial + one admin admission failures, recently not recurring, are accepted nonblocking, not fixed. Browser self/generated/key/legacy-credential and other owner command restrictions remain deferred; bootstrap/recovery remain permanently UART0-only. Numeric memory reserves/stack margins remain unapproved; no full parity or individual unreported checklist passes. Next: separately requested 8D.8 read-only settings entry and Serial page; sign-off alone authorizes no implementation. Evidence: `docs/phase8d7_implementation.md`.
- 8D.7 third account slice: `admin_ssh_console` shares parsed browser other-account policy with `user_console`; interactive add/password and forced delete/role now allowed, self/generated/key/bootstrap/recovery still blocked. Post-prompt/pre-DB-API currentness is operation admission, not cancellation of admitted derivation/commit. Existing target-only notifications follow success. Review has no actionable findings; `python3 tests/admin_console_boundary/accounts.py` adds deterministic handler/database failure and stale-next-operation regressions. Target/M2 pending; see `docs/phase8d7_implementation.md`.
- 8D.7 second slice: exact parsed browser `web certificate rotate --force`; `admin_ssh_console.{c,h}` supplies the typed request union/owner `dispatcher_actions` mask, bounded drain/200 ms handoff to the existing 12 KiB dispatcher, persistent pending gate and revalidated executing-slot reservation. `web_console.c` schedules; `web_admin_transport.c` revalidates then calls transactional `web_security_rotate_certificate()` → `web_server_stop()` → `web_server_start()`, short-circuiting errors and retaining ownership on failed stop. SSH/UART0 unchanged. No tasks/depth/routes/assets/stacks added; target stack margins unknown. Boundary `run.py` includes `certificate.c`; lifecycle/policy and transport 25/tickets 12 host groups pass as reported. Credential/account then other owner slices remain; user authorized stacking, not target/M2 sign-off. See `docs/phase8d7_implementation.md`.
- 8D.7 first-slice history: browser `reboot`/`web stop` defer via `admin_ssh_console` control task; WEB owner revalidates cookie/principal/token before lifecycle calls. Pending console input is discarded (incoming-frame disposition latched before receive). `web_console.c` defers stop only for browser origin; other restrictions remain. Tests additionally include `python3 tests/admin_console_boundary/lifecycle.py`; handoff: `docs/phase8d7_implementation.md`. No 8D.7/M2 acceptance yet.
### Browser admin backend
- Files: `src/web_admin_transport.{c,h}`, `src/web_admin_tickets.{c,h}`, protected registration/lifecycle in `web_server.c`, revocation through `web_serial_transport_revoke_*`, diagnostics in `web_console.c`.
- Routes: CSRF-protected admin-only `POST /api/admin/ws-ticket`; ordinary `GET /ws/admin` with cookie/Origin/ticket/shared-console admission before explicit 101. No UI entry or broker client. One socket, two tickets, existing two shared console slots; six total HTTPD sockets, LRU disabled, 16 URI handlers.
- Routes: CSRF-protected admin-only `POST /api/admin/ws-ticket`; ordinary `GET /ws/admin` with cookie/Origin/ticket/shared-console admission before explicit 101. Admin UI entry is explicit; no admin broker client. One socket, two tickets, existing two shared console slots; six total HTTPD sockets, LRU disabled; current overall capacity is 39 URI handlers.
- Currentness/policy: `admin_ssh_console_open_available()` shares two slots with runtime SSH; transport-qualified tokens and owner adapters revalidate outside console locks before commands/prompts. Parsed browser policy remains narrower than typed Settings; [shell contract](../web_administration.md#browser-shell-policy). Tests: `tests/admin_console_boundary/{run,accounts,lifecycle}.py`, `tests/admin_ssh_policy/run.py`, `tests/web_admin_transport/run.py --tickets`, `tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --admin`.
- Ownership: 20 ms ESP timer queues at most one HTTPD poll, no new task; HTTPD owns 1,552 B PSRAM-only payload and IO. Closure uses HTTPD-owned `shutdown`, not IDF's reusable-pointer queued close. Detach fences submitters; only successful HTTPD stop retires queued state before restart. Session/principal currentness and generation checks protect all sensitive boundaries.
- Tests: `python3 tests/web_admin_transport/run.py --tickets`, `python3 tests/web_admin_transport/server_lifecycle.py`, `python3 tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --admin`; manual smoke client/procedure in `tests/web_admin_transport/README.md` and `docs/phase8d5_implementation.md`. Final shutdown fix is host-tested and build-verified by the parent's sequential final `pio run`; target validation remains pending.
