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Apply Phase 9D security mitigations

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- Add fail-closed wolfSSL small-math policy and vectors
- Backport DHCP, EMS, and X.509 allocation fixes
- Extend source override validation and operational documentation
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Commander1024
2026-09-15 23:06:23 +02:00
parent cdc9c7335a
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@@ -17,10 +17,11 @@ This is a semantic map, not a complete file inventory. Start here, then read the
- Files: `src/security_build_policy.c`, registration in `src/CMakeLists.txt`, diagnostic flags in `sdkconfig.defaults`; tests: `tests/security_build_policy/run.py` (optional `--sdkconfig-header` checks the generated configuration).
- Compile-only guard: require no core dumps and silent panic reboot; reject panic/register output, panic/runtime GDB stubs and OCD-aware panic handling. No runtime allocation/task or physical JTAG restriction. Policy, operational profiles and target gates: [Phase 9 hardening](../security_hardening.md).
## Source-pinned dependency corrections (Phase 9C)
## Source-pinned dependency corrections (Phases 9C–9D)
- Files: root `CMakeLists.txt` (after `project()`), `cmake/security_overrides.cmake`, `tools/security_overrides.py`; tests: `tests/sdk_security_overrides/run.py --build-dir .pio/build/esp32-s3-devkitc-1-n16r8`.
- Build input is the exact-hash original **plus checked-in edits**, not installed source alone. Generated copies replace four target sources without modifying SDK/managed components: HTTPS cleanup/private-key release, HTTPD scratch lifetime/null first read, ESP-TLS server-only protocol list, and wolfSSH password bounds/payload wiping. Original notices and compile properties retained; source/hash/target ambiguity fails configuration. Never hand-edit generated copies or silently repin.
- Build input is the exact-hash original **plus checked-in edits**, not installed source alone. Generated copies replace seven target sources without modifying SDK/managed components: HTTPS cleanup/private-key release, HTTPD scratch lifetime/null first read, ESP-TLS server-only protocol list, wolfSSH password bounds/payload wiping, DHCP option bounds (CVE-2026-45160), TLS 1.2 EMS error propagation (CVE-2026-50581), and X.509 OID allocation failure (CVE-2026-34874). The mbedTLS entries explicitly select validated nested `mbedtls`/`mbedx509` targets, not the component wrapper. Original notices and compile properties retained; all seven copies carry the 2026-09-15 modification notice; source/hash/target ambiguity fails configuration. Never hand-edit generated copies or silently repin.
- Xtensa crypto policy: root `CMakeLists.txt` sets `CURVE25519_SMALL`/`ED25519_SMALL` before component parsing; `cmake/wolf_crypto_policy.cmake` PUBLIC-propagates `cmake/wolf_crypto_policy.h` to wolfSSL consumers. The resolved-settings guard requires both small implementations and rejects X25519 blinding and unreviewed Curve448/Ed448 enablement. Tests: `tests/wolf_crypto_policy/run.py`. [Wolf review](../wolf_security_review.md) distinguishes the implemented mitigation from pending ordering/parser/ECC review; [IDF review](../idf_security_review.md) records the three backports and remaining findings.
- Policy/evidence/limits: [library review](../security_library_review.md), [Phase 9C](../security_hardening.md#9c-library-cleanup-and-protocol-policy). Source-contract tests must locate and verify actual generated compilation inputs, not assume original vendor paths.
## Secure randomness