Commander1024/ESP32_Serial_Swiss_Army_Knife
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Add role-based user database administration

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Commander1024
2026-08-30 00:56:18 +02:00
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commit cd235445c7
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README.md
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@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ ESP32-S3 firmware for a secure, multi-transport RS-232 adapter. It operates one
## Development status
Hardware characterization, the serial core, session broker, and native USB CDC-ACM are complete. The Wi-Fi foundation is implemented and substantially validated, with several smoke tests still pending. The project is currently in the **SSH-Phase**; later work includes interface hardware, security hardening, OTA, BLE, enterprise Wi-Fi, WireGuard evaluation, and optional storage features. See the [Roadmap](docs/roadmap.md) for validation details and roadmap.
Hardware characterization, the serial core, USB CDC-ACM, Wi-Fi, HTTPS/WebSocket, SSH serial transport, and the local display/control interface are implemented. Phase 8A adds the bounded role-based user database and physical UART0 user administration; target-hardware validation and the later HTTPS/SSH authentication cutover are still pending. See the [Roadmap](docs/roadmap.md) for phase status and validation details.
## Documentation
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ The N16R8 target has 16 MiB flash and 8 MiB octal PSRAM. PlatformIO uses the cus
| Partition | Offset | Size | Purpose |
|---|---:|---:|---|
| `nvs` | `0x009000` | 512 KiB | Serial, Wi-Fi, shared admin credential, HTTPS identity, and SSH host-key data |
| `nvs` | `0x009000` | 512 KiB | Serial, Wi-Fi, role-based users, legacy network credential, HTTPS identity, and SSH host-key data |
| `otadata` | `0x089000` | 8 KiB | Active OTA-slot selection metadata |
| `phy_init` | `0x08B000` | 4 KiB | Optional PHY initialization data |
| `nvs_key` | `0x08C000` | 4 KiB | Reserved for future encrypted-NVS keys |
@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@ The firmware provides an interactive UART0 console at `serial-tool>`. Run `help`
The console supports session history, line editing, cursor movement, and hierarchical Tab completion. After an unattended boot, attach an ANSI-capable terminal and press Enter once to enable enhanced editing; this avoids blocking while no terminal is attached.
Serial configuration and Wi-Fi edits remain in RAM until explicitly saved with `serial save` or `wifi save`. Retrieve generated web and SSH credentials only from the physical UART0 console with `web credentials show`.
Serial configuration and Wi-Fi edits remain in RAM until explicitly saved with `serial save` or `wifi save`. During Phase 8A, retrieve the legacy HTTPS/SSH network credential only from physical UART0 with `web credentials show`; manage the new role-based accounts with the `user` command group.
## Security notes
The HTTPS interface uses a device-specific self-signed certificate and HTTP Basic authentication over TLS; there is no plaintext HTTP or TCP serial listener. SSH supports password-authenticated interactive shell sessions only. The shared admin password, HTTPS private key, SSH private key, and Wi-Fi credentials are currently stored in plaintext application-owned NVS blobs. The reserved `nvs_key` partition does not enable encryption. Do not treat this firmware as resistant to physical flash or RAM extraction until the planned hardening work is complete.
The HTTPS interface uses a device-specific self-signed certificate and HTTP Basic authentication over TLS; there is no plaintext HTTP or TCP serial listener. During Phase 8A, HTTPS and SSH continue to use the legacy shared `admin` credential while role-aware password/public-key authentication remains scheduled for Phase 8B. New user passwords are stored as salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 verifiers, but the legacy network password, HTTPS private key, SSH private key, and Wi-Fi credentials remain recoverable from unencrypted application-owned NVS blobs. Offline password guessing and stale append-oriented flash copies also remain possible. The reserved `nvs_key` partition does not enable encryption. Do not treat this firmware as resistant to physical flash or RAM extraction until the planned hardening work is complete.
## License