Commander1024/ESP32_Serial_Swiss_Army_Knife
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Phase 8D - massive refactor and admin functions / admin shell in

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webinterface. Memory and cross-origin problems.
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Commander1024
2026-09-03 16:44:52 +02:00
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docs/command_reference.md
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# Command reference
UART0 and authenticated `admin` SSH sessions use the same registered command implementations through one serialized dispatcher. Admin SSH exposes the full operational registry, including interactive prompts, recovery-secret display, network diagnostics, reboot, and HTTPS/SSH material mutation. Initial administrator bootstrap and explicit recovery of an unavailable user database remain physically bound to UART0. Admin SSH also rejects generating a replacement password for its own account so the one-time value cannot be lost when the session is revoked. Run `help` for root commands and `<group> help` for a group summary. Configuration changes are RAM-only unless explicitly saved.
UART0, authenticated `admin` SSH sessions, and the browser Admin shell use the same registered command implementations through one serialized dispatcher. The remote shells expose the operational registry, including interactive prompts, recovery-secret display, network diagnostics, reboot, and HTTPS/SSH material mutation. Initial administrator bootstrap and explicit recovery of an unavailable user database remain physically bound to UART0. A remote administrator cannot generate a replacement password for its own account, so the one-time value cannot be lost when the session is revoked. Run `help` for root commands and `<group> help` for a group summary. Configuration changes are RAM-only unless explicitly saved.
## System
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ On the first Phase 8A boot, the old shared `admin` credential is imported as a r
`user recover --force` is a destructive physical recovery operation and succeeds only while the database is unavailable. It replaces the user blob with one role-`user` account derived from the current legacy credential; run `user bootstrap` afterward. It does not erase unrelated NVS data. Successful password, role, key, bootstrap, and delete operations invalidate only that username's outstanding WebSocket tickets and active WebSocket/SSH sessions; unrelated users remain connected.
The administrator-only Settings dialog uses `/api/admin/users` for guided account create/list/edit/delete, role changes, entered or one-time generated passwords, and authorized Ed25519/P-256 key add/remove. Mutations include the displayed database generation and stable user ID, so a stale editor is rejected and reloaded instead of targeting a deleted/recreated account. CLI and browser mutations share `user_admin_service`; it serializes mutations with `admin_command_gate`, commits first, and then requests best-effort web and SSH revocation. Transport currentness checks remain authoritative if notification is incomplete. Entered keys/passwords and generated-password output are cleared from the dialog on close or failure.
## Local display
| Command | Description |
@@ -46,7 +48,7 @@ On the first Phase 8A boot, the old shared `admin` credential is imported as a r
| `display save` / `display load` | Save the working aging settings to NVS or load them. |
| `display defaults` / `display reset` | Apply 300/600-second defaults in RAM, or apply and persist them. |
When both transitions are enabled, `off-seconds` must be greater than `dim-seconds`. Applying settings counts as local UI activity. At normal boot, an initialized OLED shows a bounded five-second identity animation before the status UI begins; it scrolls the device name in yellow and draws the compact upright-terminal logo in blue. A missing OLED remains nonfatal; after reconnecting it safely, one new button press requests a bounded reprobe and is consumed without navigating.
When both transitions are enabled, `off-seconds` must be greater than `dim-seconds`. Applying settings counts as local UI activity. The administrator-only Settings dialog exposes the same typed Apply/Save/Load/Defaults/Reset behavior through `/api/admin/display`; all five operations are serialized with console display writers through `admin_command_gate`, and invalid aging combinations are rejected without applying them. At normal boot, an initialized OLED shows a bounded five-second identity animation before the status UI begins; it scrolls the device name in yellow and draws the compact upright-terminal logo in blue. A missing OLED remains nonfatal; after reconnecting it safely, one new button press requests a bounded reprobe and is consumed without navigating.
## Serial service
@@ -106,7 +108,9 @@ Opening `/dev/ttyACM*` with DTR asserted creates the `usb-cdc` broker client, st
| `wifi nslookup <host>` | Resolve and display unique IPv4/IPv6 addresses. |
| `wifi traceroute <host> [max-hops]` | Run IPv4 ICMP traceroute with up to 30 hops. |
`ping`, `nslookup`, and `traceroute` are root aliases. The four station-profile slots use lower priority values first. Edits to a disabled profile's SSID, priority, security mode, or secret are staged in RAM and do not interrupt the current Wi-Fi connection. Enabling or disabling a profile, changing an enabled profile, or changing AP policy/configuration applies the new radio policy and may reconnect Wi-Fi. Use `wifi save` to persist working changes. Passwords are not displayed by ordinary status output.
`ping`, `nslookup`, and `traceroute` are root aliases. The four station-profile slots use lower priority values first. Edits to a disabled profile's SSID, priority, security mode, or secret are staged in RAM and do not interrupt the current Wi-Fi connection. Enabling or disabling a profile, changing an enabled profile, or changing AP policy/configuration applies the new radio policy and may reconnect Wi-Fi. Use `wifi save` to persist working changes.
The administrator-only Settings dialog uses `/api/admin/wifi-config` for typed station-profile, AP policy/SSID/channel, and write-only secret edits. Reads return only `secret_set` flags. Every mutation compares the exact working-configuration generation, and Save persists only that same generation; stale or exhausted generations fail closed without applying or saving another editor's state. On a conflict, the browser clears entered secrets and reloads current values without replaying the request.
