ESP32_Serial_Swiss_Army_Knife/tests/wolfssh_auth_contract

Pinned wolfSSH authentication control-flow contract

Run from the repository root:

CCACHE_DISABLE=1 python3 tests/wolfssh_auth_contract/run.py

Requires Python 3, a host C compiler (CC, default cc), installed managed wolfSSH, and an existing firmware compilation database/toolchain. No packages are downloaded and no firmware build or device commands run. Generated C and the executable live in a temporary directory and are removed on exit. Compile, preprocess and execution subprocesses have 30/30/10-second limits.

The runner prefers the sole .pio/build/*/compile_commands.json, otherwise the root database. Select another existing database with --compile-commands PATH. It requires the actual generated wolfSSH internal.c compilation input to equal tools/security_overrides.py's rendering of the pinned original, preprocesses that compile command (-E -dM), and checks this reviewed profile:

• LIBWOLFSSH_VERSION_HEX == 0x01004020 (1.4.20).
• RSA disabled; ECDSA and Ed25519 not disabled.
• Certificates, none authentication and NO_FAILURE_ON_REJECTED not defined.

For hosts without the ESP compiler/database, explicitly use --host-only. This prints a SKIP for production feature verification; it still checks the source/version/pin and executes the rendered host contract with the reviewed feature profile. A stale compilation database is not proof of the next firmware build's configuration.

What executes

run.py checks the exact application wolfSSH pin, installed version header and reviewed SHA-256 of managed_components/wolfssl__wolfssh/src/internal.c:

81ff1f9166708abd5c2911e9fe57c0aee01c88b5d3f68c909ee8a856d37f36a9

Any same-version source change fails before compilation. Re-audit before updating this hash; do not automatically bless a dependency update.

The runner extracts actual overridden production function definitions by balancing braces after masking comments/string literals. Extraction does not rewrite their bodies; the separately verified build overlay does:

• GetBoolean, GetUint32, GetSize, GetStringRef
• DoUserAuthRequestPassword, DoUserAuthRequestPublicKey, DoUserAuthRequest
• SendUserAuthKeyboardRequest, GetAllowedAuth
• SendChannelData

Callback data structures, auth result constants and method masks are extracted from the installed public header. contract.c supplies small session/context models, name/algorithm lookup, crypto and packet-output doubles. Binary request fixtures execute the extracted parsers; ordered event traces assert callback, hashing/signature and response order, rather than inspecting source substrings.

The 35 baseline cases cover (with the stricter malformed-password contract):

• Ed25519 and ECDSA: signed authorization rejection (INVALID_PUBLICKEY, FAILURE, REJECTED, INVALID_USER, INVALID_AUTHTYPE) never hashes, verifies or calls the result callback.
• Both unsigned probe outcomes: no signature work/result callback; an accepted probe sends PK_OK but does not complete authentication.
• Bad signatures, good signatures, success-result veto, ignored failure-result callback return, and auth WOULD_BLOCK.
• Password success/failure, rejected password change, and rejection before the callback for a truncated new-password-length field. No password result callback.
• Disabled none, unknown methods/key algorithms and truncated signed framing.
• Direct keyboard-interactive dispatch invokes a registered non-NULL rejecting prompt callback, returns error and purges without preparing/building/sending a prompt. The actual library still writes the message-ID byte into its existing output buffer on this path; the test models that buffer and checks this detail.
• The actual advertised-method builder excludes keyboard despite the registered keyboard callback, because the allowed-types callback overrides the defaults.
• Actual SendChannelData copies the bounded consumed prefix before returning a positive count, both on send success and WS_WANT_WRITE. Wiping that caller prefix leaves the library copy intact. A blocked flush of earlier data returns a negative code without consuming new data.

A further 100 generated-parser cases test short/missing flags and lengths, truncated/oversized/UINT32_MAX password and replacement-password lengths, checked initial offsets and canaries, no callback on malformed fields, preserved username/service/method prefixes, and suffix wiping before response emission. They include success, invalid/backend/rejected outcomes, password changes, no callback, callback-modified credential pointers/lengths, and pending retry. WS_AUTH_PENDING deliberately preserves bytes; the project's synchronous callbacks do not use it. This is not an unconditional async secret-wipe promise.

Limits / ownership

This is a library parser/control-flow regression, not application callback integration coverage. Its rejecting keyboard callback models the parent's registration and return policy; it does not prove production registration, admission counters, awaiting-result state, principal promotion, or admin wiping. Those belong to the separate application unit suite.

Crypto helpers are instrumented doubles; algorithm name lookup is limited to fixture names. Packet construction/network send, hashing and session internals are modeled. This does not validate cryptographic correctness, encrypted packet decoding, real sockets, asynchronous re-entry, complete malformed-input safety, allocation failure, memory erasure throughout wolfSSH, or device behavior. The send test proves only the extracted copy/consumed control flow with successful packet preparation/bundling and the specified send outcomes—not the entire admin transmit loop or TLS/SSH buffer lifecycle.

All Phase9 hardware validation remains deferred to the combined phase.