Remove Legacy Credential Bootstrap Paths
Decouple user provisioning from HTTPS identity storage while retaining compatible v1 user records and migrating TLS material to the credential-free v2 format. Add focused security regression coverage and update operator documentation.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ SSH role=admin ------> shared administration dispatcher <------ UART0
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3. Attempt optional OLED initialization and a bounded boot animation. Display failure is nonfatal; a working display can delay later recovery services by about five seconds.
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4. Initialize button diagnostics and load local-UI and serial configurations, falling back to RAM defaults on load failure.
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5. Initialize the serial service, session broker, and permanent USB transport task. UART1 is not started automatically here.
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6. Load/generate HTTPS material, then initialize the user database using the legacy web credential for first migration when available. User-database failure makes network authentication fail closed.
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6. Load/generate HTTPS material, then initialize the independent user database, committing an empty database when storage is missing. User-database failure makes network authentication fail closed.
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7. Initialize the HTTPS runtime, SSH host-key material, and permanent SSH owner task.
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8. Load Wi-Fi configuration and the independent mDNS hostname configuration, persist generated first-boot Wi-Fi defaults when appropriate, initialize the nonfatal mDNS configuration service and Wi-Fi manager, and start Wi-Fi when configured for boot. The Wi-Fi manager owns subsequent mDNS announcement transitions.
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9. Start HTTPS and SSH only when their startup gates pass. The Wi-Fi portion requires valid configuration and successful manager initialization and, when enabled at boot, successful submission of its asynchronous start request; it does not require association, an IP address, or reachability. Both gates also require HTTPS security readiness, and SSH additionally requires its own security/runtime readiness. The HTTPS-security gate on SSH is an implemented dependency even though SSH has a separate host key.
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@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ TinyUSB callbacks enqueue/copy data and state; the transport task owns broker li
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`web_server` runs HTTPS only on port 443 using the device-specific self-signed P-256 certificate from `web_security`. Current routes provide the UI, static assets, status, ticket issuance, and serial WebSocket upgrade.
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HTTPS login uses `user_database` and opaque server-side cookie sessions; Basic authentication and its cache are removed in 8D.3. Before administrator bootstrap, the migrated role-`user` account is synchronized from the legacy credential, so that username/password can authenticate through the database; after bootstrap, the legacy blob is independent recovery material and is no longer consulted for authentication or synchronized into role-based accounts. Both roles retain the same shipped web status/serial UI. 8D.5 adds an admin-only backend without a normal UI entry.
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HTTPS login uses `user_database` and opaque server-side cookie sessions; Basic authentication and its cache are removed in 8D.3. No legacy credential is imported, synchronized or consulted for authentication. Both roles retain the same shipped web status/serial UI. 8D.5 adds an admin-only backend without a normal UI entry.
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`web_cookie_auth` owns login/session/logout policy: four 120-second digest-only pre-login challenges, explicit same-origin bootstrap, five credential verifications per 60-second global window, and no live-record eviction. Host-only `__Host-` Secure/HttpOnly/SameSite=Strict cookies have absolute lifetimes. Login consumes a challenge, validates bounded JSON and issues a fresh session; logout invalidates only its originating session. Mutations require CSRF and strict canonical HTTPS Origin; serial/admin upgrades require matching cookie/Origin/ticket, with admin role additionally required by the admin endpoints.
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@@ -152,19 +152,19 @@ Revocation has two layers:
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1. after a database mutation commits, the command layer makes best-effort targeted WebSocket/SSH revocation calls; notification failure does not roll back the mutation;
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2. transports periodically and at sensitive boundaries recheck principal currentness, providing authoritative fail-safe closure if notification fails.
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The final administrator cannot be deleted or demoted. UART0 is trusted for initial administrator bootstrap and explicit unavailable-database recovery. Authenticated admin SSH can run the operational registry but is denied those two recovery operations; other secret-bearing commands are remotely available unless their handlers deny them.
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The final administrator cannot be deleted or demoted. UART0 establishes the first administrator through normal `user add <username> admin` and owns explicit unavailable-database recovery to empty. Recovery refuses a healthy database. No bootstrap API or command remains. Authenticated admin SSH can run the operational registry but is denied recovery; other secret-bearing commands are remotely available unless their handlers deny them.
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NVS is not encrypted. Password verifiers improve password storage, but Wi-Fi credentials, legacy recovery credentials, and TLS/SSH private keys remain recoverable under physical flash extraction.
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NVS is not encrypted. Password verifiers improve password storage, but Wi-Fi credentials and TLS/SSH private keys remain recoverable under physical flash extraction.
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## Typed Accounts settings (8D.10)
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**8D.11 extension:** Authorized-key operations share the Accounts slot/dispatcher and canonical database key transactions with mutation-lock account ID/generation checks. A zero-wait per-account projection returns only key slot/type/SHA256 fingerprint. Independently optional admin/Origin/CSRF JSON POST `/api/settings/accounts/keys` reads this projection; existing operation POST admits bounded public-key text or key-delete/key-clear. Three stable slots may be sparse. Successful mutations target-revoke, including self; uncertain acknowledgement never triggers automatic replay. 24 handlers, unchanged socket/task/stack-size/queue budgets. Runtime stack margins remain pending. See `docs/phase8d11_implementation.md`; older no-8D.11 statements below are historical.
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Current slice 2 extends the same dispatcher slot to create/password and self role/delete/password. Mutation bodies are 768 bytes/four receives; results stay secret-free, 96 bytes, replaceable and session-bound. Conditional password mutation checks identity under the canonical database mutex. A one-second firmware-lifetime ESP timer cancels/wipes non-executing queued credentials at their 30-second deadline plus timer/scheduling latency; dequeue wipes shared inputs after copying, and dispatcher-local credentials persist until admitted work returns. This is not a hard execution/erasure deadline. Separate bodyless admin/Origin/CSRF POST `/api/settings/accounts/generate-password` returns a 24-character value before any commit, without retained retrieval. UI generation has a 60-second best-effort lifetime and context-bound saved acknowledgement before separate submission; JavaScript cannot securely wipe strings. Self revocation may prevent final response/result access; disconnect/401 proves neither success nor cancellation. Browser-shell restrictions and UART0-only bootstrap/recovery remain unchanged. The generated endpoint is independently optionally registered, with failure isolation/restart coverage and 23 handlers. Implementation is complete, host-tested/build-verified; target validation/signoff remains pending. Parent build: 25.61 s, 95,908 B RAM / 1,694,237 B flash; timer runtime costs and stack/heap margins remain unmeasured. No task/stack/queue depth/socket expansion or 8D.11 work. Current contracts and attributed host evidence: `docs/phase8d10_implementation.md`.