## Typed settings source and regression map
HTTPD reads zero-wait projections and queues only IDs to the existing dispatcher. One original-login slot per domain; canonical owners compare/reserve at execution. [API/lifetime and failure contracts](../web_administration.md#typed-settings-api-and-operation-lifetime).
| Domain | API / canonical owner | Focused source tests |
|---|---|---|
| Serial | `web_serial_settings.{c,h}` / `serial_service` | `tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --serial-settings`, `tests/admin_console_boundary/run.py` |
| Accounts / keys | `web_account_settings.{c,h}` / `user_database` | `tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --accounts`, `tests/admin_console_boundary/accounts.py` |
| Network | `web_network_settings.{c,h}` / `wifi_manager`, `mdns_service` | `tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --network`, `tests/web_network_settings/run.py` |
| Display | `web_display_settings.{c,h}` / `local_status_ui` | `tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --display` |
| Broker | `web_broker_settings.{c,h}` / `session_broker` | `tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --broker`, `tests/session_broker_diagnostics/run.py` |
| SSH | `web_ssh_settings.{c,h}` / `ssh_transport`, `ssh_security` | `tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --ssh`, `tests/ssh_management/run.py`, `tests/ssh_management/security.py` |
| HTTPS / reboot | `web_lifecycle_settings.{c,h}` / `web_server`, `web_security` | `tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --lifecycle`, `tests/web_admin_transport/server_lifecycle.py` |
Shared UI regression: `tests/web_ui_session/run.py` and its domain `.cjs` fixtures / `layout.py`. These are navigation pointers, not claims of test execution.
## SSH
- **8D.21 SSH identity extension:** `ssh_security.{c,h}` owns zero-wait atomic public metadata and task-bound/nonreused identity reservations shared by direct rotate/reset, crypto/NVS outside security locks. `ssh_transport_replace_identity()` shares canonical CLI/deferred SSH combined service-before-identity admission, existing command-mutex reservation and stop→commit→conditional restart; failed stop skips mutation/start, context retained until owner retires every slot, start rejects orphan handles. `web_ssh_settings.c`/existing `web_ui.c` SSH controller/routes add P-256 fingerprint/algorithm/both generations and confirmed rotation (same256/768/96-byte bounds, manual15-second/no-replay result flow); no browser Reset/recovery/export or shell-policy change. PASS real-security+combined-owner5, runtime-retention, management5, cookie SSH7+shared/all variants, UI158 and broad HTTPS/console/transport regressions. Final100,556 RAM/1,828,573 flash (+24/+3,500), CPU160 unchanged. Full21 allowed HTTPS+SSH implementation complete; independent SSH parent review and target acceptance pending. Contracts/tests/lifetime/failure/limits: `docs/phase8d21_implementation.md`.
- **8D.19 first service slice:** `web_ssh_settings.{c,h}` adds optional admin-only GET `/api/settings/ssh`, GET/POST `/api/settings/ssh-operation`; existing dispatcher queues only IDs to one login-bound slot. `ssh_transport_get_management_snapshot()` copies published state without owner wait/stack scan; `ssh_transport_manage_current()` checks saturated service generation under existing command mutex and exact session ID under SSH lock before canonical lifecycle/external-close admission. Exhausted session slots retire instead of wrapping. `web_ui.c` adds confirmed SSH-only Settings, sticky stale selection,15-second requests/manual Check Result/Refresh.36 handlers/six sockets/no new tasks/timers/depth/stacks/assets; CPU160 and8D.18 preserved. Tests `tests/ssh_management/run.py`, cookie `--ssh`, dispatcher, lifecycle27 and UI143. Contracts/resources/target checks (unimplemented remainder dropped by user2026-09-13; existing SSH retained): `docs/phase8d19_implementation.md`. SSH slice implemented/host/build verified and independently reviewed; target sign-off pending. No additional8D.19 expansion planned.
**Responsibility:** authenticate SSH, route users to serial and administrators to the command dispatcher, and own wolfSSH lifecycle.
