Commander1024
5a609fa40b
Add bounded login challenges, CSRF/origin enforcement, logout, and session-bound WebSocket admission. Isolate private HTTPD access behind a version-guarded adapter and add focused host coverage. Also let empty admin SSH input reach the normal console handler.
Existing serial app cookie-session cutover tests
Run from the repository root:
python3 tests/web_ui_session/run.py
Requires a host C compiler, Python 3, and Node with Fetch/Response/ReadableStream support (Node 18+). All compiler outputs and rendered scripts are temporary; no firmware build, generated assets, or device writes are performed.
The runner compiles production src/web_ui.c with HTTPD and vendored-asset data
doubles. It reuses the HTTPD stub text from tests/web_login_ui/run.py, without
importing/executing that runner. Node executes the actual C-rendered application
and inline asset-failure script, not a separately maintained implementation.
Coverage:
- Resource selection, NULL/invalid input, setter/send failure propagation, eight-header ceiling, no-store document/application, unchanged vendor caching, nosniff/no-referrer/frame denial, exact inline-loader CSP hash and login fallback.
- Session validation before initial/retried/restored connections; memory-only CSRF header and empty ticket/logout bodies; safe-text username/absolute expiry.
- 401 shutdown and navigation once; manual recovery on 403; bounded Retry-After display/backoff for capacity; network errors never assert successful logout.
- Confirmed 204 logout, lost response confirmed by session 401, uncertain logout, cancellation, explicit recovery, and stale session/ticket/status/logout/WS work.
- Pagehide/bfcache restoration, late response bodies, and superseded session checks.
- Existing writer controls, 1,024-byte binary input chunks, raw binary output, observer input gating, and explicit Disconnect pausing reconnect.
- Authentication/ticket response cap 512 bytes, existing status cap 3,072 bytes, 15-second request deadline, single status request in flight, bounded retry delay, and unchanged 5,000-line terminal scrollback.
Integration and known gaps
This is only the existing application browser portion of Phase 8D.3. It requires the simultaneous server cookie/Origin/CSRF cutover for every route. The renderer still relies on its caller to authenticate resources; protected asset failures must be 401, never a redirect to HTML served as JavaScript. No Basic fallback is implemented here. No server, auth-store, transport, admin UI, or generated asset changes are included.
These tests model DOM, timers, fetch cancellation and WebSocket events. They do not prove real-browser CSP enforcement, script-loading errors, TLS/HTTPD behavior, actual bfcache policy, cookie expiry, server revocation, or hardware serial byte integrity. Full firmware build and mandatory M1 browser/target checks remain the integrator's responsibility. The full build was deliberately not run in this restricted-write subtask. No target resource reserve is claimed. Browser secret references are dropped and never persisted/logged, but JavaScript cannot securely wipe engine-managed strings.