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Current slice 2 extends the same dispatcher slot to create/password and self role/delete/password. Mutation bodies are 768 bytes/four receives; results stay secret-free, 96 bytes, replaceable and session-bound. Conditional password mutation checks identity under the canonical database mutex. A one-second firmware-lifetime ESP timer cancels/wipes non-executing queued credentials at their 30-second deadline plus timer/scheduling latency; dequeue wipes shared inputs after copying, and dispatcher-local credentials persist until admitted work returns. This is not a hard execution/erasure deadline. Separate bodyless admin/Origin/CSRF POST `/api/settings/accounts/generate-password` returns a 24-character value before any commit, without retained retrieval. UI generation has a 60-second best-effort lifetime and context-bound saved acknowledgement before separate submission; JavaScript cannot securely wipe strings. Self revocation may prevent final response/result access; disconnect/401 proves neither success nor cancellation. Browser-shell restrictions and UART0 first-admin provisioning/recovery remain unchanged. The generated endpoint is independently optionally registered, with failure isolation/restart coverage and 23 handlers. Implementation is complete, host-tested/build-verified; target validation/signoff remains pending. Parent build: 25.61 s, 95,908 B RAM / 1,694,237 B flash; timer runtime costs and stack/heap margins remain unmeasured. No task/stack/queue depth/socket expansion or 8D.11 work. Current contracts and attributed host evidence: `docs/phase8d10_implementation.md`.
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**Historical slice 1 architecture (superseded scope/counts, retained evidence):**
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`web_account_settings` supplies an optional admin-only compact account list and one session-bound role/delete operation/result slot, separate from Serial's slot but executed on the same dispatcher queue. HTTPD authorizes/parses/queues; the dispatcher revalidates the initiating login/admin and 30-second dequeue deadline, then calls conditional database mutations and best-effort target web/SSH revocation after success. `user_database_get_accounts()` copies at most eight username/role/ID/auth-generation records under the existing mutex with zero wait and no key/password fields. `user_database_delete_current()` and `user_database_set_role_current()` compare target identity under the mutation lock and share canonical CLI commit/invariant logic; stale selection never intentionally mutates a replacement account. Results are replaceable, not durable/idempotent, and already-admitted work can complete after logout. Self-target, create/password/generated-secret workflows remain unavailable in this slice; bootstrap/recovery remain UART0-only. Accounts UI confirms mutations, retains visible stale lists/outcomes during bounded auto-check/refresh and fences navigation/session changes without changing broker ownership. Three optional routes bring HTTPD handlers to 22; six sockets/no LRU and existing tasks/stacks/queue depth remain. See `docs/phase8d10_implementation.md` for limits and pending target checks.
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`web_account_settings` supplies an optional admin-only compact account list and one session-bound role/delete operation/result slot, separate from Serial's slot but executed on the same dispatcher queue. HTTPD authorizes/parses/queues; the dispatcher revalidates the initiating login/admin and 30-second dequeue deadline, then calls conditional database mutations and best-effort target web/SSH revocation after success. `user_database_get_accounts()` copies at most eight username/role/ID/auth-generation records under the existing mutex with zero wait and no key/password fields. `user_database_delete_current()` and `user_database_set_role_current()` compare target identity under the mutation lock and share canonical CLI commit/invariant logic; stale selection never intentionally mutates a replacement account. Results are replaceable, not durable/idempotent, and already-admitted work can complete after logout. Self-target, create/password/generated-secret workflows remain unavailable in this slice; first-admin provisioning/recovery remain UART0-only. Accounts UI confirms mutations, retains visible stale lists/outcomes during bounded auto-check/refresh and fences navigation/session changes without changing broker ownership. Three optional routes bring HTTPD handlers to 22; six sockets/no LRU and existing tasks/stacks/queue depth remain. See `docs/phase8d10_implementation.md` for limits and pending target checks.
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## Typed Serial settings (8D.9)
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@@ -235,3 +235,9 @@ Hardware diagnostics are synchronous console commands. RS-232 tests own the phys
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- Avoid holding service/database/broker locks across I2C, network sends, or other potentially long operations unless the existing contract explicitly requires it. Preserve the existing broker-before-serial lock order.
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- Serial RX/TX stream payloads, broker per-client payloads, the transactional user-database candidate, and selected cryptographic allocations prefer PSRAM with internal fallback. The live user database, FreeRTOS control structures, UART driver buffers, and task stacks remain internal where deterministic/cache-disable access matters.
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- The build disables wolfSSL ESP32 AES/SHA acceleration, and the HTTPS path uses software AES for PSRAM-backed records. This preserves the validated workaround for uncoordinated mbedTLS/wolfSSL hardware-crypto locks and a prior mbedTLS external-RAM DMA watchdog stall.
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## Legacy credential removal storage boundary
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`user_database_init(load_result)` has no credential input. Missing storage is persisted empty; `user_database_recover_empty()` is the unavailable-only destructive recovery API. Valid v1 user bytes load without rewriting or account changes. The private `v1_admin_marker` retains its byte position and is derived from administrator count during mutations; it is not a public bootstrap state, new role or schema change. No user migration/bootstrap/synchronization API remains.
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`web_security` owns TLS only. A private reader validates 1,392-byte v1 `web_sec/material`, copies exact key/certificate DER, fingerprint and generation into 1,340-byte v2, commits, then publishes. Temporary v1 credential-bearing input is wiped; no public legacy credential type/getter/rotation remains. Malformed/unknown records and read/validation/commit failures fail closed, with no fallback regeneration or overwrite of rejected records. Missing material may be generated; explicit reset replaces TLS only. Downgrade to v1-only firmware is incompatible. Logical NVS replacement is not secure flash erasure. Contracts/evidence: `docs/legacy_credential_removal.md`.
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@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
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- Files: `src/web_server.{h,c}`, `src/web_serial_transport.{h,c}`, `src/web_ui.{h,c}`, `src/web_console.{h,c}`
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- Ordinary HTTPS idle cleanup: `src/web_httpd_idle.{c,h}`, owner sweep in `web_httpd_adapter.{c,h}`, lifecycle/TLS composition in `web_server.c`; `tests/web_httpd_idle/run.py`. Independent of diagnostics/optional transports: 15-second observed idle, one-second timer/one queued probe, six rows, actual WS/async/pending exemptions, safe current-owner shutdown and stop/restart fencing. No LRU/socket/timeout/stack increase. SDK queue/owner-delay limits and target checklist: `docs/https_idle_cleanup.md`.