- Files: `src/ssh_transport.{h,c}`, `src/ssh_security.{h,c}`, `src/ssh_console.{h,c}`
- Interfaces: init/start/stop, session snapshots/disconnect/revocation, host-key replacement, counters
- Interfaces: init/start/stop, session snapshots/disconnect/revocation, host-key replacement, counters; `ssh_transport_get_management_snapshot()` / `ssh_transport_manage_current()` fence lifecycle and exact session admission. `ssh_transport_replace_identity()` reserves service before task-bound security identity across stop/commit/restart, retains context until all slots retire and rejects orphan starts. Tests: `tests/ssh_management/run.py`, `tests/ssh_management/security.py`, `tests/ssh_management/runtime.py`.
- Called by: startup, network clients, user revocation, console/local UI
- Dependencies: user database, broker, admin SSH console, secure random, wolfSSH/wolfSSL; boot start gate requires Wi-Fi and SSH security/runtime readiness, independently of HTTPS identity readiness (verified in `main.c` after accepted legacy cleanup).
- Flow: role `user` -> broker; role `admin` -> `admin_ssh_console`
@@ -152,17 +128,16 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
## Administration console infrastructure
**Responsibility:** provide one canonical command registry and serialized execution for UART0 and admin SSH.
**Responsibility:** provide one canonical command registry and serialized execution for UART0, admin SSH and browser admin.
- Files: `src/admin_ssh_console.{h,c}`, `src/console_input.{h,c}`, `src/console_completion.{h,c}`, `src/system_console.{h,c}`, `src/network_console.{h,c}` and all `*_console.{h,c}` modules
- Entry points: `admin_ssh_console_init()`, `admin_ssh_console_start_uart_frontend()`, command registration functions
- Called by: startup, UART0 frontend, role-`admin` SSH transport
- Called by: startup, UART0 frontend, role-`admin` SSH transport, browser admin transport
- Dependencies: ESP-IDF console/linenoise, all command handlers, user-principal currentness
- Flow: `UART0/admin SSH -> bounded request queue -> one dispatcher -> esp_console_run()`
- Flow: `UART0/admin SSH/browser admin -> bounded request queue -> one dispatcher -> esp_console_run()`
- Ownership: dispatcher is sole `esp_console_run()` caller; the SSH owner exclusively performs post-initialization wolfSSH runtime calls.
- Lifecycle: remote session tokens include slot generation; fixed output/history/prompt state is wiped immediately on idle close or after an executing handler returns. Admin SSH `exit` and Ctrl+D on an empty command line request bounded deferred self-disconnect after best-effort output draining.
- Constraint: one slow command or prompt serializes all administration. Admin SSH is unavailable until command registration and UART frontend creation complete; supported deferred actions wait only for a bounded application-buffer drain heuristic.
- 8D.4/8D.5 boundary: `admin_ssh_console_open_owned()` retains explicit-index admission; runtime SSH and browser owners use `admin_ssh_console_open_available()` for the same two slots. Copied transport-qualified identity and immutable firmware-lifetime currentness/drain/lifecycle adapters; SSH publishes its allocated console index separately from its physical SSH slot. Owners handle liveness/output; dispatcher and prompt waits additionally require owner currentness (250 ms polling plus check/scheduling latency). SSH publishes locked principal copies; consumed console output is wiped. Completion scratch is nonblockingly serialized. Browser unsupported lifecycle/account mutations are rejected before execution. Focused host command: `python3 tests/admin_console_boundary/run.py`.
## Wi-Fi
@@ -170,7 +145,6 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
- Files: `src/wifi_config.{h,c}`, `src/wifi_manager.{h,c}`, `src/wifi_console.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_config.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_service.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_console.{h,c}`, `src/network_console.{h,c}`
- Interfaces: config defaults/validate/load/save; manager init/start/stop/apply/reconnect/next-profile/snapshot
- Called by: startup, console, local UI, ESP event callbacks; typed Network settings uses secret-free zero-wait projections and dispatcher-owned canonical conditional mutations (8D.12/8D.13).
- Dependencies: secure random for default AP password, NVS, ESP-NETIF/Wi-Fi/events, Espressif mDNS, lwIP diagnostics
- Lifecycle: permanent manager task and bounded queue; callbacks enqueue compact events only.
- Constraint: application NVS is authoritative (`WIFI_STORAGE_RAM`); working edits are not persisted until save. Start/stop, including local controls, intentionally update the RAM `enabled_at_boot` field. Working-config copies contain PSKs and must be tightly scoped and wiped; routine status/local UI must use secret-free snapshots.