Phase 8D - massive refactor and admin functions / admin shell in

webinterface. Memory and cross-origin problems.

docs/agent/code-map.md

@@ -60,15 +60,15 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
 
 **Responsibility:** serve authenticated HTTPS UI/API, issue WebSocket tickets, and adapt browser serial sessions to broker clients.
 
-- Files: `src/web_server.{h,c}`, `src/web_serial_transport.{h,c}`, `src/web_ui.{h,c}`, `src/web_console.{h,c}`
+- Files: `src/web_server.{h,c}`, `src/web_session.{h,c}`, `src/web_serial_transport.{h,c}`, `src/web_admin_transport.{h,c}`, `src/web_ui.{h,c}`, `src/web_console.{h,c}`
 - Security files: `src/web_security.{h,c}`
 - Asset files: authored/generated boundary in `src/web_assets_data.{h,c}`, `web_assets/SOURCES.md`, `web_assets/generate_embedded_assets.py`
-- Interfaces: web init/start/stop/snapshots; HTTP handlers; ticket mint/consume; attach/detach; targeted session revocation
+- Interfaces: generation-tagged web init/start/stop/TLS refresh and snapshots; HTTP handlers including `/api/admin/users`, `/api/admin/wifi-config`, and `/api/admin/display`; ticket mint/consume; attach/detach/finalize; targeted session revocation
 - Called by: startup, ESP-IDF HTTPS server, user administration revocation, console/local UI
 - Dependencies: user database, secure random, broker, successful Wi-Fi manager initialization at boot, mbedTLS/HTTPS server; actual network reachability is an operational prerequisite, not an initializer invariant
-- Flow: `browser -> HTTPS Basic auth -> ticket -> WebSocket -> web transport -> broker`
-- Ownership: HTTPD owns socket send/close work; transport task owns broker mediation; two fixed WebSocket slots and four outstanding tickets.
-- Security constraints: Basic-auth cache hits still revalidate principal currentness; the browser's combined Connect/Disconnect control closes the WebSocket and pauses automatic reconnect until Connect is selected. Changes to the authored inline loader must update its hard-coded CSP hash in the same change.
+- Flow: `browser -> HTTPS login session -> exact-session ticket -> serial WebSocket -> broker`; admin sessions may separately use `admin ticket -> admin WebSocket -> canonical dispatcher` without joining the broker.
+- Ownership: HTTPD owns socket send/close work; separate permanent web tasks own serial broker mediation and browser-admin console I/O; there are two serial slots/four serial tickets and one admin slot/two admin tickets. HTTPS lifecycle transitions are serialized separately from state snapshots, carry a lifecycle generation, and retain failed-stop/finalizer ownership for retry. The admin transport disables new HTTPD calls during detach and tracks calls already in progress.
+- Security constraints: eight opaque browser sessions retain digest-only tokens and copied current principals, with at most two sessions per account. Mutations require strict same-origin and session-bound CSRF checks. Typed URL-form bodies decode in their own storage and are limited to 512 bytes/10 unique fields. User and Wi-Fi editors use optimistic generations; user edits also bind stable user IDs, while Wi-Fi reads expose only `secret_set` flags. Terminal-mode switching never closes the serial socket or releases its writer lease; the combined control explicitly connects/disconnects only serial. Changes to the authored inline loader must update its hard-coded CSP hash in the same change.
 - Asset constraint: `web_assets_data.c` is checked-in generated input to the build; do not hand-edit or regenerate casually.
 
 ## SSH
@@ -87,47 +87,47 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
 
 **Responsibility:** persist bounded accounts, verify passwords/SSH keys, issue secret-free principals, and enforce account invariants.
 