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- Opt-in admission diagnostics: `src/web_diagnostics.{c,h}`, `tests/web_diagnostics/run.py`. Public synchronous HTTPS create/close callbacks publish six post-TLS connection records; four ticket/upgrade wrappers feed a 32-entry numeric ring. UART0/admin SSH `web diagnostics enable|disable|show|clear`; no queue/task/cleanup override or capacity change. Full bounds, SDK semantics and preaccept/TLS blind spots: `docs/phase8d11_implementation.md`.
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- Legacy removal: `user_database` persists missing storage empty and preserves valid v1 user bytes; private derived `v1_admin_marker`, no public bootstrap/migration/sync APIs. `web_security` privately migrates v1 1392-byte material to TLS-only v2 1340-byte material, exact identity/generation retained, commit before publish, fail closed without fallback overwrite. Credential commands removed; user generated passwords and TLS rotation remain. Contracts, downgrade and evidence limits: `docs/legacy_credential_removal.md`.
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- Security files: `src/web_security.{h,c}`, `src/web_cookie_auth.{h,c}`, `src/web_session_store.{h,c}`, `src/web_auth_parse.{h,c}`. Private IDF boundary: `src/web_httpd_adapter.{h,c}`.
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- Asset files: authored/generated boundary in `src/web_assets_data.{h,c}`, `web_assets/SOURCES.md`, `web_assets/generate_embedded_assets.py`
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- Interfaces: web init/start/stop/snapshots; HTTP handlers; ticket mint/consume; attach/detach; targeted session revocation
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@@ -118,11 +119,11 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
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**Responsibility:** persist bounded accounts, verify passwords/SSH keys, issue secret-free principals, and enforce account invariants.
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- Files: `src/user_database.{h,c}`, `src/user_console.{h,c}`; `src/admin_command_gate.{h,c}` is currently a narrow recursive wrapper used only by the `user` command handler, not the global command serializer
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- Interfaces: init/migration/recovery, authenticate, principal-currentness, account/password/role/key mutations, snapshots
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- Interfaces: credential-independent init/empty recovery, authenticate, principal-currentness, account/password/role/key mutations, snapshots
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- Called by: web and SSH authentication/currentness checks and console administration
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- Dependencies: NVS, secure random, mbedTLS cryptography; after a committed command-layer mutation, best-effort web/SSH revocation calls supplement authoritative transport currentness checks
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- Ownership: database mutex protects the internal live record and PSRAM-preferred transactional candidate; password authentication runs PBKDF2 outside the mutex and revalidates afterward, while mutation locking must be checked per operation.
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- Authorization: UART0 exclusively owns initial administrator bootstrap and unavailable-database recovery; current admins may use admin SSH for other commands unless handler policy denies them. HTTPS currently treats both roles alike.
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- Authorization: UART0 establishes the first administrator through normal `user add` and exclusively owns unavailable-database recovery to empty (healthy database refused); current admins may use admin SSH for other commands unless handler policy denies them. HTTPS serial/status permits both roles; administration requires `admin`.
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- Constraint: final administrator cannot be deleted or demoted; transport principals must be rechecked after mutations.
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## Administration console infrastructure
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@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ This file is working memory. Update it during active work and before handoff; do
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## Development state
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- **Legacy credential removal (2026-09-08), implemented/host-tested/build-verified; target pending:** New database and TLS module contracts inspected. Missing user storage commits empty; normal UART0 `user add <username> admin [--generate]` provisions the first administrator. Unavailable-only UART0 recovery rebuilds empty and refuses healthy storage. Existing valid user v1 bytes stay unchanged; private derived `v1_admin_marker`, no public bootstrap/migration/sync API. HTTPS private v1 reader migrates `web_sec/material` 1392 → TLS-only v2 1340 bytes, retaining exact DER/fingerprint/generation, committing before publication; failures fail closed without fallback replacement. Legacy credential commands removed; generated user passwords and TLS rotation retained; reset is TLS-only. Older v1-only firmware cannot read v2; logical NVS replacement is not secure flash wiping, and no factory erase is required. Startup integration complete; SSH gate independent of HTTPS identity, obsolete completion/policy entries removed. Parent security15, canonical accounts, policy/startup64-gate combinations, console lifecycle, cookie accounts, idle18+guards and build/diff checks PASS. Integration agent reports broad auth/transport/lifecycle/UI regression PASS. Review no actionable findings; final agent-added sparse populated v1 reload/authorization regression PASS, test-only extension. Parent final production build 3.93 s, 99,260 B RAM / 1,705,781 B flash (−56/−3,200 vs idle-cleanup baseline). Host NVS doubles do not prove flash/power-loss behavior; no independently captured old-device TLS fixture or hardware validation. Record: `docs/legacy_credential_removal.md`.
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- **Scoped user report — HTTPS idle cleanup worked (2026-09-08):** User accepted that the cleanup worked. This supersedes the no-target-acceptance wording for that specific behavior below, not the historical measurements. No additional soak duration, detailed checklist passes, resource reserve approval, broader 8D.11/M3 sign-off or legacy-removal target validation was supplied.
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- **User-authorized bounded ordinary HTTPS idle cleanup complete (2026-09-08), host-tested/build-verified; target pending:** Preserved existing 8D.11 key/diagnostic implementation (initial Git status was clean). User capture: post-TLS occupancy 6/6, ordinary4/serial2/admin0, ordinary connection ages 50–74 s; admin ticket returned in 14 ms, no TLS/upgrade observed and ticket unconsumed. Installed IDF stops selecting listener at capacity with LRU disabled. `web_httpd_idle.{c,h}` plus sole-private-boundary sweep in `web_httpd_adapter`: six owner-only rows, 15-second observed-idle window (three five-second status polls), one-second ESP timer/at most one queued owner probe, current fd shutdown (no reusable-pointer queued close), all-route SDK request-plus-purge completion marker and input readiness/WS/async checks, TLS-create fd reset, submit fence/nonwrapping restart generations. Diagnostics does not gate policy; socket/timeout/LRU/task/stack/asset settings unchanged. Implementation `pio run` PASS 57.55 s, final confirmation PASS 3.13 s; **99,316 B RAM / 1,708,981 B flash (+160/+1,384 versus diagnostic baseline)**. Rows144 B/module static167 B before placement; timer32 B internal heap before overhead; sweep local frame80 B, runtime margins unmeasured. Final idle **18 + SDK guards**, server **18**, diagnostics **12+1** PASS; cookie accounts/admin/settings/serial-settings, admin transport25/tickets12, store/serial, UI68+CSP and canonical console/account/key/lifecycle/policy suites PASS; diff check PASS. Cookie test-double missing `<stdint.h>` fixed and all variants rerun. Exact contracts/audit/tests/resources/target checklist: `docs/https_idle_cleanup.md`. Ordinary ages are connection ages, not proved idle duration. No hard wall-clock/admission guarantee: owner-blocking handshake/parser/send delays cleanup; continuously active ordinary sockets are not evicted. Reported queue errors retry, but accepted-and-lost nonblocking UDP work stays one reserved probe until successful stop/restart (tested), rather than accumulating unsafe delayed work. Failed stop remains detached/owned until retry. No hardware/upload/erase/commit, target acceptance or reserve approval; next is the documented target reproduction/soak, not capacity changes.
