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Add HTTPS identity rotation support

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Commander1024
2026-09-13 18:21:37 +02:00
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README.md
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@@ -24,6 +24,14 @@ Apply changes RAM; **Save** explicitly persists device working state, not unsent
Confirm disruptive actions only with a recovery route ready. `accepted` does not mean online or verified DNS, and HTTPS/SSH/both browser terminals may disconnect before acknowledgement. Never automatically replay uncertain operations: reconnect via STA/AP, use Check Result/Refresh and inspect state. UART0 remains administrative recovery and native USB remains network-independent UART1 access. Changed hostnames require client DNS/trust/login checks. Browser-shell command restrictions are unchanged. See the [full bounded API, implementation evidence and pending target checklist](docs/phase8d12_13_implementation.md); no new commands or generated assets are introduced.
### Browser HTTPS identity (8D.21 HTTPS-only slice)
Administrators can use **Settings → HTTPS / Reboot → Refresh** to inspect the stored HTTPS certificate's public SHA-256 fingerprint and identity/service generations, then explicitly confirm **Rotate HTTPS identity**. Rotation persists a new certificate and private key and restarts HTTPS, invalidating all web logins and both browser terminal routes. Save browser drafts first. User accounts, SSH identity, Wi-Fi and device configuration are unchanged; UART0 administration and native USB UART1 access remain independent.
A lost acknowledgement, expired login or failed stop/start does **not** prove that the old identity remains: the new identity may already be persisted, with an old certificate still served if shutdown failed. There is no rollback or automatic retry. Inspect the result through trusted UART0 using `web certificate info`; verify that fingerprint before renewing browser trust, then reload and sign in freshly. Accepting a certificate warning alone is not trusted verification. Use canonical `web stop` / `web start` for retained-server recovery when necessary. The existing CLI `web reset --force` retains TLS-only replacement/recovery semantics and starts a stopped service; the browser has no duplicate reset or unavailable-material recovery action. No certificate/private-key export is provided.
The [HTTPS slice is implemented and host/build verified](docs/phase8d21_implementation.md); independent parent review and target trust/persistence/full-mix checks remain pending. SSH identity work requires a separate request, so full 8D.21 remains incomplete.
## Documentation
- [Hardware wiring](docs/wiring.md): hardware profile, GPIO assignments, connector guidance, and safety notes.