-- Files: `src/user_database.{h,c}`, `src/user_console.{h,c}`; `src/admin_command_gate.{h,c}` is currently a narrow recursive wrapper used only by the `user` command handler, not the global command serializer
-- Interfaces: init/migration/recovery, authenticate, principal-currentness, account/password/role/key mutations, snapshots
-- Called by: web and SSH authentication/currentness checks and console administration
-- Dependencies: NVS, secure random, mbedTLS cryptography; after a committed command-layer mutation, best-effort web/SSH revocation calls supplement authoritative transport currentness checks
-- Ownership: database mutex protects the internal live record and PSRAM-preferred transactional candidate; password authentication runs PBKDF2 outside the mutex and revalidates afterward, while mutation locking must be checked per operation.
-- Authorization: UART0 exclusively owns initial administrator bootstrap and unavailable-database recovery; current admins may use admin SSH for other commands unless handler policy denies them. HTTPS currently treats both roles alike.
+- Files: `src/user_database.{h,c}`, `src/user_admin_service.{h,c}`, `src/user_console.{h,c}`, `src/admin_command_gate.{h,c}`
+- Interfaces: init/migration/recovery, authenticate, principal-currentness, account/password/role/key mutations, optimistic mutation results, snapshots
+- Called by: web and SSH authentication/currentness checks, `/api/admin/users`, and console administration
+- Dependencies: NVS, secure random, mbedTLS cryptography, web/SSH targeted revocation
+- Ownership: database mutex protects the internal live record and PSRAM-preferred transactional candidate; password authentication runs PBKDF2 outside the mutex and revalidates afterward. `user_admin_service` is the shared typed mutation boundary for web and console paths: its recursive `admin_command_gate` region serializes snapshot expectation checks plus commit, then performs best-effort web and SSH revocation after a committed change.
+- Authorization: UART0 exclusively owns initial administrator bootstrap and unavailable-database recovery. Both roles may use browser serial; only current admins may use guided admin APIs, the browser Admin shell, or admin SSH, subject to handler policy.
 - Constraint: final administrator cannot be deleted or demoted; transport principals must be rechecked after mutations.
 
 ## Administration console infrastructure
 
-**Responsibility:** provide one canonical command registry and serialized execution for UART0 and admin SSH.
+**Responsibility:** provide one canonical command registry and serialized execution for UART0, admin SSH, and the browser Admin shell.
 
-- Files: `src/admin_ssh_console.{h,c}`, `src/console_input.{h,c}`, `src/console_completion.{h,c}`, `src/system_console.{h,c}`, `src/network_console.{h,c}` and all `*_console.{h,c}` modules
-- Entry points: `admin_ssh_console_init()`, `admin_ssh_console_start_uart_frontend()`, command registration functions
-- Called by: startup, UART0 frontend, role-`admin` SSH transport
+- Files: `src/admin_ssh_console.{h,c}`, `src/console_input.{h,c}`, `src/console_completion.{h,c}`, `src/system_console.{h,c}` and all `*_console.{h,c}` modules
+- Entry points: `admin_ssh_console_init()`, `admin_ssh_console_start_uart_frontend()`, `admin_ssh_console_open()`, command registration functions
+- Called by: startup, UART0 frontend, role-`admin` SSH transport, browser admin transport
 - Dependencies: ESP-IDF console/linenoise, all command handlers, user-principal currentness
-- Flow: `UART0/admin SSH -> bounded request queue -> one dispatcher -> esp_console_run()`
+- Flow: `UART0/admin SSH/browser admin -> bounded request queue -> one dispatcher -> esp_console_run()`
 - Ownership: dispatcher is sole `esp_console_run()` caller; the SSH owner exclusively performs post-initialization wolfSSH runtime calls.
-- Lifecycle: remote session tokens include slot generation; fixed output/history/prompt state is wiped immediately on idle close or after an executing handler returns. Admin SSH `exit` and Ctrl+D on an empty command line request bounded deferred self-disconnect after best-effort output draining.
-- Constraint: one slow command or prompt serializes all administration. Admin SSH is unavailable until command registration and UART frontend creation complete; supported deferred actions wait only for a bounded application-buffer drain heuristic.
+- Lifecycle: remote session tokens include frontend identity and slot generation; fixed output/history/prompt state is wiped immediately on idle close or after an executing handler returns. Remote `exit` and Ctrl+D on an empty command line request bounded deferred self-disconnect after best-effort output draining.
+- Constraint: one slow command or prompt serializes all administration. Remote admin-console admission is unavailable until command registration and UART frontend creation complete; supported deferred actions wait only for a bounded application-buffer drain heuristic.
 