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- **Authorized 8D.11 admission diagnostic slice complete (2026-09-08), host-tested/build-verified; target pending:** `web_diagnostics.{c,h}` uses public synchronous HTTPS create/close callbacks and four ticket/upgrade wrappers, six fixed metadata slots and a 32-record opt-in numeric ring. Console `web diagnostics enable|disable|show|clear` via UART0/admin SSH; browser policy unchanged. No close/open override, queue probe/task, capacity/timeout/log-level/assets/SDK change. Post-TLS owner-published occupancy only; TLS failures/in-progress handshakes and preaccept backlog remain invisible. Final `pio run` PASS **10.30 s, 99,156 B RAM / 1,707,597 B flash**, **+3,080/+3,912 B** versus recorded key-slice baseline. Ring/table target symbols 2,816/192 B; diagnostic handler/record/TLS callback/show local frames 144/144/160/528 B excluding callees, runtime margins unmeasured. PASS diagnostic **12+1**, server lifecycle **16**, canonical console lifecycle/policy/boundary, canonical account/key transactions, cookie/admin and cookie/accounts, admin transport **25**/tickets **12**, browser **68 plus renderer/CSP**, store/serial and diff check. Exact files/commands/contracts and reproduction checklist in `docs/phase8d11_implementation.md`. Existing key work preserved; no device/commit/upload/erase, timeout diagnosis, target acceptance or reserve approval claimed. Next is user target capture, not capacity changes or 8D.12.
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@@ -127,7 +131,7 @@ Based on checked-in source plus `README.md` and `docs/roadmap.md`:
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These observations should be checked when touching the relevant area; they are not automatically bugs requiring unrelated cleanup.
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- Some source comments still call shared commands UART0-only or call the current local status/control task read-only.
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- `USER_DATABASE_LOAD_EMPTY` is only an initialization/failure sentinel at the checked-in revision: every successful `user_database_init()` path returns `STORED` or `MIGRATED_LEGACY`, so `main.c`'s successful "new empty" log branch is unreachable.
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- Legacy-removal module contracts now make `USER_DATABASE_LOAD_EMPTY` a successful persisted-empty initialization result; older migration/sentinel observations are superseded. Final startup integration/build evidence is pending.
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- SSH startup is currently gated on successful `web_security` initialization even though SSH uses separate host-key material. **Needs verification:** whether this coupling is intentional recovery policy or an accidental startup dependency.
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## Items to verify in future work
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@@ -46,11 +46,11 @@ Phase 8D.2 adds a third identity: non-reused 64-bit originating web-session IDs
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## UART0 is the physical recovery authority
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**Decision:** UART0 remains independent of UART1 and networking. Initial administrator bootstrap and explicit unavailable-user-database recovery are restricted to UART0.
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**Decision:** UART0 remains independent of UART1 and networking. The first administrator is created with normal `user add` on UART0; explicit unavailable-user-database recovery to empty is UART0-only and refuses healthy storage. No bootstrap command/API remains.
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**Rationale/evidence:** `main.c` configures UART0 separately; command policy and user handlers deny these operations remotely. README/roadmap identify UART0 as the trusted recovery console.
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**Consequence for future changes:** Network failures or credential corruption must not remove UART0 recovery. Do not expose bootstrap/recovery through web or admin SSH without an explicit security redesign.
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**Consequence for future changes:** Network failures or credential corruption must not remove UART0 recovery. Do not expose unauthenticated first-admin provisioning or recovery through web or admin SSH without an explicit security redesign.
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**Relevant files:** `src/main.c`, `src/admin_ssh_console.c`, `src/user_console.c`, `docs/roadmap.md`
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@@ -140,17 +140,17 @@ The following first-slice exclusions are historical and superseded by slice 2:
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**Rationale/evidence:** Serial, Wi-Fi, local UI, web security, users, and SSH security each validate schema/size and own their namespace. User/security mutations build and validate candidate state before committing it; security modules avoid silently replacing an established identity. The live user database remains internal while its 5,360-byte candidate is a persistent PSRAM-preferred allocation with internal fallback and is wiped after every transaction.
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**Consequence for future changes:** Add schema versions and transactional candidate validation. Do not overwrite unknown records automatically; provide explicit migration/reset behavior. Preserve the distinct persistence contracts: explicit save/load/default/reset for working configuration and per-blob commit-before-live-install for user and identity mutation. Keep candidate ownership mutex-local and wipe/free it on initialization or recovery failure. Recheck external-buffer staging in the flash/NVS implementation when upgrading from the pinned ESP-IDF 5.5 baseline. Pre-bootstrap legacy credential rotation spans `web_sec/material` and `user_db/database`, is not cross-namespace atomic, and relies on boot reconciliation after interruption.
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**Consequence for future changes:** Add schema versions and transactional candidate validation. Do not overwrite unknown records automatically; provide explicit migration/reset behavior. Preserve the distinct persistence contracts: explicit save/load/default/reset for working configuration and per-blob commit-before-live-install for user and identity mutation. Keep candidate ownership mutex-local and wipe/free it on initialization or recovery failure. Recheck external-buffer staging in the flash/NVS implementation when upgrading from the pinned ESP-IDF 5.5 baseline. Legacy credential synchronization and reconciliation are removed. Missing user storage commits empty; valid user v1 bytes remain compatible, with private `v1_admin_marker` derived from admin count, not a public bootstrap contract. HTTPS v1 (1,392 bytes) migrates through a private validated reader to TLS-only v2 (1,340 bytes), preserving exact DER/fingerprint/generation and committing before publication. Failures fail closed without fallback regeneration or overwriting rejected records. See `docs/legacy_credential_removal.md`.