## mDNS
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| Command | Description |
|---|---|
| `web` / `web help` | Show web-service command usage. |
| `web status` | Show HTTPS and WebSocket state. |
| `web status` | Show HTTPS, browser-session, serial-WebSocket, and admin-WebSocket state. |
| `web start` / `web stop` | Start or stop HTTPS service. |
| `web counters` / `web clear-counters` | Show or clear web counters. |
| `web credentials show` | Display the legacy migration/recovery credential on UART0 or authenticated admin SSH; it is not a role-based network login. |
| `web credentials show` | Display the legacy migration/recovery credential on UART0 or an authenticated remote admin shell; it is not a role-based network login. |
| `web credentials rotate --force` | Replace the legacy recovery credential and synchronize the migrated pre-bootstrap account only. |
| `web certificate info` | Display certificate identity and fingerprint. |
| `web certificate rotate --force` | Replace the HTTPS certificate and private key. |
| `web reset --force` | Explicitly replace missing, incompatible, or damaged legacy credentials and web material. |
HTTPS listens on port 443 only. Authenticate with any current user-database username/password; both `user` and `admin` roles receive the existing status and browser-terminal interface. The device serves vendored xterm.js without Internet access. Browser sessions use one-time account-bound tickets, binary WebSocket frames, and the broker's one-writer rule. The combined **Connect**/**Disconnect** control closes the current WebSocket and pauses automatic reconnect when active; after a user-paused disconnect, it changes to **Connect** to resume connection attempts. Account mutations revoke only that account's tickets and sessions.
HTTPS listens on port 443 only. Sign in with any current user-database username/password through the same-origin login page; explicit logout permits account switching without relying on a browser HTTP-authentication cache. The device stores at most eight opaque eight-hour browser sessions, with at most two retained per account, and sends the raw token only in a host-only secure cookie. State-changing requests require strict Origin and session-bound CSRF validation.
Both roles receive the offline browser serial terminal. Its one-time ticket and active WebSocket are bound to the exact browser session and obey the broker's one-writer rule. The combined **Connect serial**/**Disconnect serial** control closes only the serial WebSocket and pauses automatic reconnect when active. Account mutations revoke that account's browser sessions, serial/admin tickets, and WebSockets without disturbing unrelated accounts.
An administrator additionally receives a **Serial terminal**/**Admin shell** selector, typed Serial controls, guided user/password/role/authorized-key management, generation-safe Wi-Fi profile/AP/secret editing and saving, display-aging controls, and contextual Serial, Wi-Fi, broker-client, and writer-transfer popovers. The browser admin shell uses the same bounded editor, history, completion, prompts, serialized dispatcher, and registered command handlers as admin SSH and UART0; it never joins the serial broker. Switching terminal modes only changes visibility and focus: it does not close the serial WebSocket or release its writer lease. Writer transfer requires an explicit confirmation and atomically checks both the expected current writer and generation-safe target ID. Service/session controls beyond the guided serial/Wi-Fi actions, network diagnostics, security/danger operations, and unusual hardware/debug commands remain shell-only. Initial `user bootstrap` and `user recover --force` remain physical-UART0-only.
Typed mutation endpoints accept only body-backed URL-encoded forms bounded to 512 bytes and 10 unique fields; duplicate, oversized, malformed, stale-session, wrong-origin, and wrong-CSRF requests fail without a side effect. HTTPS start/stop and TLS refresh are serialized and carry a lifecycle generation. Certificate rotation and full material reset always trigger a post-material TLS refresh; a newer explicit lifecycle request takes precedence. Teardown disables transport-owned HTTPD calls, tracks any already in progress, retains an HTTPD handle after stop failure, and retries pending post-stop admin-transport finalization before a later start.
## SSH serial transport
@@ -151,7 +161,7 @@ HTTPS listens on port 443 only. Authenticate with any current user-database user
SSH listens on port 22 and accepts user-database passwords plus stored `ssh-ed25519` and `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256` public keys. wolfSSH verifies key possession after the database authorizes the username/key pair; unsigned key probes do not complete authentication. A `user` receives the broker-backed UART1 serial stream. An `admin` receives the administration shell instead, does not become a broker client, and cannot acquire a UART1 writer lease.
UART0 and admin SSH submit to one bounded queue, and one dispatcher task is the sole caller of `esp_console_run()`. Consequently, SSH commands execute the canonical UART0 handlers and produce the same status and mutation behavior rather than using a second command implementation. Remote output is routed into the authenticated session's bounded output ring; only the SSH transport task accesses wolfSSH.
UART0, admin SSH, and the browser admin shell submit to one bounded queue, and one dispatcher task is the sole caller of `esp_console_run()`. Consequently, remote commands execute the canonical UART0 handlers rather than using separate command implementations. Each remote frontend has generation-safe session identity, exact authorization checks, bounded editor/history/output state, and transport-owned network I/O; only the SSH transport task accesses wolfSSH and only HTTPD performs browser WebSocket sends/closes.
UART0 and admin SSH use shared whole-line Tab completion. A unique/common prefix expands inline; a Tab that cannot extend an ambiguous prefix prints the matching candidates and redraws the unchanged input line instead of cycling candidates. Admin SSH additionally supports four-entry per-session command history with Up/Down, inline cursor editing with Left/Right, Home/End (including Pos1/Ende terminal sequences), Backspace/Delete, Ctrl-C, and visible or no-echo interactive prompts. Its history is RAM-only, private to the session, and wiped on disconnect. Ping callbacks enqueue bounded typed results so all formatting remains on the dispatcher task.