 ## Wi-Fi
 
 **Responsibility:** persist station/AP policy and own asynchronous ESP-NETIF/Wi-Fi state transitions.
 
 - Files: `src/wifi_config.{h,c}`, `src/wifi_manager.{h,c}`, `src/wifi_console.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_config.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_service.{h,c}`, `src/mdns_console.{h,c}`, `src/network_console.{h,c}`
-- Interfaces: config defaults/validate/load/save; manager init/start/stop/apply/reconnect/next-profile/snapshot
-- Called by: startup, console, local UI, ESP event callbacks
+- Interfaces: config defaults/validate/load/save; manager init/start/stop/apply/reconnect/next-profile/snapshot; versioned working-config copy, compare-and-swap, and exact-generation save
+- Called by: startup, console, local UI, typed web handlers, ESP event callbacks
 - Dependencies: secure random for default AP password, NVS, ESP-NETIF/Wi-Fi/events, Espressif mDNS, lwIP diagnostics
 - Lifecycle: permanent manager task and bounded queue; callbacks enqueue compact events only.
-- Constraint: application NVS is authoritative (`WIFI_STORAGE_RAM`); working edits are not persisted until save. Start/stop, including local controls, intentionally update the RAM `enabled_at_boot` field. Working-config copies contain PSKs and must be tightly scoped and wiped; routine status/local UI must use secret-free snapshots.
+- Constraint: application NVS is authoritative (`WIFI_STORAGE_RAM`); working edits are not persisted until save. Start/stop, including local controls, intentionally update the RAM `enabled_at_boot` field. Browser edits compare a nonzero working-config generation, and browser Save persists exactly that generation; stale or exhausted generations fail closed. Working-config copies contain PSKs and must be tightly scoped and wiped; web reads expose only `secret_set` flags, and routine status/local UI must use secret-free snapshots.
 
 ## Local display and controls
 
 **Responsibility:** own OLED I2C/framebuffer operations and present status plus constrained button actions.
 
-- Files: `src/local_display.{h,c}`, `src/local_status_ui.{h,c}`, `src/local_boot_animation.{h,c}`, `src/local_ui_config.{h,c}`, `src/local_ui_console.{h,c}`
+- Files: `src/local_display.{h,c}`, `src/local_status_ui.{h,c}`, `src/local_boot_animation.{h,c}`, `src/local_ui_config.{h,c}`, `src/local_ui_console.{h,c}`; shared writer serialization uses `src/admin_command_gate.{h,c}`
 - Interfaces: display init/frame/draw/commit/snapshot; UI start/activity/config; versioned NVS settings
-- Called by: startup, local UI task, diagnostics, display console
+- Called by: startup, local UI task, diagnostics, display console, and typed `/api/admin/display` handlers
 - Dependencies: copied snapshots/public APIs from serial, broker, USB, Wi-Fi, web, SSH
-- Ownership: `local_display` solely owns I2C0 and framebuffer mutex; a frame belongs to its initiating task.
+- Ownership: `local_display` solely owns I2C0 and framebuffer mutex; a frame belongs to its initiating task. Typed web Apply/Save/Load/Defaults/Reset and console display writers share `admin_command_gate`, serializing each complete working-config or persistence operation.
 - Lifecycle: the low-priority task is firmware-lifetime only if button GPIO initialization succeeds; it still runs with an absent panel so a press can reprobe after successful I2C bus setup. Failed bus creation is not recoverable by that reprobe, and `display` configuration commands depend on the UI task.
 - Constraint: collect service snapshots before I2C; local UI never joins broker or handles secrets.
 
@@ -155,8 +155,10 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
 | Change HTTPS endpoints/authentication | `web_server.*`, `web_security.*`, `user_database.*` |
 | Change SSH login or role routing | `ssh_transport.*`, `ssh_security.*`, `user_database.*` |
 | Add or change a command | relevant `*_console.c`, `console_completion.c`, `admin_ssh_console.c` policy/deferred handling |
-| Change account roles/passwords/keys | `user_database.*`, `user_console.c`, transport revocation APIs |
-| Change Wi-Fi policy or profile persistence | `wifi_manager.*`, `wifi_config.*`, `wifi_console.c` |
+| Change account roles/passwords/keys | `user_admin_service.*`, `user_database.*`, `user_console.c`, `/api/admin/users` handlers, transport revocation APIs |
+| Change Wi-Fi policy or profile persistence | `wifi_manager.*`, `wifi_config.*`, `wifi_console.c`, `/api/admin/wifi-config` handlers |
+| Change guided display aging | `local_ui_config.*`, `local_status_ui.*`, `/api/admin/display` handlers, `web_ui.c` |
+| Change HTTPS stop/restart or TLS-material refresh | `web_server.*`, `web_console.c`, `web_admin_transport.*`, deferred control in `admin_ssh_console.*` |
 | Change station mDNS hostname or persistence | `mdns_service.*`, `mdns_config.*`, `mdns_console.c`, then `wifi_manager.c` |
 | Change OLED rendering or buttons | `local_status_ui.c`, `local_display.*`, `local_ui_config.*` |
 | Change board GPIO or electrical tests | `board_pins.h`, hardware test module, `docs/wiring.md` |