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**Relevant files:** `src/serial_config.c`, `src/wifi_config.c`, `src/mdns_config.c`, `src/mdns_service.c`, `src/local_ui_config.c`, `src/web_security.c`, `src/user_database.c`, `src/ssh_security.c`
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## NVS is persistence, not a physical security boundary
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**Decision:** The current firmware stores Wi-Fi credentials, recovery credentials, and TLS/SSH private keys in unencrypted application NVS. The reserved NVS-key partition does not enable encryption.
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**Decision:** The current firmware stores Wi-Fi credentials and TLS/SSH private keys in unencrypted application NVS. The reserved NVS-key partition does not enable encryption.
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**Rationale/evidence:** `partitions.csv`, README security notes, and current code show no NVS-encryption setup. Original rationale for deferring encryption is outside the implementation; the observable limitation is explicit.
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**Consequence for future changes:** Do not claim resistance to flash extraction. Avoid increasing stored secret exposure. Enabling encryption requires migration/recovery planning, not just changing the partition table.
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**Consequence for future changes:** Do not claim resistance to flash extraction. Logical NVS replacement can leave old plaintext credentials in flash and is not secure erasure; no factory erase is required by this cleanup. Older v1-only firmware cannot read v2 HTTPS material. Avoid increasing stored secret exposure. Enabling encryption requires migration/recovery planning, not just changing the partition table.
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**Relevant files:** `partitions.csv`, `README.md`, `src/web_security.c`, `src/ssh_security.c`, `src/wifi_config.c`
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+11
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@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
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# Command reference
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|
||||
UART0 and authenticated `admin` SSH sessions use the same registered command implementations through one serialized dispatcher. Admin SSH exposes the full operational registry, including interactive prompts, recovery-secret display, network diagnostics, reboot, and HTTPS/SSH material mutation. Initial administrator bootstrap and explicit recovery of an unavailable user database remain physically bound to UART0. Admin SSH also rejects generating a replacement password for its own account so the one-time value cannot be lost when the session is revoked. Run `help` for root commands and `<group> help` for a group summary. Configuration changes are RAM-only unless explicitly saved.
|
||||
UART0 and authenticated `admin` SSH sessions use the same registered command implementations through one serialized dispatcher. Admin SSH exposes the full operational registry, including interactive prompts, network diagnostics, reboot, and HTTPS/SSH material mutation. Create the first administrator through normal `user add <username> admin` on physical UART0; explicit recovery of an unavailable database is UART0-only. Admin SSH also rejects generating a replacement password for its own account so the one-time value cannot be lost when the session is revoked. Run `help` for root commands and `<group> help` for a group summary. Configuration changes are RAM-only unless explicitly saved.
|
||||
|
||||
Browser-admin uses the same dispatcher with temporary 8D.7 restrictions. It now supports deferred **`reboot`** and **`web stop`** in addition to admin-only `exit`. The control task waits up to ten seconds for application output drain plus 200 ms; acknowledgement delivery is best effort, not confirmed receipt. Input observed during deferral is discarded. `web stop` closes both browser routes; restart HTTPS via UART0/admin SSH `web start` and sign in again. Reboot affects all transports and loses RAM-only changes. The second slice also permits exact parsed **`web certificate rotate --force`** (equivalent quoting accepted, no missing force or extra arguments). After drain/delay it queues a typed action on the existing dispatcher; pending input remains discarded until completion. This does not bound dispatcher wait or certificate/NVS/lifecycle execution time. Certificate commit precedes HTTPS stop/start: early generation/persistence errors skip restart, stop failure retains ownership and skips start, and later lifecycle failure does not undo the new persisted identity. Success closes both browser routes and any web writer lease; verify/trust the new certificate through a trusted channel and sign in again with unchanged account credentials. USB/UART0/SSH remain usable; use UART0/admin SSH for stop/start recovery if needed. Other `web` forms besides `web status`, `web stop` and this exact rotation remain blocked (including certificate info, credential display/rotation and reset). User mutations, Wi-Fi/mDNS mutations and restricted SSH lifecycle commands remain unavailable from browser admin. See `phase8d7_implementation.md` for the exact remaining policy and target-validation status.
|
||||
Browser-admin uses the same dispatcher with temporary 8D.7 restrictions. It now supports deferred **`reboot`** and **`web stop`** in addition to admin-only `exit`. The control task waits up to ten seconds for application output drain plus 200 ms; acknowledgement delivery is best effort, not confirmed receipt. Input observed during deferral is discarded. `web stop` closes both browser routes; restart HTTPS via UART0/admin SSH `web start` and sign in again. Reboot affects all transports and loses RAM-only changes. The second slice also permits exact parsed **`web certificate rotate --force`** (equivalent quoting accepted, no missing force or extra arguments). After drain/delay it queues a typed action on the existing dispatcher; pending input remains discarded until completion. This does not bound dispatcher wait or certificate/NVS/lifecycle execution time. Certificate commit precedes HTTPS stop/start: early generation/persistence errors skip restart, stop failure retains ownership and skips start, and later lifecycle failure does not undo the new persisted identity. Success closes both browser routes and any web writer lease; verify/trust the new certificate through a trusted channel and sign in again with unchanged account credentials. USB/UART0/SSH remain usable; use UART0/admin SSH for stop/start recovery if needed. Other `web` forms besides `web status`, `web stop` and this exact rotation remain blocked (including certificate info and reset; legacy credential commands are removed). User mutations, Wi-Fi/mDNS mutations and restricted SSH lifecycle commands remain unavailable from browser admin. See `phase8d7_implementation.md` for the exact remaining policy and target-validation status.
