Commander1024/ESP32_Serial_Swiss_Army_Knife
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Add Phase 9C security hardening

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Generate exact-hash SDK source overrides without modifying dependencies.
Harden
SSH allocation and algorithm policy, tighten web authentication cleanup,
and add
focused host contract tests and documentation.
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Commander1024
2026-09-15 22:12:57 +02:00
parent 751dfb9ddb
commit cdc9c7335a
41 changed files with 3597 additions and 89 deletions
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README.md
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@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ ESP32-S3 firmware for a secure, multi-transport RS-232 adapter. It operates one
## Development status
Hardware characterization, serial/USB/Wi-Fi/HTTPS/SSH and local display/control are implemented and hardware-validated. **Phase 8 role-based users and administration is complete:** 8A–8C were target-hardware validated and the user explicitly signed off tested firmware at **8D.22 (2026-09-13)**. See the [roadmap](docs/roadmap.md#phase-8--role-based-users-and-administrative-access--complete) and [acceptance evidence](docs/web_administration_acceptance.md). Very low internal/DMA lifetime minima remain a nonblocking headroom follow-up, not an approved reserve. **Phase 9 security hardening is in progress**: 9A crash/debug policy and 9B SSH admission/credential handling have passed host/build checks. Hardware validation is deferred to Phase 9 as a whole. Production readiness is not yet established. See [security hardening](docs/security_hardening.md) for scope, operational profiles, and validation gates.
Hardware characterization, serial/USB/Wi-Fi/HTTPS/SSH and local display/control are implemented and hardware-validated. **Phase 8 role-based users and administration is complete:** 8A–8C were target-hardware validated and the user explicitly signed off tested firmware at **8D.22 (2026-09-13)**. See the [roadmap](docs/roadmap.md#phase-8--role-based-users-and-administrative-access--complete) and [acceptance evidence](docs/web_administration_acceptance.md). Very low internal/DMA lifetime minima remain a nonblocking headroom follow-up, not an approved reserve. **Phase 9 security hardening is in progress**: 9A crash/debug policy, 9B SSH admission/credential handling and 9C library cleanup/protocol policy have passed host/build checks. Hardware validation is deferred to Phase 9 as a whole. Production readiness is not yet established. See [security hardening](docs/security_hardening.md) for scope, operational profiles, and validation gates.
### Browser administration
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ This removes saved serial configuration and all other flash contents. The firmwa
pio run
```
The build requires the reviewed ESP-IDF 5.5.0 and pinned component sources. It generates audited security corrections under `.pio/build/` without changing the installed SDK/managed components; changed source hashes fail configuration rather than silently dropping a fix. See the [library review and upgrade contract](docs/security_library_review.md). Do not edit generated corrections or update hashes without reviewing the new source.
## Upload and monitor
Connect the board's **USB-to-UART** port for firmware upload and the UART0 development console, then run:
@@ -93,6 +95,8 @@ The HTTPS interface uses a device-specific self-signed certificate and a same-or
SSH uses separate, boot-lifetime global admission budgets for handshakes and password/signed-key checks (burst six, one refill per ten seconds), and unsigned key probes (burst twelve, one per five seconds). Reconnect, SSH restart and counter clearing do not replenish them. Rate denial closes the authenticating connection without sleeping the owner task; the three-attempt per-connection failure limit remains. These global limits can temporarily deny legitimate new SSH logins under attack and do not promise fair access or zero CPU impact. Hidden console prompts reject overlong/unsupported input instead of silently accepting a prefix; consumed SSH admin staging bytes are wiped. See [security hardening](docs/security_hardening.md#9b-ssh-admission-and-credential-handling) for exact semantics and remaining review work.
Phase 9C limits HTTPS to TLS 1.2 ECDHE-ECDSA with AES-128/256-GCM, and SSH to AES-128/256-GCM with Curve25519/P-256 key exchange. Legacy-only clients may no longer connect; existing device identities and authorized keys do not need rotation. The HTTPS policy is server-local, leaving outbound-client defaults intact. Pinned dependency corrections address cleanup leaks, parser bounds and secret-bearing storage retirement; secure allocation growth can temporarily require old and new blocks, so target resource validation remains necessary. These fixes are not a complete secret-zeroization or upstream-advisory certification. See the [audit, exact algorithms and limits](docs/security_library_review.md).
The Phase 9A supported build baseline requires disabled core dumps and silent panic reboot, rejecting panic print/halt/GDBstub and software debugger-aware options at compile time. Development, test, and production are operational profiles of the same build baseline, not separate PlatformIO environments. Silent panic reboot sacrifices panic backtraces/register dumps; reset-reason/boot information and ordinary status/logging can remain. This is not a general log-redaction guarantee. Treat raw flash, RAM and dumps as secret-bearing; do not export them as routine diagnostics. No retroactive dump clearing or secure-erase claim is made. See [security hardening](docs/security_hardening.md) for the pending checks and reviewed synthetic-secret debugging procedure.
## License