Document the Phase 9 security baseline
Add source-reviewed operational guidance, update acceptance and roadmap references, consolidate agent state, and disable core dumps with silent panic reboot defaults.
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@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
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- Dependencies: every subsystem initializer
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- Lifecycle constraint: optional display/network failures should not remove UART0 administrative recovery or USB UART1 access; the custom administration frontend starts only after command registration.
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## Small Phase 9 operating baseline
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- `sdkconfig.defaults` explicitly selects no core dumps and silent panic reboot; existing generated configs can override defaults. README documents verification. No dependency overlays, custom crypto policy or version changes are part of this phase.
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- User accepted the reduced Phase 9 on 2026-09-18 and waived a new hardware check; this is not a claim of a new hardware-test pass.
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- [Operational checklist](../security_operations.md) and [scope/acceptance](../roadmap.md#phase-9--security-and-production-hardening): intermittent trusted-network use, unchanged authentication/recovery, no physical-extraction protection. Keep upgrades separate and do not restore the abandoned extensive patchset.
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## Secure randomness
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**Responsibility:** provide the sole project-owned, mutex-serialized application DRBG, seeded before Wi-Fi/radio use.
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@@ -64,7 +70,7 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
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- Files: `src/web_server.{h,c}`, `src/web_serial_transport.{h,c}`, `src/web_ui.{h,c}`, `src/web_console.{h,c}`
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- Ordinary HTTPS idle cleanup: `src/web_httpd_idle.{c,h}`, owner sweep in `web_httpd_adapter.{c,h}`, lifecycle/TLS composition in `web_server.c`; `tests/web_httpd_idle/run.py`. Independent of diagnostics/optional transports: 15-second observed idle, one-second timer/one queued probe, six rows, actual WS/async/pending exemptions, safe current-owner shutdown and stop/restart fencing. No LRU/socket/timeout/stack increase. SDK queue/owner-delay and regression contract: `docs/https_idle_cleanup.md`.
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- Independent throughput diagnostics: `web_serial_transport.{c,h}` owns two fixed per-slot binary-TX aggregates and epoch fences; `web_console.c` exposes default-disabled `web performance enable|disable|show|clear`. Queue-entry/callback-entry, synchronous-send and completion/drain-return estimates, not peer receipt or scheduler-only latency. `tests/web_serial_performance/run.py`; resource/evidence limits and UART0 paired capture: `docs/web_throughput_diagnostics.md`.
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- Storage compatibility: `user_database` persists missing storage empty and preserves valid v1 user bytes; private derived `v1_admin_marker`, no public bootstrap/migration/sync APIs. `web_security` privately migrates v1 1392-byte material to TLS-only v2 1340-byte material, exact identity/generation retained, commit before publish, fail closed without fallback overwrite. Credential commands removed; user generated passwords and TLS rotation remain. Contracts, downgrade and evidence limits: `docs/legacy_credential_removal.md`.
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- Storage compatibility: `user_database` persists missing storage empty and preserves valid v1 user bytes; private derived `v1_admin_marker`, no public bootstrap/migration/sync APIs. `web_security` privately migrates v1 1392-byte material to TLS-only v2 1340-byte material, exact identity/generation retained, commit before publish, fail closed without fallback overwrite. Credential commands removed; user generated passwords and TLS rotation remain. Contracts, downgrade and evidence limits: [legacy compatibility](../roadmap.md#phase8-legacy-credential-compatibility).
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- Security files: `src/web_security.{h,c}`, `src/web_cookie_auth.{h,c}`, `src/web_session_store.{h,c}`, `src/web_auth_parse.{h,c}`. Private IDF boundary: `src/web_httpd_adapter.{h,c}`.
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- HTTP policy/UI: `web_cookie_auth` + `web_auth_parse` enforce bounded cookie/Origin/CSRF/admin admission; `web_login_ui.{c,h}` serves login, `web_ui.c` owns session-fenced Serial/Admin/Settings and shared quick controllers. Tests: `tests/web_cookie_auth/run.py` (domain variants), `tests/web_auth_parse/run.py`, `tests/web_login_ui/run.py`, `tests/web_ui_session/run.py`.
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- Admission diagnostics: `web_diagnostics.{c,h}`, `tests/web_diagnostics/run.py`; six post-TLS records/32-event opt-in ring, no HTTPD off-owner inspection. [Contract](../web_admission_diagnostics.md).
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