|
||||
|
||||
## System
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,13 +16,11 @@ Browser-admin uses the same dispatcher with temporary 8D.7 restrictions. It now
|
||||
|
||||
| Command | Description |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `user status` / `user list` | Show database generation, capacity, administrator/bootstrap state, and all secret-free account summaries. |
|
||||
| `user status` / `user list` | Show database generation, capacity, administrator count, and all secret-free account summaries. |
|
||||
| `user show <username>` | Show one account's role, ID, authentication generation, and SSH-key fingerprints. |
|
||||
| `user bootstrap` | Set and confirm the `admin` password without echo, then promote the migrated account to `admin`. |
|
||||
| `user bootstrap --generate` | Bootstrap `admin` with a generated 24-character password displayed once. |
|
||||
| `user add <username> <user|admin>` | Create an account using a bounded no-echo password and confirmation prompt. |
|
||||
| `user add <username> <user|admin> --generate` | Create an account with a generated password displayed once. |
|
||||
| `user delete <username> --force` | Delete an account; the pre-bootstrap migrated `admin` and final administrator are protected. |
|
||||
| `user delete <username> --force` | Delete an account; the final administrator is protected. |
|
||||
| `user role <username> <user|admin> --force` | Change a role; the final administrator cannot be demoted. |
|
||||
| `user password <username>` | Set and confirm a new password without echo. |
|
||||
| `user password <username> --generate` | Replace a password with a generated value displayed once. |
|
||||
@@ -30,13 +28,13 @@ Browser-admin uses the same dispatcher with temporary 8D.7 restrictions. It now
|
||||
| `user key add <username> <type> <base64>` | Import a key non-interactively; intended for authenticated admin SSH and also accepted on UART0. |
|
||||
| `user key delete <username> <0..2> --force` | Delete one key by the index shown by `user show`. |
|
||||
| `user key clear <username> --force` | Delete all public keys for an account. |
|
||||
| `user recover --force` | When normal user-database initialization failed, explicitly replace its blob from the current legacy network credential. |
|
||||
| `user recover --force` | When normal user-database initialization failed, explicitly replace only its blob with an empty database; UART0-only, refuses a healthy database. |
|
||||
|
||||
Usernames must match `[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,15}`. Passwords contain 12–64 printable ASCII characters. The fixed database supports eight users and three SSH keys per user; initial key types are `ssh-ed25519` and `ecdsa-sha2-nistp256`. A key may be assigned to multiple accounts but cannot be duplicated within one account. Password verifiers, salts, raw key blobs, and passwords are absent from ordinary status output. `Ctrl-C` cancels a password or key prompt, and generated passwords are shown once.
|
||||
|
||||
On the first Phase 8A boot, the old shared `admin` credential is imported as a role-`user` account, not silently granted administrator rights. Run `user bootstrap` from physical UART0 to establish the administrator. Phase 8B now authenticates HTTPS and SSH passwords through this database and enables stored SSH public keys. Before bootstrap, `web credentials rotate --force` and `web reset --force` synchronize the migrated verifier; after bootstrap, that legacy credential is recovery-only and does not authenticate or alter role-based users.
|
||||
Missing `user_db/database` storage is committed empty. On UART0 run `user add <username> admin`, optionally with `--generate`, to create the first administrator. There is no bootstrap command, imported shared credential, or synchronization with HTTPS material. Existing valid v1 user databases load unchanged, including previously migrated role-`user` accounts; no account is silently promoted.
|
||||
|
||||
`user recover --force` is a destructive physical recovery operation and succeeds only while the database is unavailable. It replaces the user blob with one role-`user` account derived from the current legacy credential; run `user bootstrap` afterward. It does not erase unrelated NVS data. Successful password, role, key, bootstrap, and delete operations invalidate only that username's outstanding WebSocket tickets and active WebSocket/SSH sessions; unrelated users remain connected.
|
||||
`user recover --force` is destructive and succeeds only while the database is unavailable. It rebuilds only the user blob empty, importing no credentials; then create an administrator with normal `user add` on UART0. It refuses a healthy initialized database, including a healthy empty one, and does not erase unrelated NVS data. Successful password, role, key and delete operations invalidate only that username's outstanding tickets and active web/SSH sessions; unrelated users remain connected.
|
||||
|
||||
## Local display
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -129,11 +127,9 @@ When the Wi-Fi station receives an IPv4 address, the Wi-Fi manager announces `sa
|
||||
| `web status` | Show HTTPS and WebSocket state. |
|
||||
| `web start` / `web stop` | Start or stop HTTPS service. |
|
||||
| `web counters` / `web clear-counters` | Show or clear web counters. |
|
||||
| `web credentials show` | Display the legacy migration/recovery credential on UART0 or authenticated admin SSH; it is not a role-based network login. |
|
||||
| `web credentials rotate --force` | Replace the legacy recovery credential and synchronize the migrated pre-bootstrap account only. |
|
||||
| `web certificate info` | Display certificate identity and fingerprint. |
|
||||
| `web certificate rotate --force` | Replace the HTTPS certificate and private key. Browser admin defers commit and HTTPS restart; both browser routes close and new certificate trust/relogin is required. UART0/admin SSH behavior is unchanged. |
|
||||
| `web reset --force` | Explicitly replace missing, incompatible, or damaged legacy credentials and web material. |
|
||||
| `web reset --force` | Explicitly replace HTTPS certificate/private key only, including missing, incompatible or damaged material; never changes users. |
|
||||
|
||||
HTTPS listens on port 443 only. Authenticate with any current user-database username/password; both `user` and `admin` roles receive the existing status and browser-terminal interface. The device serves vendored xterm.js without Internet access. Browser sessions use one-time account-bound tickets, binary WebSocket frames, and the broker's one-writer rule. The combined **Connect**/**Disconnect** control closes the current WebSocket and pauses automatic reconnect when active; after a user-paused disconnect, it changes to **Connect** to resume connection attempts. Account mutations revoke only that account's tickets and sessions.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -157,7 +153,7 @@ UART0 and admin SSH submit to one bounded queue, and one dispatcher task is the
|
||||
|
||||
UART0 and admin SSH use shared whole-line Tab completion. A unique/common prefix expands inline; a Tab that cannot extend an ambiguous prefix prints the matching candidates and redraws the unchanged input line instead of cycling candidates. Admin SSH additionally supports four-entry per-session command history with Up/Down, inline cursor editing with Left/Right, Home/End (including Pos1/Ende terminal sequences), Backspace/Delete, Ctrl-C, and visible or no-echo interactive prompts. Its history is RAM-only, private to the session, and wiped on disconnect. Ping callbacks enqueue bounded typed results so all formatting remains on the dispatcher task.
|
||||
|
||||
`exit`, `reboot`, `ssh stop`, session disconnect, and SSH host-key reset/rotation use bounded deferred control. The firmware waits on a best-effort basis for the administration output ring and transport TX buffer to drain before acting; this is not confirmation that the peer received the acknowledgement. The shell stops accepting another command while such an action is pending. SSH host-key replacement or service stop closes all SSH sessions; reconnect and verify the new fingerprint where applicable. Web recovery credentials/certificates, Wi-Fi secrets, and interactive user passwords/keys are available to authenticated administrators and must therefore be treated as remotely accessible administrative material. `user bootstrap` and `user recover --force` remain UART0-only. A connected administrator also cannot generate its own replacement password remotely, preventing the one-time password from being lost during self-revocation. SSH does not provide `exec`, SFTP, SCP, forwarding, or subsystems.
