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Document M2 sign-off and update project status

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Commander1024
2026-09-07 19:29:56 +02:00
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docs/roadmap.md
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@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ Implementation sequence:
- Keep SFTP, SCP, `exec`, forwarding, subsystems, and unauthenticated shells disabled.
- Target-hardware validation passed for route separation, history/Tab editing, interactive visible/hidden prompts, output/backpressure, generated and entered user/password/key management including the longest ECDSA P-256 import, ping event routing, deferred reboot/SSH lifecycle drain behavior, bootstrap/recovery rejection, targeted self/other-user revocation during queued work, UART0/SSH administration serialization, and concurrent USB/WebSocket/user-SSH/admin-SSH operation. Stress at 460800 baud with SSH and WebSocket clients caused substantial expected packet drops and slower display controls, but did not exhaust memory or require lowering the supported baud-rate range.
4. **Phase 8D — Integrated web administration — Planned, staged delivery**
- **Implementation checkpoint:** 8D.0–8D.6 and M1 validated by user sign-off; [8D.7 implemented scope explicitly user-validated on 2026-09-07](phase8d7_implementation.md). Browser selector, bounded stop/reboot, certificate rotation and other-account operations are implemented. User reports verified certificate rotation/web start-stop and full mix without broker drops up to 230400 baud after correcting external adapter baud. Intermittent supported two serial + one admin admission failures, recently not recurring, are accepted nonblocking, not fixed. Self/generated/key/legacy-credential and other owner parity remain deferred/restricted; bootstrap/recovery remain UART0-only. Full parity is not claimed, numeric reserves and M2 acceptance remain open, and settings remain planned. No new implementation is authorized.
- **Implementation checkpoint:** 8D.0–8D.6 and M1 validated by user sign-off; [8D.7 implemented scope validated and M2 explicitly signed off by the user on 2026-09-07](phase8d7_implementation.md) ("Jupp, sign M2 off"). This supersedes earlier M2-open statements without requiring revalidation. Browser selector, bounded stop/reboot, certificate rotation and other-account operations are implemented. User reports verified certificate rotation/web start-stop and full mix without broker drops up to 230400 baud after correcting external adapter baud. Intermittent supported two serial + one admin admission failures, recently not recurring, are accepted nonblocking, not fixed. Browser self/generated/key/legacy-credential and other owner command restrictions remain deferred; bootstrap/recovery remain permanently UART0-only. Full parity is not claimed; numeric memory reserves/stack margins remain unapproved. Next is separately requested 8D.8 read-only settings entry and Serial page; sign-off alone authorizes no implementation. The requirements below retain the full end-state scope, not additional conditions reopening accepted M2.
- **Execution plan:** [Phase 8D incremental plan](phase8d_plan.md). Implement one numbered chunk per request, with a build, focused regression checks, memory accounting, and a handoff before stopping. The requirements below describe the final scope, not one implementation task.
- **Milestones:** 8D.0–8D.3 establish a measured baseline and reliable login/logout with the existing serial UI; 8D.4–8D.7 add the shared browser admin shell and verify retained serial ownership; 8D.8–8D.21 add typed settings and contextual controls one domain at a time; 8D.22 performs final integration acceptance. Login and runtime-memory target validation gate the first two milestones; do not defer them until the entire phase is implemented. No wholesale import of the rolled-back experimental implementation.
- Begin with integrated authentication: replace browser-facing HTTP Basic authentication with a same-origin HTTPS login page, explicit logout, and bounded opaque server-side sessions. Store only a digest of each random session token with a copied secret-free principal, expiry, CSRF state, and authentication-generation binding. Send the raw token only in a host-only `__Host-` cookie with `Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Strict`, `Path=/`, no `Domain`, and an explicit lifetime; never retain passwords, Basic headers, raw tokens, verifiers, or SSH-key blobs in snapshots or logs.