|
||||
`exit`, `reboot`, `ssh stop`, session disconnect, and SSH host-key reset/rotation use bounded deferred control. The firmware waits on a best-effort basis for the administration output ring and transport TX buffer to drain before acting; this is not confirmation that the peer received the acknowledgement. The shell stops accepting another command while such an action is pending. SSH host-key replacement or service stop closes all SSH sessions; reconnect and verify the new fingerprint where applicable. TLS certificate management, Wi-Fi secrets, and interactive user passwords/keys are available to authenticated administrators and must therefore be treated as remotely accessible administrative material. `user recover --force` remains UART0-only; `user bootstrap` and all `web credentials` commands are removed. A connected administrator also cannot generate its own replacement password remotely, preventing the one-time password from being lost during self-revocation. SSH does not provide `exec`, SFTP, SCP, forwarding, or subsystems.
|
||||
|
||||
## Hardware diagnostics
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -184,3 +180,5 @@ UART0 and admin SSH use shared whole-line Tab completion. A unique/common prefix
|
||||
| `debug buttons test [seconds]` | Run the bounded button event test for 1–30 seconds; the default is 10 seconds. |
|
||||
|
||||
Follow the exact wiring in [Electrical tests](electrical_tests.md) before invoking diagnostics. The OLED must be powered from 3.3 V because module I²C pull-ups may connect to `VCC`; verify that all external pull-ups also terminate at 3.3 V. Display diagnostics probe the standard SSD1315-compatible 7-bit `0x3c`/`0x3d` addresses. The currently tested module acknowledges at `0x3c`, whose 8-bit write/read forms are `0x78`/`0x79`; an explicit `scan --force` is available only for the dedicated local-UI bus. Diagnostics initially run at 100 kHz and treat an absent display as nonfatal. RS-232 diagnostics that require UART1 refuse to use it until `serial stop` releases it. The RGB LED shows test state: blue idle, yellow/orange running, green passed, red failed.
|
||||
|
||||
HTTPS storage migration preserves the exact TLS identity and commits TLS-only v2 before publication. Older v1-only firmware cannot read v2. Logical NVS replacement is not secure flash erasure; no factory erase is required. See [legacy removal](legacy_credential_removal.md).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
# Bounded ordinary HTTPS idle retention
|
||||
|
||||
Implemented 2026-09-08 on the existing 8D.11 key/diagnostic implementation. Host-tested and firmware-build verified; **not target validated or signed off**. No upload, erase, commit, SDK patch or generated-asset change.
|
||||
Implemented 2026-09-08 on the existing 8D.11 key/diagnostic implementation. Host-tested and firmware-build verified. **Subsequent scoped user report:** the user accepted that idle cleanup worked. This supersedes the original target-pending status for that behavior only; no additional soak duration, individual checklist passes, memory reserve approval or broader 8D.11/M3 sign-off is inferred. The implementation evidence below remains historical and unchanged. No agent upload, erase, commit, SDK patch or generated-asset change.
|
||||
|
||||
## Evidence and scope
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
|
||||
# Legacy credential removal
|
||||
|
||||
## Scope and status — 2026-09-08
|
||||
|
||||
Agreed removal of the obsolete shared web credential, user bootstrap/migration/synchronization paths, and related public APIs/commands. User-generated passwords and HTTPS certificate rotation remain supported. Implementation and integration are complete, host-tested and build-verified; target validation remains pending. No device operation, factory erase, commit or asset generation was performed.
|
||||
|
||||
Separately, the user reported and accepted that ordinary HTTPS idle cleanup worked. This is a scoped functional report, not an invented soak, individual checklist execution, memory reserve approval, broader 8D.11/M3 sign-off or target validation of this credential removal. Prior measurements remain in [the idle-cleanup record](https_idle_cleanup.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## User database
|
||||
|
||||
- `user_database_init(load_result)` takes no legacy credential. Missing `user_db/database` storage is committed as an empty v1 database; no account/password is imported.
|
||||
- Create the first administrator on physical UART0 with `user add <username> admin`, optionally `--generate`. Entered passwords use hidden confirmation; generated passwords are shown once. There is no reserved bootstrap account or public bootstrap state.
|
||||
- `user recover --force` is UART0-only, calls `user_database_recover_empty()`, and destructively rebuilds only an unavailable database empty. It refuses a healthy initialized database, including an empty one. Follow with normal `user add`; unrelated configuration and TLS/SSH identities are untouched.
|
||||
- Valid existing v1 database bytes load without rewriting or changing accounts, roles, IDs, authentication generations, verifiers or authorized keys. Previously migrated role-`user` accounts are not automatically promoted. The private `v1_admin_marker` preserves the old wire byte and is derived from administrator count during mutations; it is not a new role, public bootstrap field or schema change.
|
||||
- No public bootstrap, legacy user migration or synchronization API remains. Final-admin protection, conditional mutations, copied principal currentness and target-only revocation remain the canonical account contracts.
|
||||
|
||||
## HTTPS identity storage
|
||||
|
||||
`web_security` owns only TLS material. At the unchanged `web_sec/material` key, a private byte-oriented reader validates the shipped **1,392-byte v1** layout and builds **1,340-byte TLS-only v2**. It retains the **exact private-key DER, certificate DER, SHA-256 fingerprint and material generation**: this migration is not certificate rotation.
|
||||
|
||||
The v2 candidate is validated and committed before live publication. Temporary credential-bearing v1 input is wiped. No public legacy credential reader/type, display, rotation or authentication path remains. Unknown/malformed material, read failures, invalid cryptographic identity and migration write/commit failures fail closed; they do not trigger fallback regeneration or overwrite of rejected material. Truly missing material may be generated and saved normally.
|
||||
|
||||
`web credentials show`, `web credentials rotate --force` and `user bootstrap` (including its generated form) are removed. `web certificate info` and `web certificate rotate --force` remain subject to existing frontend policy. `web reset --force` explicitly replaces TLS certificate/private key only; it does not reset passwords, import accounts or synchronize verifiers. TLS replacement/restart can close browser sessions and requires renewed certificate trust/login, without changing user credentials or revoking unrelated SSH sessions.
|
||||
|
||||
## Compatibility and physical-security limits
|
||||
|
||||
**Older v1-only firmware cannot read v2 HTTPS storage.** Do not assume a downgrade preserves usable HTTPS or restores removed credentials. Existing user database v1 compatibility is separate from this HTTPS downgrade incompatibility.
|
||||
|
||||
Replacing an NVS blob logically removes credential fields from the current record; it is **not secure flash wiping**. Append-oriented historical copies may retain plaintext legacy credentials, and current Wi-Fi secrets/TLS/SSH private keys remain unencrypted. PBKDF2 verifiers remain subject to offline guessing. No factory/partition erase is required or authorized by this cleanup.
|
||||
|
||||
## Evidence and handoff
|
||||
|
||||
- Parent reran successfully: `python3 tests/web_security/run.py` (**15 production groups**, real installed host mbedTLS plus public-surface checks), `tests/admin_console_boundary/accounts.py`, `tests/admin_ssh_policy/run.py`, `tests/admin_console_boundary/lifecycle.py`, `tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py --accounts`, and `tests/web_httpd_idle/run.py` (**18 + SDK guards**).
|
||||
- Integration agent additionally reports PASS for console boundary, auth parser, cookie default/admin/settings/serial-settings, session-store/default/serial, admin transport/tickets, server lifecycle, diagnostics, login UI and browser UI (68 + renderer/CSP). These are attributed agent runs, not additional parent reruns.
|
||||
- Startup now uses credential-free initialization and explicit TLS migration-source logging; SSH no longer depends on HTTPS identity readiness. Policy tests cover 64 service-gate combinations and RNG failure. Removed command/completion entries are tested; browser restrictions and UART0-only recovery remain.
|
||||
- Independent review found no actionable regression. A subsequent agent test extension verifies populated sparse key slots 0/2 across persisted v1 reload, unchanged entire records/no writes, fingerprint snapshots, retained-key authorization and rejection of the removed key; canonical accounts tests and scoped diff check passed. This final extension changes tests only.
|
||||
- Parent `pio run` **PASS, 3.93 s**, **99,260 B RAM / 1,705,781 B flash**, **−56 B RAM / −3,200 B flash** versus the recorded idle-cleanup baseline. Parent `git diff --check` passed before final test/documentation additions.
|
||||
- Host NVS doubles do not prove actual flash durability or power-loss behavior; TLS v1 fixture uses current-generated identity wrapped in the historical layout rather than an independently captured old-device blob. Device upgrade, persistence, failure-injection, frontend command removal and TLS-reset isolation checks remain manual validation procedures, not claimed passes; see [user administration tests](user_administration_tests.md).
|
||||
- Earlier phase records retain their historical evidence and procedures. Their legacy credential/bootstrap/reconciliation instructions are superseded by this record and the current command reference, not rewritten as if the old behavior never existed.
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,20 @@
|
||||
|
||||
This document retains phase-specific regression procedures. The Phase 8A and 8B sections describe the behavior of those historical implementation baselines; they are not the current end-to-end acceptance behavior. In current Phase 8C firmware, HTTPS and SSH authenticate through the user database, role-`user` SSH sessions receive the broker-backed serial stream, and role-`admin` SSH sessions receive the administration shell. Use the Phase 8C section for current routing and shared-console validation. Never include generated or entered passwords in test logs.
|
||||
|
||||
## Current legacy-removal regression procedure
|
||||
|
||||
The legacy bootstrap/credential/reconciliation instructions in the phase baselines below are **historical only**, superseded by [legacy credential removal](legacy_credential_removal.md) and the current [command reference](command_reference.md). Basic authentication is also historical; current HTTPS uses cookie login. The current overrides apply to later Phase 8C/browser procedures too: no `user bootstrap` or `web credentials` command remains, first-admin creation uses normal UART0 `user add`, and recovery rebuilds empty. Never treat the checklist below as evidence of execution.
|
||||
|
||||
1. On a disposable controlled NVS image with only `user_db/database` missing, boot and confirm an empty database is persisted with zero accounts/admins and no imported credential. Reboot and confirm it remains empty. Keep physical UART0 attached; do not factory-erase the device for this test.
|
||||
2. Run `user add maint admin` on UART0, check hidden password confirmation and cancellation, then confirm account/password persistence after reboot. Separately exercise `user add operator user --generate` and secure one-time display. Final-administrator delete/demotion must still fail. Existing SSH own-password generation restrictions and typed browser generated-password support remain unchanged.
|
||||
3. Load a valid existing v1 user image and verify accounts, roles, IDs, auth generations, verifiers and keys are unchanged, including a formerly migrated role-`user` account. No bootstrap status should appear and no account should be silently promoted. No web material change may synchronize a verifier.
|
||||
4. On a disposable malformed user image, confirm authentication fails closed without automatically overwriting storage. On UART0 run `user recover --force`, confirm empty storage, then `user add maint admin`. Recovery must refuse healthy databases, including healthy empty storage, and be unavailable through SSH/browser. Verify serial/Wi-Fi configuration and TLS/SSH identities remain intact. Inject read/write/commit failures where available and check failure isolation and complete committed records, not partial live mutations.
|
||||
5. Upgrade valid 1,392-byte v1 `web_sec/material`; verify persisted 1,340-byte TLS-only v2 and exact certificate/key DER, fingerprint and generation retention in a controlled fixture without logging private data. Reboot and confirm identity continuity. Malformed/unknown/cryptographically invalid records and migration read/write/commit failures must fail closed without fallback replacement. Do not interpret a failed commit as proof that no flash write occurred.
|
||||
6. Confirm help/completion/status expose no legacy credential/bootstrap operation or secret. Removed commands must reject without mutation. Exercise retained user generation and `web certificate rotate --force` through supported frontends. `web reset --force` must change TLS only, require new certificate trust/login after HTTPS restart, leave user credentials/generations unchanged, and not revoke unrelated SSH sessions.
|
||||
7. Recheck UART0/native USB availability and broker one-writer/isolated-observer behavior with network authentication unavailable. Record only nonsecret counters and telemetry. Older v1-only firmware cannot read HTTPS v2; logical NVS replacement is not secure flash erasure and no factory erase is required.
|
||||
|
||||
Evidence: implementing agents report security 15 groups with real installed mbedTLS and account tests PASS; final integration/build and this target checklist are pending. The user's report that idle cleanup worked is separate, with no additional soak or broad sign-off inferred.
|
||||
|
||||
## Historical Phase 8A baseline — role-based database and UART0 administration
|
||||
|
||||
Keep UART0 physically attached throughout these tests. At the Phase 8A baseline, HTTPS and SSH still used the legacy shared credential while the new database and public keys were prepared for the Phase 8B cutover.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user